JAS, List Again, I am assuming, perhaps incorrectly, that you are responding to my post, although, again, you refrain from using my name. If you are not referring to my comments - then - my deep apologies. But since, your comments DO deal with the issues which I have brought up - then, I will reply.
I will say, again, that these are two opposing outlines of the universe - that of JAS is, I would suggest, filiated with Idealism, with its original determinism of a primordial Mind over Matter and the one I suggest is Peirce’s objective idealism, where Mind and Matter coevolve and neither is primordial. Because Peirce does not himself use the term ‘random’ and instead, uses the terms of ‘freedom or spontaneity’ - as well as fortuitous distribution ... “For it is of the nature of Chance to be First and that which is First is Chance,; and fortuitous distribution that is, utter irregularity, is he only thing which it is legitimate to explain by the absence of any reason to the contrary” [7.521]...does not preclude my using ‘random' as a synonym for these terms, for they all mean ‘“made, done, happening without method or conscious decision’. ; ’something that is done by chance’, undetermined action'. I disagree that Thirdness is a synonym for an ‘inexhaustible continuum of possibilities'. And see no evidence in Peirce that “every actual individual; must first be a potential individual of of a general kind”... which, again, seems to me, quite clear to be an outline of idealism - and Plato’s Ideal Forms. The ‘original generality’, aka ’the womb of indeterminacy” [1.412] is not in my understanding of Peirce, akin to the actual habits, the laws, the rules, of Thirdness. To equate this tendency to simply form habits, [3ns] with the actual habits themselves, is, I suggest a profound idealistic error. That is, there is”a universal tendency of all things toward generalization and habit-taking”. [7.515] . But, ‘plasticity and evolution’ remain - which means - new novel habits. That is - the law’ “can evolve or develop itself” [7.515]. But again, ALL three universal categories are foundational principles, with none primary or privileged - ie - I reject not only that Thirdness rules’ but that one can understand that Thirdness functions as some form of actual habits. . As Peirce pointed out, Hegel’s flaw with regard to the Categories was that he “does not look upon as Categories at all, or at least he does not call them so, but as three stages of thinking” [6.38]. Peirce points out the vital reality of ’spontaneity’ in his acknowledgment of “this marvellous and infinite diversity and manifoldness of things’ [1.160]..and his ‘doctrine of fallibilism’ [1.163] where [1.175] the laws grow, ie “The infallibilist naturally thinks that everything always was substantially as it is now” Laws at any rate being absolute could not grow. They always were, or, they sprang instantaneously into being by a sudden fiat like the drill of a company of soldiers. This makes the laws of nature absolutely blind and inexplicable. This absolutely blocks the road of inquiry. The fallibilist won’t do this. He asks may these forces of nature not be somehow amenable to reason ?May they not have naturally grown up?… And in Peirce’s examination of absolute chance [6.47—], he rejects that “‘all the arbitrary specifications of the universe were introduced in one dose, in the beginning, if there was a beginning, and that variety and complication of nature has always been just as much as it is now, But I, for my part, think that the diversification, the specification, has been continually taking place”. [6.57]..By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the universe, acting always and everywhere though restrained within narrow bounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures from law continually, and great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all the variety and diversity of teh universe” [6.59]…and he rejects the ‘mechanical law’ which ’shoves this spontaneity “back to the beginning of time”. That is, as I’ve argued before- these are two opposite interpretations of the Peircean analysis of evolution and development. They are obviously incompatible. I don’t think there’s much more to say - but - after all- an academic will always find a reason to discuss an issue! Edwina > On Nov 22, 2025, at 9:42 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > List: > > For the third time, I am responding in this thread to a post that belongs > here, not in another thread about a different topic. With respect to "Sign > Tokens and Sign Types," I will simply point out again that, as quoted below, > Peirce states plainly that anything "which should have a unique embodiment, > incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen" (CP 5.138, EP 2:203, > 1903)--if any such strictly singular thing exists at all, it is impossible > for it to be a sign. > > With respect to the emergence of novelty, I am not aware of any text where > Peirce uses the word "random" when discussing tychism as "the doctrine that > absolute chance is a factor of the universe" (CP 6.201, 1898). Instead, he > states, "Thus, when I speak of chance, I only employ a mathematical term to > express with accuracy the characteristics of freedom or spontaneity" (ibid.). > Chance, freedom, and spontaneity are not synonymous with randomness in this > context, and no one is disputing that they are real. On the contrary, as I > have acknowledged previously, the