Helmut, list
Your comment on the ‘epistemic cut’ – a concept long debated in philosophy, physics, etc is relevant to the discussion on Peirce’s 5.525.
I refer to the work done by Harald Atmanspacher [and others, such as Primas] on this issue, where the distinction is made. between the epistemic and the ontological descriptions of reality.
A simple question is:” Can nature be observed and described as it is in itself independent of those who observe and describe? In other words can a knowledge system fully know another knowledge system?
See ‘Ontic and Epistemic descriptions of Chaotic Systems’. H, Atmanspacher. Nov 2000Research Gate.net
Ontic states refer to all the properties of a physical system – without ‘any reference to epistemic knowledge or ignorance’. The “properties of the system are treated as intrinsic properties…and follows universal deterministic laws’. As a rule, ontic states are empirically inaccessible. Epistemic states describe our [usually non-exhaustive knowledge of the properties of a physical system…epistemic states are, at least in principle, empirically accessible”.[Ibid]
I can also compare the ontic state to the External Object [described by Peirce in 5.525 and 8.314,which is ‘as it is’ unaffected by our interaction with it’ vs the epistemic Dynamic Object, which is most certainly an object of our knowledge and, affected by our knowledge of it. [see 8.31 and ep2.278. ] where the Interpretant becomes a new Dynamic Object.
By the way, I think any reference to insisting that the External Object can be known by Agent A, and even, further, defined as the ‘Truth’ eventually, by ‘not stopping the path of inquiry ‘ and in an infinite future’ are irrelevant. Infinity means just that – there is no closure. My view of what Peirce was referring to in this section is epistemic knowledge or cognition and interactions[ which are carried out by cognizant entities [ human and other biological entities] to gather information about these objects…refers to the empirical reality gained by semiosic interactions with these Dynamic Objects…and expressed by humans via symbols [ which are limited systems] and by non-humans by indexical behaviour [ equally limited]… the ontological reality on the other hand is ‘the real is anything that is not affected by men’’ and their cognitions about it; 5.525
When Peirce writes that the ‘Ding an sich’ cannot neither be indicated nor found’ [5.525] and then ‘consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it’..I understand this to refer to human epistemic informational interactions. – to claim that, with long trying, we can eventually find out the Truth’ of this object is naïve. That is – epistemic informational tactics cannot be used with the Ding an sich’. But as to whether the Ding an sich ‘exists’ in itself – I’m not sure. My view is that all matter in our universe – since matter and mind are two inseparable correlates of the universe – operates within a semiosic process. There obviously need be no human consciousness or cognition involved. [4.551}. The question then becomes – is there matter in our universe that operates and will always operate, outside of human epistemic cognitive interactions>
Edwina
On Sep 3, 2025, at 3:12 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:
Jon, Jack, List,sorry that I write something without having fully understood your positions. Is what you are talking about the epistemic cut, and whether it is bridgeable by applying an infinity to one side of its? In this case, I would say that this way it is not bridgeable. Why should infinity of inquiry be able to bridge a gap, which exists not due to different quantity, but due to different quality?In chaos theory, a quantity difference can switch to quality difference, but in a common coordinate system. I think, aboutness is about two separated-by-nature coordinate systems, one ontological, and one representative.Best, Helmut_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _3. September 2025 um 19:20"Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]>wrote:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.Jack, List:JRKC: 5.525 demonstrates that when words migrate to predicates and all which can be "said" of a subject is said there remains a subject, the truth of which, cannot be what has been said of it--the subject is not what is given in the propositionThat is not what CP 5.525 (c. 1905) demonstrates at all. Again, Peirce simply states the logical principle that every proposition has at least one subject that must be indicated or found, not merely described using words. An index or precept identifies an individual object, and words attribute general concepts to it by means of syntax. If that object really conforms to those concepts accordingly, then the proposition is true--it represents the object as it really is.JRKC: Accordingly, I find your two propositions confuse agreement on facts with truth of the subject as it really is.There is no such thing as "truth of the subject," only truth of propositions about a subject. In other words, what you call "agreement on facts" is the only kind of truth there is. Remember, "A fact is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). It is a fact that the grass in my yard is (mostly) green today, i.e., my grass really is green. It is a fact that Peirce died in 1914, i.e., Peirce really did die that year. Hence, these are both true propositions that represent things as they really are--exactly what you requested.JRKC: Yet equivocation with selective, functionally adequate propositions with the subject’s reality is a categorical error. They tell us something about the subject, but they are never identical with what the subject really is. This is obvious.It is not equivocation nor a category error, it is how cognition works. It is indeed obvious that propositions are not identical with their objects, and no one is claiming otherwise--that would be a category error. We prescind facts from the "one individual, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality" (ibid.); and we represent them in true propositions, correctly attributing general concepts (signified by words) to individual objects (denoted by indices or precepts) in accordance with logical relations (embodied by syntax). A complete representation would require infinitely many such propositions, i.e., the beliefs of an infinite community after infinite investigation and thus infinite experience.JRKC: