Helmut I don’t understand how you relate lychastic evolution to metaphysics! Check out the meaning of tychasm 6.302..
And in physics,chemistry.. - where evolution and adaptation does function..you will find that the habits of organization [ 3ns] have become fixed with the result that physical forms rarely if ever change - ie- the format of electron and neutron and chemical forms rarely if ever mutate to form a nw chemical! The reason for this is obvious- to prevent entropic dissipation of energy. If the universe’s base was made up of constantly changing patterns of organization [ 3ns] then, the within this chaos the more complex forms of matter, which preserve energy more strongly than the less complex - would never emerge. But in the biological realm, the flexibility of habit is obvious - and new forms/habits of organization do emerge without prior precedent..but..are operative within the more stable laws of physics and chemistry. These serve the purpose of strengthening the preservation of energy in eh universe. Edwina > On Dec 8, 2025, at 12:24 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > Edwina, List, > > what did you mean by "chance deviations"? I have not read the respective > texts by Peirce about tychism, I guess tychism claims, that certain, not all, > parts of metaphysics are due to evolution. I cannot see, how e.g. the laws of > logic might be due to evolutional change, because they are more or less > self-corrobating, that is "tautological" (as I wrote) in a broader sense, so > I guess, tychism sees not them, but natural laws and constants due to > evolutionary change. Anyway- if metaphysics is stripped of some before > reliable-seeming aspects, and laws and constants are no longer regarded for > laws and constants, but for parameters due to evolutional change, this makes > any philosophy more complicated, because, the more changing parameters you > have, the more chaotical gets the system of thought, and the more futile it > seems to apply a calculation or estimation. Ok, one might say, that laws and > constants change very slowly, so it is ok to regard them for being constant, > but still there is a psychological aspect of somehow hovering futility of > truth-inquiry. I guess, this psychological aspect is the reason for my > reluctance against tychism. And the fact, that nobody ever has observed a > change of e.g. light velocity, gravitation, electron resting mass, the number > Pi, things like that. This is where my suspicion comes from, that tychism is > an unjustified abduction from values that do change to all values in general. > I admit, that I feel kind of sick from similar unjustified abductions, from > Nietzsche (against all values) to nowadays rightwing libertarianism reminding > me of Stirnerian anarcho-egocentrism. So I am quite sensitive about this > topic, and, though very muchly treasuring Peirce, am not refraining from > suspecting, that in this singular case (of tychism) he was wrong. > > Best, Helmut > 6. Dezember 2025 um 17:51 > "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]> > wrote: > Helmut, list > > The problem with ‘infinite inquiry’ and the concept of ’truth’ is that the > former is..infinite..and the latter is…finite…These are two different worlds, > so to speak. The infinite is purely intellectual [ pure Thirdness] a utopian > cloud which will always find more angels on a pinhead, , and the finite > includes all three categories - and particularly Secondness - which focuses > on ‘hic et nunc’ realities. . > > After all- if you want to find out the truth of a virus- then, the inquiry > should be finite, because the truth of that virus is also finite. It is THAT > virus and made up of THIS and THAT…etc. > > And I think one has to be careful with the concept of ’truth’. It doesn’t > mean some kind of a priori Form that we lesser mortals struggle for centuries > to uncover. And again - if we declare that the search for truth is’infinite’ > then, by definition, such a search is futile. > > Truth is a posteriori - that is, the identity of an entity [let’s say a new > form of insect] is formed with the emergence of this entity..and its ’truth’ > or operative nature, is examined within its realities. That’s pragmatism. > > I don’t see how accepting tychism as an active force in evolution and > adaptation, ie, accepting chance deviations, ‘blocks the way of inquiry’. To > assert that, suggests that you believe that Truth is a priori and that we > cannot accept anything due to chance. But- After all- according to Peirce [ > and of course, modern science], such chance deviations [ without any hint or > connection to ’the possible or potential']..are the basis of evolution. > > Edwina > > On Dec 6, 2025, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > Begin forwarded message: > > From: [email protected] > Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Truth and Reality (was Sign Tokens and Sign Types) > Date: December 5, 2025 at 9:05:25 PM EST > To: [email protected], [email protected] > Cc: [email protected] > Reply-To: [email protected],[email protected] > > Ben, List, > > I don´t think, that quantity and quality compete with each other easily. The > number of questions asked is a quantity, that can not be reckoned against the > capacity for answering them, because this capacity is not the sum of the > respective capacities regarding each single question. This is so, because > capacity to answer questions is only a little dependent on knowledge about > the topics about which the questions are asked, and a lot more dependent on > general ability of logical thinking. Which is a quality. I don´t see, that in > all cases infinite inquiry would approach truth. What kind of truth anyway? > Truth about the past is dependent on complete and reliable documentation, > like a police investigation based on evidence. This is not given. Truth about > the present depends on stable, unchanging parameters like laws and constants, > to be gained knowledge of, because the process of gaining knowledge takes > time, and if parameters meanwhile are changing, you again have the said > problem of incomplete documentation (of what parameters had been like > before). That is why I