logic of actualization begins with > spontaneity (1ns), which is followed by reaction (2ns) and then habit-taking > (3ns). However, I also maintain that this occurs within the constitution of > being, which is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities > (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). Every actual individual must first > be a potential individual of a general kind, even if it is the very first of > that kind to be actualized, and thus a novelty within our universe of > existence. > > This primordiality of 3ns as potentiality, generality, and continuity is not > my suggestion, it is Peirce's conception as explicitly and repeatedly > asserted in his 1898 blackboard lecture. "Let the clean blackboard be a sort > of diagram of the original vague potentiality ... We see the original > generality like the ovum of the universe ... This habit is a generalizing > tendency, and as such a generalization, and as such a general, and as such a > continuum or continuity. It must have its origin in the original continuity > which is inherent in potentiality. Continuity, as generality, is inherent in > potentiality, which is essentially general. ... The original potentiality is > essentially continuous, or general" (CP 6.203-5; bold added). In short, for > anything whatsoever that comes into existence and then persists, that habit > "must have its origin in the original continuity which is inherent in > potentiality." This obviously does not entail determinism or > necessitarianism, which Peirce vigorously rejects, and > self-generation/self-organization is not the only viable alternative. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Fri, Nov 21, 2025 at 8:25 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> JAS, List" >> >> JAS wrote that >> >> What I continue to question, especially in light of (CP 5.138, EP 2:203, >> 1903) and the absence of a concrete example, is whether there are any such >> actual signs. >> >> This assertion, as I understand it, denies that novelty can emerge within >> the operations of semiosis [ as Signs] – solely within the actual world and >> due to causes only within the actual world ie – not linked to any primal >> realm of Thirdness. It denies that the first step of this novel entity is, >> itself, a Sign [ie a triad made up of O-R-I see definitions of the Sign in >> Marty’s 76 definitions] ] even though its mediative Correlate, the >> Representamen is not, at this stage, functioning as a general, and thus, not >> capable of replication. But is instead, as Peirce wrote: >> >> “A representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of >> repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact >> represented." 5.138.. >> >> By this I understand that the Representam in these cases would certainly >> mediate -as part of that triad - ensuring the actuality of the entity as a >> Sign - but would not have the capacity as a general, to enable replication. >> It is still a triad and still a Sign, [noting that of the ten classes of >> signs, four do not involve 3ns]. This then leads to – how does novelty and >> replication of this novelty emerge? >> >> I should note that numerous actual biological examples of novelty and >> speciation in the biological realm have been provided to the list.And >> numerous actual societal examples of cognitive novelty have been provided. >> In other words- novelty and deviation and diversification of matter and mind >> are realities. The question then moves to – are these pre-ordained, so to >> speak or self-organized? >> >> As Peirce pointed out: “the tychastic development of thought, then, will >> consist in slight departures from habitual ideas in different directions >> indifferently, quite purposeless and quite unconstrained whether by outward >> circumstances or by force of logic”, these new departures being followed by >> unforeseen results which end to fix some of them as habits more than others” >> 6.307 >> >> My comment is that Peirce notes that these departures are random and not >> linked to existent logic [ie, that a priori Thirdness potentiality suggested >> by JAS] >> >> Peirce also writes about “a principle of generalization, or tendency to form >> habits, which I hold has produced all regularities”. [6.63] As he outlines >> in 6.266, ‘when some atoms of the protoplasm have become partially >> emancipated from law what happens to them?” He answers with ‘the tendency to >> take habits’, which means that they can form new habits of association, ie, >> within that representamen, to enable ‘diversification’.. >> >> And Robert Marty has provided his lattice of five paths, which clearly shows >> how a ‘first Sign’, eg a qualisign or sinsign, can emerge, whose >> representamen of mediation is not within the generalities of 3ns and thus, >> cannot enable replication, but, which gradually adds information which it >> transforms to generals [habits] and thus, in the future enables replication >> of that type to form a new species or new invention. >> >> I think these examples show that for Peirce, novelty is a reality within the >> actual semiosic operations of the universe and as such, is self-organized >> with ‘no purpose or logic other than actualization. >> >> Edwina >> > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> > . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, > then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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