Helmut Social Darwinism has absolutely nothing to do with Darwinism or evolution. It’s not a natural or logical expansion of biological evolution but - is a mental aberration. - confined to a few who make political and economic use of it for their own agendas.
I’ve no idea what you mean by cosmological Darwinism. It is a FACT that the laws of physics and chemistry are more or less [to my knowledge] set and were set early in the emergence of the universe, and as such, form the basis for the biological realm - whose laws of organization are not ’set’ but are flexible and adaptive. This is why we see such an enormous diversity of species/Types. The function? Simple -as I’ve said- to prevent the entropy of energy and the return to the original Nothing. Evolution, according to Darwin, is not just about species, but about adaptation within species - leading to an enormous diversity of Types, ie, of subtypes, subspecies..as well as totally new and novel species. No-one is talking about social Darwinism here! I know of no-one who believes in such a thing! I disagree with you -the laws of ‘inanimate nature’ are most certainly ‘habits’ or 3ns. And I disagree with your insistence on requiring a brain for the emergence of habits. I’ve quoted the following from Peirce so many times - It’s strange that you don’ recall, but here goes again.. 4.551. “Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals and throughout the purely physical world; and one cannot more deny that it is really there, than that the colours, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there”…. OK! Got it? As Peirce wrote - thought/Mind/Thirdness..functions within crystals, within the physical realm! No need for a brain! And yes, Peirce does explain all nature within the three categories of 1ns, 2ns and 3ns. And I think- according to the non-Peircean rules of this List - I’m not allowed to post anymore today. Edwina > On Dec 8, 2025, at 1:28 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > Edwina, List, > > I relate tychism to metsphysics, because natural laws belong to metaphysics, > but tychism claims, that they are due to evolution, meaning, they do not > belong to metaphysics, but to physics, as they are not laws, but parameters. > Evolution, that is darwinism, has later been expanded to social darwinism, > and look, what damage social darwinism has done in history, and still does > (more and more just now). So I am against expanding darwinism to cosmological > darwinism, as this would be the final expansion, including all, also social > life. Evolution according to Darwin is a matter of species, nothing else. > Sociality, culture, is based on needs and wills of individuals and > collectives, not on blind habit-taking. Inanimate nature is based on > unchanging laws, which are not habits at all. Habits can only form themselves > by a solid-state network such as a brain (Hebbian learning) or a computer > chip. Explaining all nature with a generalized "habit"-concept is a dead end, > is my opinion. Sorry for this heresy. > Best, Helmut > 8. Dezember 2025 um 18:43 > "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]> > > Helmut > > I don’t understand how you relate lychastic evolution to metaphysics! Check > out the meaning of tychasm 6.302.. > > And in physics,chemistry.. - where evolution and adaptation does > function..you will find that the habits of organization [ 3ns] have become > fixed with the result that physical forms rarely if ever change - ie- the > format of electron and neutron and chemical forms rarely if ever mutate to > form a nw chemical! The reason for this is obvious- to prevent entropic > dissipation of energy. If the universe’s base was made up of constantly > changing patterns of organization [ 3ns] then, the within this chaos the > more complex forms of matter, which preserve energy more strongly than the > less complex - would never emerge. > > But in the biological realm, the flexibility of habit is obvious - and new > forms/habits of organization do emerge without prior precedent..but..are > operative within the more stable laws of physics and chemistry. These serve > the purpose of strengthening the preservation of energy in eh universe. > > Edwina > > On Dec 8, 2025, at 12:24 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > Edwina, List, > > what did you mean by "chance deviations"? I have not read the respective > texts by Peirce about tychism, I guess tychism claims, that certain, not all, > parts of metaphysics are due to evolution. I cannot see, how e.g. the laws of > logic might be due to evolutional change, because they are more or less > self-corrobating, that is "tautological" (as I wrote) in a broader sense, so > I guess, tychism sees not them, but natural laws and constants due to > evolutionary change. Anyway- if metaphysics is stripped of some before > reliable-seeming aspects, and laws and constants are no longer regarded for > laws and constants, but for parameters due to evolutional change, this makes > any philosophy more complicated, because, the more changing parameters you > have, the more chaotical gets the system of thought, and the more futile it > seems to apply a calculation or estimation. Ok, one might say, that laws and > constants change very slowly, so it is ok to regard them for being constant, > but still there is a psychological aspect