Thus, while such propositions may be “valid-true” in the pragmatic sense (our habits are not confounded by them), they do not achieve the stronger claim: representing the subject as it really is (which was the test one had to pass here). That’s precisely the barrier the model-theoretic result marks out.Any proposition expressing a belief whose corresponding habits of conduct would never be confounded by any possible future experience is true (full stop), i.e., it represents its subject as it really is. The model-theoretic result has no bearing whatsoever on whether a given proposition does this; it only demonstrates that in most cases, it cannot be proved true as a theorem within a formal system. Truth and provability are not synonymous.JRKC: I just wanted to point out that you didn't pass the test ... Peirce's logical conclusion has to be overturned for you to pass itOn the contrary, I passed it with flying colors, and you continue to exhibit a fundamental misunderstanding of Peirce's logical principle as stated in CP 5.525. It is patently absurd to ascribe blatant self-contradiction to him by interpreting it as somehow confirming an incognizable thing-in-itself, when he explicitly employs it for directly refuting that notion. Here is more detailed statement of what he is actually highlighting there.CSP: Every subject of a proposition, unless it is either an Index (like the environment of the interlocutors, or something attracting attention in that environment, as the pointing finger of the speaker) or a Subindex (like a proper name, personal pronoun, or demonstrative) must be a Precept, or Symbol, not only describing to the Interpreter what is to be done, by him or others or both, in order to obtain an Index of an individual (whether a unit or a single set of units) of which the proposition is represented as meant to be true, but also assigning a designation to that individual, or, if it is a set, to each single unit of the set. (CP 2.330, EP 2:286, 1903)Again, we do not need to represent something completely in order to represent it as it really is; we just need an index or precept to denote it, in addition to words that accurately describe it. I also still recommend carefully reading EP 2:168 (1903)--the whole page--and this time, I have attached an image of it, in case you do not have access to it.Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran ChristianOn Wed, Sep 3, 2025 at 6:23 AM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote:Jon, Jerry, Mike, list
JAS:You requested one example of a true proposition which represents things as they really are. That very sentence of mine is one example of a true proposition which represents things as they really are--you really made that specific request. Other obvious examples include "the grass in my yard is (mostly) green today" and "Charles Sanders Peirce died in 1914." Again, every true proposition represents things as they really are--that is the very definition of a true proposition. Why did you think that complying with your request would be at all difficult, let alone "close to impossible"? As I said before, most of our beliefs can be expressed as true propositions, because otherwise our corresponding habits of conduct would be constantly confounded by experience.
I asked because 5.525 demonstrates that when words migrate to predicates and all which can be "said" of a subject is said there remains a subject, the truth of which, cannot be what has been said of it — the subject is not what is given in the proposition (and that's why the structural incompleteness is highly relevant, especially if we're discussing 5.525 where such is organically derived).Accordingly, I find your two propositions confuse agreement on facts with truth of the subject as it really is. Saying “Peirce died in 1914” or “the grass is green today” is certainly valid within our practices: these statements fit records, habits of use, and expectations. But that is not the same as representing the subject as it really is — you are not giving the truth of either subject — and that is what I expect cannot be done (in propositions), following Peirce's own logic, carefully explicated, in 5.525. The bar for that claim (this is the truth of the subject: as it "really" is) is much higher and thus why I cannot think of a propostion which meets that truth-standard.Why? Because what is predicated is always partial and conventional. “Green” is one, categorically linguistic, aspect of grass, but even ignoring the categorical linguistic (I mean categorial error/conflation...), such as it is ignores infinitely many other aspects of what "grass" is or would be. And, even then, qua 5.525, there would remain whatever "grass" is which could not be the finite nor infinite descriptions/definitions of such (minimally in propositions).Peirce “died in 1914” is likewise: may be said to capture a historical record about Peirce, but it is not the truth of Peirce (as subject). Only God knows how you could go about that in a written/spoken record. Yet equivocation with selective, functionally adequate propositions with the subject’s reality is a categorical error. They tell us something about the subject, but they are never identical with what the subject really is. This is obvious.Thus, while such propositions may be “valid-true” in the pragmatic sense (our habits are not confounded by them), they do not achieve the stronger claim: representing the subject as it really is (which was the test one had to pass here). That’s precisely the barrier the model-theoretic result marks out.Anyway, you have your own distinct framework, Mike has another interesting way of demonstrating how Peirce would respond to the result Peirce himself anticipates, and then Jerry has made an interesting set of remarks which I have to read more closely as I think it's highly interesting in the most technical respect of what "interesting" conveys. So I'll spend most of the day reading through other people's comments as I think there's lots there to consider. I just wanted to point out that you didn't pass the test (but that I do not understand how you could pass it, so it's not a dig or anything personal {Peirce's logical conclusion has to be overturned for you to pass it — and it won't be}).Best,Jack
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] .
► <a href="">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to
https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
