List: Once more, I have changed the subject line so that this post and the one to which it is a response are in a different thread, where they belong--we are no longer discussing "Sign Tokens and Sign Types." Even so, I *did *touch on "the reality of novelty in the universe" in my post <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00064.html> yesterday in that thread--it is right there in the quotation from it that is included below, as well as in the immediately preceding sentence.
JAS: *Which* of the infinite potentialities within that continuum are actualized is where chance/spontaneity plays a role (tychism). Recognizing that nothing can be actual without first being possible is *not *embracing necessitarianism/determinism. On the contrary, actualizing something that is *not *possible is, quite literally, *impossible* in any coherent metaphysical system. I am also not referring to Platonic forms that "exist" in an immaterial realm, I am talking about Aristotelian potentiality; after all, Peirce describes himself as "an Aristotelian of the scholastic wing, approaching Scotism, but going much further in the direction of scholastic realism" (CP 5.77n, EP 2:180, 1903). In his 1898 blackboard lecture, he does talk about "Platonic worlds," but the very first time that he uses the term, he explicitly distinguishes what he has in mind from Plato's original conception. CSP: From this point of view we must suppose that the existing universe, with all its arbitrary 2ns, is an offshoot from, or an arbitrary determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world; not that our superior logic has enabled us to reach up to a world of forms to which the real universe, with its feebler logic, was inadequate. (CP 6.192) It is not that there are two *distinct *worlds, that of existing things and that of ideas/forms, as Plato himself maintained. It is that our world of existing things *emerges *from a world of ideas/forms, which is *itself *a product of evolution. CSP: The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the *existing universe*, but rather a process by which the very Platonic forms themselves have become or are becoming developed. (6.194) The evolution of forms begins or, at any rate, has for an early stage of it, a vague potentiality; and that either is or is followed by a continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great for the individual dimensions to be distinct. It must be by a contraction of the vagueness of that potentiality of everything in general, but of nothing in particular, that the world of forms comes about. (6.196) In short, if we are going to regard the universe as a result of evolution at all, we must think that not merely the existing universe, that locus in the cosmos to which our reactions are limited, but the whole Platonic world, which in itself is equally real, is evolutionary in its origin, too. (6.200) At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are, therefore, to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one another; until finally out of one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in which we happen to be. (6.208) The original vast continuum of *vague *potentiality (3ns) contracts into a collection of *individual *possibilities that together constitute a Platonic world (1ns), from which our universe of *existence *is actualized (2ns). Peirce even affirms that there are *multiple *such Platonic worlds--different combinations of mutually consistent possibilities that are (or were) *capable *of actualization--but as far as I know, he never states or implies that there are other *existing *universes that *have been* actualized. After all, if they are not *reacting *with our own universe, then they do not exist *for us*. Invoking pragmaticism, they can make no difference whatsoever in our beliefs and corresponding habits of conduct. That raises the question of why *this *universe exists and not another, which again is where I see 1ns as chance/spontaneity coming into play--contributing to *which *possibilities are actualized. Novelty "emerges" when a previously unactualized possibility is actualized for the very first time--again, spontaneity (1ns) is followed by reaction (2ns) and then habit-taking (3ns). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Nov 15, 2025 at 11:22 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Robert, Ulysses, JAS, List > > I did not receive either Robert’s or Ulysses’ posts. They came attached > to this post from JAS. > > I note that JAS did not include my name in his response, and so, I am > assuming that he does not want to take up the issue I have been posting > about - namely, the reality of novelty in the universe. > > I have provided enough quotations and examples - But, the FACTS are, that > Peirce includes the category of Firstness in his universe, and this means > that both the emergence of novelty and its transformation into habit > within Thirdness, is clearly outlined in his various examination of > diversity and growth. > > Plus, his rejection of what he called ’necessitarianism’ and a priori > determinism, means that it is quite incorrect to declare, as JAS has done, > that > > After all, nothing can become *actual* without first being a > *real*possibility, > i.e., a potentiality. This is consistent with my longstanding metaphysical > hypothesis that the constitution of being is an inexhaustible continuum > (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of which are actualized > (2ns), and that the sequence of events in each case of the latter is > spontaneity (1ns) followed by reaction (2ns) and then habit-taking (3ns). > > The above outline, in my view, rejects Peirce’s outline of the emergence > of novel instances. It is incorrect, I suggest, to define actuality as > dependent on a Firstness operating as ‘indefinite possibilities', which > defines this category as some kind of Well-of-Platonic Forms [or God’s > Will] - and we are back to a form of necessitarianism and determinism. . > This puts the universe into some kind of predetermined identity - where > these ‘Forms’ or possibilities have some kind of reality. And where there > is no possibility of actual total novelty. This ignores Peirce’s clear > definition of Firstness as ‘chance, freedom, ..and novelty. Complete > novelty with no past defining them as ‘possibility’ and no clear path > ‘forward’ so to speak. > > Peirce outlines how these novel deviations can become habits - and points > out that habits do emerge, do grow. As I said - his tychasm and agapsm > clearly show these actions. And we cannot ignore the increasing complexity > of the universe. > > To posit that speciation and complexity is dependent on a pre-existent > ‘well of possibilities’ requires that one explain how and why such an > ‘infinite’ well came into being..and why novelty is rejected. After all- if > one posits such an infinite realm of possibilities, then, this rejects > self-organized novelty within the universe, and *puts us back onto the > 18th-19th pre-darwinian mindset of ‘It’s God’s Determination. * It’s the > same mindset - and too ambiguous to analyse. > > As for human or cognitive novelty and the emergence of for example, novel > technological habits, there can be, I think, no question that these exist > - and again, are not located in some pre-existent ‘realm of infinite > possibilities. Whether it be the wheel or the compass or the vaccine - the > ’shuffling’ of existent material entities and their rearrangement into a > new entity [ the wheel, the spectacle, the engine,, the vaccine]..are novel > entities with utterly new habits-of-formation. > > Therefore, again, I agree with Peirce that novelty and emergence of > totally new entities andha bits is a reality - > > Edwina >
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