Jon, List, Jon, I appreciated your long proposition form — or semantic-statement — of 5.525. It is worth reading carefully and critically. The point I am pressing is that all propositions (as Peirce had shown, and as I subsequently confirmed through mathematical rigor at the meta-propositional level) necessarily have subjects which propositions, structurally, can never account for as such subjects exist, insofar as they exist at all. What this shows is that one could know a quasi-infinite amount about a thing through propositions, and yet structural incompleteness still holds: the subject is never known. If you replace “subject” with “thing” you are not far from Kant, though Peirce himself may have preferred to resist that association. The simplest way of putting this is that things or subjects do exist — in themselves, or by-themselves-as-such, whatever the habitual or conjunctive human relation — but they cannot be known by finite or infinite inquiry. This is what the broader incompleteness demonstrates. One might have a trillion lines in a database about a single object and still not know what it is, as it is. That is a condition that will never change. It is a constant, and it holds for all propositions and all possible representation. No amount of time makes a difference to that incapacity. It is therefore a broader incompleteness, ontological rather than merely mathematical. The thing-in-itself must exist. All experience of possible things is indeed experience of things, but such experience is not what things are. It is human use of things, and this says nothing about the non-human status of those same things, which also exist both logically and chronologically. Peirce’s 5.525 is important, but it demands something his own logic cannot provide. In fact, it supports the thing-in-itself more strongly than it undermines it. My conclusion is that Peirce had something with 5.525 — the logical meta-propositional constant — but he misapplied it when deploying it against the thing-in-itself. A Kantian would instead take it as confirmation. I am not a Kantian, nor a Peircean; I am interested in what is true in either framework, and I try to carry that forward. JAS: Also, ‘how people understand the world they live in’ has no effect whatsoever on ‘what is reality’ because, by definition, the latter is as it is regardless of how anyone understands. I would emphasize here that the ding-an-sich is as it is, regardless of experience or understanding. That is the minimal price of admission to the principle. Finally, 5.525 gives us a subject — indeed every possible subject — which negates “time,”*** since it holds axiomatically as a mathematical and logical constant. It shows the impossibility of ever representing any subject, not only in propositions but in the most formal sense, as such subjects are. This is the constant tension between existence and human consubstantial experience of existence, present at the most basic logical level. *** — Peirce is right in the logical section in 5.525 but it is not a good proof against Kant, at all. Whatever his arguments elsewhere, using what amounts to a much more general incompleteness (which I have been using very much in favour of the existence of the ding-an-sich) makes no real sense. I would like to have more from him in terms of what he was thinking when he used that material in that way, because it's an instance of genius, and then nonsense (by his own standards). Dogma, rather — maybe just an incorrect line of argumentation rather than being too harsh.
When I say negates time, I mean it holds for all possible propositions and so no infinite inquiry is going to overturn that — thus, what the principle points to, so to speak, is not positivist knowledge of things, qua subjects, which cannot be had at all, really, (as they are in themselves), but a clear delimitation of that idea. That's the mathematical-logical outcome (I overdid it and I think you may have, too) of that statement. Now I know you'll disagree with me — which is fine — but there is so much contradication as far as I can tell that one has to account for it. Consider the depth of Peirce's system — and now consider that truth cannot be defined within systems — does this give no one pause for thought regarding maximal assumptions? With the ding-an-sich one points to fallibility and a kind of common sense (this cannot be whatever it is to me — regardless of whatever such a thing is). Said to be the Kantian price, yet the buy-in is basically free. With the "real", I need dynamic objects, and final interpretants, and so on and on and if these be subjects of propositions one has to seriously consider their status (especially as such is second or third order, being linguistic-categorical). Just some thoughts. ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Sunday, August 31, 2025 7:24 PM To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Propositions, Truth, and Experience (was Will and Belief) Jack, List: "The actual result of the Peircean principle regarding inquiry over time" cannot possibly be affirming the reality of an incognizable thing-in-itself because (a) "the Will to Learn" precludes sincere inquirers from ever assuming that there is no more to know about any given thing, and (b) no possible future experience could falsify their belief that there is more to know about it, which corresponds to their habit of continuing to investigate it. Also, "how people understand the world they live in" has no effect whatsoever on "what is 'reality'" because, by definition, the latter is as it is regardless of how anyone understands it. In fact, misunderstandings of reality manifest as habits of conduct that would, in the long run, be confounded by additional experience of reality itself. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Sat, Aug 30, 2025, 7:31 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jon, The ding-an-sich exists outside all formal systems. As a serious question, what if that is the real? The actual result of the Peircean principle regarding inquiry over time — that things, all things, as they exist, exist in themselves insofar as their existence is beyond knowing (as such actually are). That — realization — if accepted (and you're right about formal system limitation) is rather profound. It would change a lot of "things" regarding how people understand the world they live in. That in turn, has an immense change on what is "reality" and so on and on. You've written a post which again I'll read more into tomorrow, that was just my thought on the last paragraph. Best, Jack
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