Jack, List: I am glad that we agree about every proposition being both indexical and symbolic--I would add iconic, but you have not said whether you agree with that--as well as LLMs not properly being characterized as having "intelligence."
Your link to a paper about the latter from a Peircean standpoint did not work for me until I used the Wayback Machine ( https://web.archive.org/web/20250125053357/https://signosfilosoficos.izt.uam.mx/index.php/SF/article/download/853/683/), and it turns out that the full text is in Spanish. However, I came across another relevant piece that is brief, online, and in English--"LLMs through Saussurean and Peircean Lenses" ( https://medium.com/higher-neurons/llms-through-saussurean-and-peircean-lenses-e64d340d1d10). In summary, "Saussure illuminates the systematic interplay among linguistic signs, thereby explaining how a disembodied intelligence could deftly manipulate symbols in the absence of an external world. Peirce, by contrast, provides the philosophical scaffolding for understanding how embodied agents--like human beings--anchor those symbolic manipulations in tangible perception and experience." On the other hand, we still seem to disagree about the relationship between a true proposition and reality. I continue to suspect that this is a mere symptom of a more fundamental difference at a deeper level, namely, nominalism vs. scholastic realism. JRKC: Your proposition doesn't meet the criteria I stipulated for a "true proposition" wherein the subject proposed/represented would be precisely, within the propositional structure, what said subject, if extant, in any respect, is beyond that structure. Again, you did not stipulate any such criteria when you first presented your "test"; you simply said, "I would ask only that you present one example of a true proposition which represents things as they really are." Even so, my examples *do *meet your newly prescribed criteria because they represent *real facts*. "What we call a 'fact' is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself" (EP 2:304, 1901). In other words, the structure of a proposition *matches *the structure of reality, which helps explain why the latter is intelligible in the first place. "The third element of the phenomenon is that we perceive it to be intelligible, that is, to be subject to law, or capable of being represented by a general sign or Symbol" (CP 8.268, 1903). "The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of the knowledge of such reality" (CP 6.341, 1907). JRKC: I.e., it is not a test that can be passed--it refers to the ontic reality rather than the agreed-upon meaning such as "grass is green"--yes, I can understand you, and it will not "confound experience", but such is not the truth of "grass" or "green". Meaning is "agreed-upon" only in the sense that any *particular *human language is largely a matter of conventions. "My grass is green today" in English, "Mein Gras ist grün heute" in German, and "Mi césped está verde hoy" in Spanish all express the *very same* proposition. "Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of, it is one and the same representamen" (EP 2:203, 1903). Each is a *token *of a different *type*, but an *instance *of the same *sign*--a proposition that is *true* independent of any individual human formulation of it, and even if no one ever said it or thought it at all, because it is determined by the "ontic reality" that my grass *is *green today. Moreover, the proposition's *ultimate *meaning in accordance with pragmaticism is that anyone who *believes *it has corresponding habits of conduct, which *would *never be confounded by any *possible* future experience; hence, an infinite community after infinite investigation, and thus infinite experience, would affirm it. If that is not *truth*, then what is? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Sep 8, 2025 at 5:05 AM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Gary, List, > > Jon, there's a good bit there. Yes, predication is indexical-symbolic (has > to be). Consider that example of a true proposition which you gave to me — > "you really did ask for that" (a proposition which is almost entirely > indexical: that is, you indexed my previous statement, as per > recursion/embedding, as if to point to it (through obvious use of deictic > signifiers qua predication). > > Your proposition doesn't meet the criteria I stipulated for a "true > proposition" wherein the subject proposed/represented would be precisely, > within the propositional structure, what said subject, if extant, in any > respect, is beyond that structure. I.e., it is not a test that can be > passed —it refers to the ontic reality rather than the agreed-upon meaning > such as "grass is green" —yes, I can understand you, and it will not > "confound experience", but such is not the truth of "grass" or "green". The > threshold for the "test" is set by an interpretation, valid, my analysis > shows, of Peirce's own conclusion in 5.525. At any rate, your position was > later clarified as facts of the propositional kind, though you note the > same or similar nuance, though differently, as being the only kind of truth > there is (or at least the only kind within that category). We don't agree > there but that clearly demarcates why you think you've passed and why I > disagree. We are arguing at two different categorical levels — which is > fine. > > Anyway, leaving the above aside, for I am working on it within a new (more > nuanced) proof-structure (with more Peircean references*), I'd like to > share the below abstract with respect to LLM/AI*: > > Abstract: Charles S. Peirce was interested on logical machines developed > in the late 19th century and discussed whether they could develop the > authentic semiotic processes indispensable for deductive reasoning. Is it > possible for machines to have a genuine capacity to carry out inferences? > In this paper, Peirce's arguments are analyzed, who argued that deduction, > in general, cannot be reduced to mechanical factors. To this end, reference > will be made to the idea of theorematic reasoning, which is fundamental for > mathematical proofs and goes beyond mechanical procedures. The idea of > semiosis in Peirce will also be explored, which seems to extend to the > organic realm, but not to the artificial inorganic world of machines. > Finally, some conclusions will be drawn about Artificial Intelligence from > Peirce’s semiotic perspective. > https://www.academia.edu/oa/4403458984 > Artificial Intelligence Through Peirce's Lens > In short, I agree. That which is functional artifice, > algorithmic/transform, is not intelligence. Nor do I think it ever will be. > Not merely for the reasons you cite but for kinds of reasons and the > Peircean lens offers but a few. > > Best, > Jack > >
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