of somehow hovering futility of > truth-inquiry. I guess, this psychological aspect is the reason for my > reluctance against tychism. And the fact, that nobody ever has observed a > change of e.g. light velocity, gravitation, electron resting mass, the number > Pi, things like that. This is where my suspicion comes from, that tychism is > an unjustified abduction from values that do change to all values in general. > I admit, that I feel kind of sick from similar unjustified abductions, from > Nietzsche (against all values) to nowadays rightwing libertarianism reminding > me of Stirnerian anarcho-egocentrism. So I am quite sensitive about this > topic, and, though very muchly treasuring Peirce, am not refraining from > suspecting, that in this singular case (of tychism) he was wrong. > > Best, Helmut > 6. Dezember 2025 um 17:51 > "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]> > wrote: > Helmut, list > > The problem with ‘infinite inquiry’ and the concept of ’truth’ is that the > former is..infinite..and the latter is…finite…These are two different worlds, > so to speak. The infinite is purely intellectual [ pure Thirdness] a utopian > cloud which will always find more angels on a pinhead, , and the finite > includes all three categories - and particularly Secondness - which focuses > on ‘hic et nunc’ realities. . > > After all- if you want to find out the truth of a virus- then, the inquiry > should be finite, because the truth of that virus is also finite. It is THAT > virus and made up of THIS and THAT…etc. > > And I think one has to be careful with the concept of ’truth’. It doesn’t > mean some kind of a priori Form that we lesser mortals struggle for centuries > to uncover. And again - if we declare that the search for truth is’infinite’ > then, by definition, such a search is futile. > > Truth is a posteriori - that is, the identity of an entity [let’s say a new > form of insect] is formed with the emergence of this entity..and its ’truth’ > or operative nature, is examined within its realities. That’s pragmatism. > > I don’t see how accepting tychism as an active force in evolution and > adaptation, ie, accepting chance deviations, ‘blocks the way of inquiry’. To > assert that, suggests that you believe that Truth is a priori and that we > cannot accept anything due to chance. But- After all- according to Peirce [ > and of course, modern science], such chance deviations [ without any hint or > connection to ’the possible or potential']..are the basis of evolution. > > Edwina > > On Dec 6, 2025, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > Begin forwarded message: > > From: [email protected] > Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Truth and Reality (was Sign Tokens and Sign Types) > Date: December 5, 2025 at 9:05:25 PM EST > To: [email protected], [email protected] > Cc: [email protected] > Reply-To: [email protected],[email protected] > > Ben, List, > > I don´t think, that quantity and quality compete with each other easily. The > number of questions asked is a quantity, that can not be reckoned against the > capacity for answering them, because this capacity is not the sum of the > respective capacities regarding each single question. This is so, because > capacity to answer questions is only a little dependent on knowledge about > the topics about which the questions are asked, and a lot more dependent on > general ability of logical thinking. Which is a quality. I don´t see, that in > all cases infinite inquiry would approach truth. What kind of truth anyway? > Truth about the past is dependent on complete and reliable documentation, > like a police investigation based on evidence. This is not given. Truth about > the present depends on stable, unchanging parameters like laws and constants, > to be gained knowledge of, because the process of gaining knowledge takes > time, and if parameters meanwhile are changing, you again have the said > problem of incomplete documentation (of what parameters had been like > before). That is why I think, that belief in tychism blocks the way of > inquiry, by exposing the pursue of truth as futile. In this case you only > have the unchanging, quasi-tautological laws of pure logic for reference, but > can´t apply them for anything. Not helpful. so I think, because I hope so, > that tychism is a not-justified abduction from observed worldly changes. > Best, Helmut > 5. Dezember 2025 um 14:29 > "Benjamin Udell" <[email protected]> > wrote: > Jon, list, > Peirce used the word "indefinite" as much closer, in signification, to > "vague" than to "infinite". It seems convenient to call indefinitely long > times or distances infinite because of some part-way cognateness between the > words, and because times or distances may seem infinite to us lowly mortals, > and because Ancient Greek _apeiros_ seems to have been used in both senses > "indefinite" and "infinite", and because, if there are any inquiries that > seem interminable, still it seems quite plausible that intelligent beings > will bag their answers after infinite time. > > In F.R.L. (1899) http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/frl_99.htm , Peirce > said that Auguste Comte said that we earthlings never would be able to > discover the chemical composition of the stars, and that, very soon > afterward, the spectroscope was invented ("discovered," quoth Peirce, very > decidedly, I suspect) which soon enough revealed the chemical composition of > the stars. Peirce usually thought in terms of a definite increase of > knowledge after some actually elapsed definite time, given in advance a > prospect of an indefinite amount of time to play with in the first place. To > say guarantee the final opinion after infinite time seems like unneeded > cheating, anyway confusing to people new to Peirce. Interestingly more > precise would be to say what kind of question _would_ require an infinite > time. The "full meaning" or full final interpretant of one's spouse? People > mention the halting problem as maybe solvable (even deductively) with > infinite time. The difference remains infinite between (A) finite, soever > indefinite and soever prolonged or extended but still finite, and (B) > infinite. > > From Peirce 1885 unpublished till _Collected Papers_, "An American Plato" - > Review: Josiah Royce > CP 8.43, also in Writings 6. Note that Peirce took a somewhat cosmic view > even as he discussed "questions asked," not questions _askable_ (expectably > or imaginably or whatever). > > BEGIN QUOTE > The problem whether a given question will ever get answered or not is not so > simple; the number of questions asked is constantly increasing, and the > capacity for answering them is also on the increase. If the rate of the > latter increase is greater than that of the [former] the probability is unity > that any given question will be answered; otherwise the probability is zero. > END QUOTE. > > Peirce was discussing definite and finite amounts of time of actual > discovery, and an indefinite amount of time in which to discover. Peirce > didn't promise that which Quine and others later wanted, an observable normal > rate of progress in inquiries. It's a question of contingent mental > evolution, not of partly conditional but still pre-programmed vegetable > growth. Of course you know all that. But the involvement of vague, > indefinite future dates of discovery doesn't morph by itself into the > involvement of infinities of inquiry. Sorry, I'm repeating myself, I guess > it's time for the old man to take a nap. > > Thanks for the Peirce quote that you found, it's exactly the passage that I > was thinking of. > > It's interesting that Peirce, as you point out, did assert that there truth > in mathematics, even though he seemed reluctant to go all-in on mathematics > harboring the real. His usual definitions of truth and the real lock the two > ideas together. Well, the ideas are regulative, not speculative, but one > suspects that Peirce would welcome a stronger argument for the real in > mathematics. (It would be terminologically easier if we called the real > numbers singulions and the complex numbers binions. Maybe not easier, what > would we call the imaginary numbers?) > > Best, Ben > > On 12/3/2025 5:58 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Ben, List: > > I changed the subject line to match the topics that your post addresses. > > BU: I think Peirce seldom if ever wrote about the result of "infinite" > inquiry. He said that inquiry pushed far enough or for long enough will reach > the truth - sooner or later - but still inevitably. > > We are using different terms but seem to be saying essentially the same > thing. The pragmaticistic definition of truth as what an infinite community > *would* affirm after infinite investigation is derived from Peirce's > well-known statement, "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to > by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object > represented in this opinion is the real" (CP 5.407, EP 1:139, 1878). In my > own words, truth is the final interpretant of every sign whose dynamical > object is a reality. Accordingly, what I am discussing is a real but > potential or ideal infinity, not an actual infinity; again, a regulative > principle and an intellectual hope--what Peirce sometimes calls a "would-be." > He says so himself in the subsequent paragraph. > > CSP: Our perversity and that of others may indefinitely postpone the > settlement of opinion; it might even conceivably cause an arbitrary > proposition to be universally accepted as long as the human race should last. > Yet even that would not change the nature of the belief, which alone could be > the result of investigation carried sufficiently far; and if, after the > extinction of our race, another should arise with faculties and disposition > for investigation, that true opinion must be the one which they *would > ultimately* come to. "Truth crushed to earth shall rise again," and the > opinion which *would finally* result from investigation does not depend on > how anybody may actually think. (CP 5.408, EP 1:139, 1878; bold added) > > Moreover, in his very next published article, he refers to "an *unlimited* > community" and "a hope, or calm and cheerful wish, that the community may > last *beyond any assignable date*," thus facilitating "the *unlimited > *continuance of intellectual activity" (CP 2.654-5, EP 1:150, 1878; bold > added). His further definitions of truth after the turn of the century > reflect his even stronger embrace of scholastic realism, as well as his > development of semeiotic. "Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement > with the *ideal limit* towards which *endless investigation would tend* to > bring scientific belief" (CP 5.565, 1902; bold added). "Now thought is of the > nature of a sign. In that case, then, if we can find out the right method of > thinking and can follow it out,--the right method of transforming > signs,--then truth can be nothing more nor less than the last result to which > the following out of this method *would ultimately* carry us" (CP 5.553, EP > 2:380, 1906; old added). > > BU: As I recall, Peirce had doubts about the reality of things in > mathematics, but he thought that some of those things imposed themselves on > the mind with a forcefulness very like that of the real. > > These might be the remarks that you have in mind. > > CSP: The pure mathematician deals exclusively with hypotheses. Whether or not > there is any corresponding real thing, he does not care. His hypotheses are > creatures of his own imagination; but he discovers in them relations which > surprise him sometimes. A metaphysician may hold that this very forcing upon > the mathematician's acceptance of propositions for which he was not prepared, > proves, or even constitutes, a mode of being independent of the > mathematician's thought, and so a *reality*. But whether there is any reality > or not, the truth of the pure mathematical proposition is constituted by the > impossibility of ever finding a case in which it fails. (CP 5.567, 1902) > > The realities that pure mathematicians study are not actualities (2ns) with > which they react, but logical possibilities (1ns) that they imagine, along > with necessary consequences (3ns) that they draw from them--some of which can > be far from obvious when they initially formulate their hypotheses, and are > thus surprising whenever they are discovered. Peirce's distinction between > corollarial and theorematic (or theoric) reasoning comes into play here, even > though both are deductive (e.g., see CP 7.204-5, EP 2:96, 1901; NEM 4:1-12, > 1901; CP 4.612-6, 1908; NEM 3:602, 1908). As a result, "Mathematics is purely > hypothetical: it produces nothing but conditional propositions. Logic, on the > contrary, is categorical in its assertions" (CP 4.240, 1902). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2025 at 1:33 PM Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> > <mailto:[email protected]> wrote: > > > Jon, list, > > I dip in for a moment, then vanish. I wanted to reply to posts by Edwina, > Robert, and Ulysses but got busy as I do these days. I hope I'll get to those. > > Jon, you wrote, > > What an infinite community *would* affirm after infinite investigation is > precisely how Peirce explicates the meaning of *truth* in practical > terms--those beliefs whose corresponding habits of conduct *would* never be > confounded by any *possible* future experience. > > I think Peirce seldom if ever wrote about the result of "infinite" inquiry. > He said that inquiry pushed far enough or for long enough will reach the > truth - sooner or later - but still inevitably. The inquiry that continues > indefinitely, by an indefinite community of inquirers, will attain, sooner or > later, definite increase of knowledge. Each increase in actual knowledge > occurs, as I understand it, at a finite remove from the inquiry's beginning, > while you sound like you're discussing an actual infinity - e.g., an infinity > of years or an infinity of one year's achieved subdivisions (sounds like it > would get infinitely hot) - after which the truth is reached. I remember over > 10 or 15 years ago discussing on peirce-l with Clark Gobel the idea of an > inquiry into the full meaning of one's wife, not just one's wife as a sign of > this or that or the weather today, but as one's wife per se, as representing > everything that one's wife may represent. I thought that such an inquiry was > so open-ended that maybe it _would_ require an eternity of inquiry, like the > final entelechy of the universe (or whatever Peirce called it) maybe because > a real example of "full meaning" is somehow too 2nd-order semiosic, to be > dealt with finitely. Well, Clark seemed not to like that idea, while I was > thinking vaguely (indeed as I'm no expert) of Turing oracles and the like. > > I ought to note that, as to the reality of undiscovered legisigns, Peirce > himself seemed reluctant to assert the reality of things in pure mathematics > - discovered or undiscovered. I've long much leaned in favor of it - maths as > discovered, not invented. The mathematician Kronecker split the difference, > saying that God created the integers, all the rest is the work of man. As I > recall, Peirce had doubts about the reality of things in mathematics, but he > thought that some of those things imposed themselves on the mind with a > forcefulness very like that of the real. Unfortunately I lost the email > drafts where I kept the quotes. Maybe one will need to allow of "grades" of > realness. I have no idea how to do that in a non-handwaving way. > > Best, Ben > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply > All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L > <mailto:[email protected]> . But, if your subscribed email account > is not your default email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE > PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> > . 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