think, that belief in tychism blocks the way of > inquiry, by exposing the pursue of truth as futile. In this case you only > have the unchanging, quasi-tautological laws of pure logic for reference, but > can´t apply them for anything. Not helpful. so I think, because I hope so, > that tychism is a not-justified abduction from observed worldly changes. > Best, Helmut > 5. Dezember 2025 um 14:29 > "Benjamin Udell" <[email protected]> > wrote: > Jon, list, > Peirce used the word "indefinite" as much closer, in signification, to > "vague" than to "infinite". It seems convenient to call indefinitely long > times or distances infinite because of some part-way cognateness between the > words, and because times or distances may seem infinite to us lowly mortals, > and because Ancient Greek _apeiros_ seems to have been used in both senses > "indefinite" and "infinite", and because, if there are any inquiries that > seem interminable, still it seems quite plausible that intelligent beings > will bag their answers after infinite time. > > In F.R.L. (1899) http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/frl_99.htm , Peirce > said that Auguste Comte said that we earthlings never would be able to > discover the chemical composition of the stars, and that, very soon > afterward, the spectroscope was invented ("discovered," quoth Peirce, very > decidedly, I suspect) which soon enough revealed the chemical composition of > the stars. Peirce usually thought in terms of a definite increase of > knowledge after some actually elapsed definite time, given in advance a > prospect of an indefinite amount of time to play with in the first place. To > say guarantee the final opinion after infinite time seems like unneeded > cheating, anyway confusing to people new to Peirce. Interestingly more > precise would be to say what kind of question _would_ require an infinite > time. The "full meaning" or full final interpretant of one's spouse? People > mention the halting problem as maybe solvable (even deductively) with > infinite time. The difference remains infinite between (A) finite, soever > indefinite and soever prolonged or extended but still finite, and (B) > infinite. > > From Peirce 1885 unpublished till _Collected Papers_, "An American Plato" - > Review: Josiah Royce > CP 8.43, also in Writings 6. Note that Peirce took a somewhat cosmic view > even as he discussed "questions asked," not questions _askable_ (expectably > or imaginably or whatever). > > BEGIN QUOTE > The problem whether a given question will ever get answered or not is not so > simple; the number of questions asked is constantly increasing, and the > capacity for answering them is also on the increase. If the rate of the > latter increase is greater than that of the [former] the probability is unity > that any given question will be answered; otherwise the probability is zero. > END QUOTE. > > Peirce was discussing definite and finite amounts of time of actual > discovery, and an indefinite amount of time in which to discover. Peirce > didn't promise that which Quine and others later wanted, an observable normal > rate of progress in inquiries. It's a question of contingent mental > evolution, not of partly conditional but still pre-programmed vegetable > growth. Of course you know all that. But the involvement of vague, > indefinite future dates of discovery doesn't morph by itself into the > involvement of infinities of inquiry. Sorry, I'm repeating myself, I guess > it's time for the old man to take a nap. > > Thanks for the Peirce quote that you found, it's exactly the passage that I > was thinking of. > > It's interesting that Peirce, as you point out, did assert that there truth > in mathematics, even though he seemed reluctant to go all-in on mathematics > harboring the real. His usual definitions of truth and the real lock the two > ideas together. Well, the ideas are regulative, not speculative, but one > suspects that Peirce would welcome a stronger argument for the real in > mathematics. (It would be terminologically easier if we called the real > numbers singulions and the complex numbers binions. Maybe not easier, what > would we call the imaginary numbers?) > > Best, Ben > > On 12/3/2025 5:58 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Ben, List: > > I changed the subject line to match the topics that your post addresses. > > BU: I think Peirce seldom if ever wrote about the result of "infinite" > inquiry. He said that inquiry pushed far enough or for long enough will reach > the truth - sooner or later - but still inevitably. > > We are using different terms but seem to be saying essentially the same > thing. The pragmaticistic definition of truth as what an infinite community > *would* affirm after infinite investigation is derived from Peirce's > well-known statement, "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to > by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object > represented in this opinion is the real" (CP 5.407, EP 1:139, 1878). In my > own words, truth is the final interpretant of every sign whose dynamical > object is a reality. Accordingly, what I am discussing is a real but > potential or ideal infinity, not an actual infinity; again, a regulative > principle and an intellectual hope--what Peirce sometimes calls a "would-be." > He says so himself in the subsequent paragraph. > > CSP: Our perversity and that of others may indefinitely postpone the > settlement of opinion; it might even conceivably cause an arbitrary > proposition to be universally accepted as long as the human race should last. > Yet even that would not change the nature of the belief, which alone could be > the result of investigation carried sufficiently far; and if, after the > extinction of our race, another should arise with faculties and disposition > for investigation, that true opinion must be the one which they *would > ultimately* come to. "Truth crushed to earth shall rise again," and the > opinion which *would finally* result from investigation does not depend on > how anybody may actually think. (CP 5.408, EP 1:139, 1878; bold added) > > Moreover, in his very next published article, he refers to "an *unlimited* > community" and "a hope, or calm and cheerful wish, that the community may > last *beyond any assignable date*," thus facilitating "the *unlimited > *continuance of intellectual activity" (CP 2.654-5, EP 1:150, 1878; bold > added). His further definitions of truth after the turn of the century > reflect his even stronger embrace of scholastic realism, as well as his > development of semeiotic. "Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement > with the *ideal limit* towards which *endless investigation would tend* to > bring scientific belief" (CP 5.565, 1902; bold added). "Now thought is of the > nature of a sign. In that case, then, if we can find out the right method of > thinking and can follow it out,--the right method of transforming > signs,--then truth can be nothing more nor less than the last result to which > the following out of this method *would ultimately* carry us" (CP 5.553, EP > 2:380, 1906; old added). > > BU: As I recall, Peirce had doubts about the reality of things in > mathematics, but he thought that some of those things imposed themselves on > the mind with a forcefulness very like that of the real. > > These might be the remarks that you have in mind. > > CSP: The pure mathematician deals exclusively with hypotheses. Whether or not > there is any corresponding real thing, he does not care. His hypotheses are > creatures of his own imagination; but he discovers in them relations which > surprise him sometimes. A metaphysician may hold that this very forcing upon > the mathematician's acceptance of propositions for which he was not prepared, > proves, or even constitutes, a mode of being independent of the > mathematician's thought, and so a *reality*. But whether there is any reality > or not, the truth of the pure mathematical proposition is constituted by the > impossibility of ever finding a case in which it fails. (CP 5.567, 1902) > > The realities that pure mathematicians study are not actualities (2ns) with > which they react, but logical possibilities (1ns) that they imagine, along > with necessary consequences (3ns) that they draw from them--some of which can > be far from obvious when they initially formulate their hypotheses, and are > thus surprising whenever they are discovered. Peirce's distinction between > corollarial and theorematic (or theoric) reasoning comes into play here, even > though both are deductive (e.g., see CP 7.204-5, EP 2:96, 1901; NEM 4:1-12, > 1901; CP 4.612-6, 1908; NEM 3:602, 1908). As a result, "Mathematics is purely > hypothetical: it produces nothing but conditional propositions. Logic, on the > contrary, is categorical in its assertions" (CP 4.240, 1902). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2025 at 1:33 PM Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> > <mailto:[email protected]> wrote: > > > Jon, list, > > I dip in for a moment, then vanish. I wanted to reply to posts by Edwina, > Robert, and Ulysses but got busy as I do these days. I hope I'll get to those. > > Jon, you wrote, > > What an infinite community *would* affirm after infinite investigation is > precisely how Peirce explicates the meaning of *truth* in practical > terms--those beliefs whose corresponding habits of conduct *would* never be > confounded by any *possible* future experience. > > I think Peirce seldom if ever wrote about the result of "infinite" inquiry. > He said that inquiry pushed far enough or for long enough will reach the > truth - sooner or later - but still inevitably. The inquiry that continues > indefinitely, by an indefinite community of inquirers, will attain, sooner or > later, definite increase of knowledge. Each increase in actual knowledge > occurs, as I understand it, at a finite remove from the inquiry's beginning, > while you sound like you're discussing an actual infinity - e.g., an infinity > of years or an infinity of one year's achieved subdivisions (sounds like it > would get infinitely hot) - after which the truth is reached. I remember over > 10 or 15 years ago discussing on peirce-l with Clark Gobel the idea of an > inquiry into the full meaning of one's wife, not just one's wife as a sign of > this or that or the weather today, but as one's wife per se, as representing > everything that one's wife may represent. I thought that such an inquiry was > so open-ended that maybe it _would_ require an eternity of inquiry, like the > final entelechy of the universe (or whatever Peirce called it) maybe because > a real example of "full meaning" is somehow too 2nd-order semiosic, to be > dealt with finitely. Well, Clark seemed not to like that idea, while I was > thinking vaguely (indeed as I'm no expert) of Turing oracles and the like. > > I ought to note that, as to the reality of undiscovered legisigns, Peirce > himself seemed reluctant to assert the reality of things in pure mathematics > - discovered or undiscovered. I've long much leaned in favor of it - maths as > discovered, not invented. The mathematician Kronecker split the difference, > saying that God created the integers, all the rest is the work of man. As I > recall, Peirce had doubts about the reality of things in mathematics, but he > thought that some of those things imposed themselves on the mind with a > forcefulness very like that of the real. Unfortunately I lost the email > drafts where I kept the quotes. Maybe one will need to allow of "grades" of > realness. I have no idea how to do that in a non-handwaving way. > > Best, Ben > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply > All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L > <mailto:[email protected]> . But, if your subscribed email account > is not your default email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE > PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> > . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, > then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply > All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L > <mailto:[email protected]> . But, if your subscribed email account > is not your default email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE > PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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