Gary F, Jeff, List, Gary, thanks for introducing this intriguing question as to the nature of 1ns. And, Jeff, your introduction of Mills' discussion of 'quality' seems to me to provide a useful contrast to Peirce’s account of qualitative possibility,1ns, in the 1898 Cambridge Lectures.
Of course, both reject the old scholastic notion that a quality is some mysterious entity inhabiting an object. And for both of them, the way we encounter qualities is as feelings (sensations). But Mill shrinks 'quality' into a kind of regularity of sensation: to call snow “white” is, in Mill's view, simply to say that when snow is present under normal conditions that we have a certain sensation: the quality, for him, is nothing other than the sensation. Peirce, on the other hand, does not reduce qualities to physio/psychological events. Rather, he examines the issue through phenomenological prescission by abstracting from any subject/object relation to extract, as it were, the *pure suchness* of a quality -- what it would be 'for itself'. True, this mode of being can only be *experienced* as feeling. But quality is not a mere feeling in a subject, nor, as mentioned above, some occult causal 'power' in an object but, rather, the irreducible 1ns that any sensation instantiates (but is not limited to). So, Peirce’s claim that “whatever is First is ipso facto sentient” is most certainly not some panpsychist idea that stones and the like have minds. It is a statement about how we can conceive qualitative being. Feeling, in the RLT analysis, is not yet a psychological event. 1ns is, rather, the category under which pure feeling can be presented to thought in phenomenological analysis. Mill never argues anything like this as his 'sensations' presuppose a subject and an object, while Peirce is trying to describe what is prior both to reaction (2ns) and mediation/interpretation (3ns). Thus Mill’s account, as I see it, is nominalist: qualities for him are only names for kinds of sensations. On the other hand, Peirce’s view is grounded in extreme scholastic realism such that *qualities are real possible modes of feeling* whether or not they are embodied in any particular experience. Actual subjective feeling arises only when certain kinds of complex, semiotic systems emerge (for prime example, biological systems) and, indeed, Peirce initiated an inquiry into how complex semiotic systems emerge. What distinguishes him from Mill in this matter is his insistence that qualities (1nses) are not merely descriptions of sensations but, rather, *genuine modes of semeiotic being*, prescindible from any particular instance of their appearance. In my view, with this insight Peirce deepens the inquiry into the qualitative aspect of reality as being in its own distinct category, namely, 1ns. Best. Gary R On Wed, Dec 10, 2025 at 6:37 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F, List, > > I'd be happy to explore the ideas with you. Thank's for providing a link > to the relevant passage: > > Firstness may be defined as follows: It is the mode in which anything > would be for itself, irrespective of anything else, so that it would not > make any difference though nothing else existed, or ever had existed, or > could exist. Now this mode of being can only be apprehended as a mode of > feeling. For there is no other mode of being which we can conceive as > having no relation to the possibility of anything else. In the second > place, the First must be without parts. For a part of an object is > something other than the object itself. Remembering these points, you will > perceive that any color, say magenta, has and is a positive mode of > feeling, irrespective of every other. Because Firstness is all that it is, > irrespective of anything else, when viewed from without (and therefore no > longer in the original fullness of firstness), the firstnesses are all the > different possible sense-qualities, embracing endless varieties of which > all we can feel are but minute fragments. Each of these is just as simple > as any other. It is impossible for a sense quality to be otherwise than > absolutely simple. It is only complex to the eye of comparison, not in > itself. > — Peirce, RLT 147, PM 167 (1898) > > My working assumption is that, in 1898, Peirce is continuing, > deepening and possibly revising the inquiries taken up earlier in his > career in works such as "A New List of Categories". He refers to this work > just few paragaphs after this remark, so this seems like a safe assumption. > > What is more, I think it is helpful to compare Peirce's philosophical > inquiries in RLT to those conducted by others--especially the philosophers > he was actively engaging with. In Putnam's comments on Lecture 3, he makes > some references to the work of Kant and Mill. Following Putnam's lead, > consider Mill's analysis of the categories of experience in his works in *A > System of Logic*. In Vol. I, Book I, Chapter 3, Mill examines the > different kinds of things that may be denoted by names. The analysis > appears to draw on, and disagree with, Aristotle's account of the > Categories. Unlike Aristotle's list, Mill narrows his account of the > categories down to three that he treats as fundamental: quality, relation > and quantity. > > Consider what Mill says in the relevant section: > https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_3frepePb6XsC/page/68/mode/2up > > "Of Quality, Quantity, and Relation. We shall come to the two latter > presently: in the first place we shall confine ourselves to the former. > > Let us take, then, as our example, one of what are termed the sensible > qualities of objects, and let that example be whiteness. When we ascribe > whiteness to any substance, as, for instance, snow; when we say that snow > has the quality whiteness, what do we really assert? Simply, that when snow > is present to our organs, we have a particular sensation, which we are > accustomed to call the sensation of white. But how do I know that snow is > present? Obviously by the sensations which I derive from it, and not > otherwise. I infer that the object is present, because it gives me a > certain assemblage or series of sensations. And when I ascribe to it the > attribute whiteness, my meaning is only, that, of the sensations composing > this group or series, that which I call the sensation of white colour is > one. > > This is one view which may be taken of the subject. But there is also > another, and a different view. It may be said, that it is true we know > nothing of sensible objects, except the sensations they excite in us; that > the fact of our receiving from snow the particular sensation which is > called a sensation of white, is the ground on which we ascribe to that > substance the quality whiteness ; the sole proof of its possessing that > quality. But because one thing may be the sole evidence of the existence of > another thing, it does not follow that the two are one and the same. The > attribute whiteness (it may be said) is not the fact of our receiving the > sensation, but something in the object itself; a power inherent in it; > something in virtue of which the object produces the sensation. And when we > affirm that snow possesses the attribute whiteness, we do not merely assert > that the presence of snow produces in us that sensation, but that it does > so through, and by reason of, that power or quality. > > For the purposes of logic it is not of material importance which of these > opinions we adopt. The full discussion of the subject belongs to the other > department of scientific inquiry, so often alluded to under the name of > metaphysics ; but it may be said here, that for the doctrine of the > existence of a peculiar species of entities called qualities, I can see no > foundation except in a tendency of the human mind which is the cause of > many delusions. I mean, the disposition, wherever we meet with two names > which are not precisely synonymous, to suppose that they must be the names > of two different things; whereas in reality they may be names of the same > thing viewed in two different lights, which is as much as to say under > different suppositions as to surrounding circumstances. Because quality and > sensation cannot be put indiscriminately one for the other, it is supposed > that they cannot both signify the same thing, namely, the impression or > feeling with which we are affected through our senses by the presence of an > object; although there is at least no absurdity in supposing that this > identical impression or feeling may be called a sensation when considered > merely in itself, and a quality when regarded as emanating from any one of > the numerous objects, the presence of which to our organs excites in our > minds that among various other sensations or feelings. And if this be > admissible as a supposition, it rests with those who contend for an entity > *per > se* called a quality, to show that their opinion is preferable, or is > anything in fact but a lingering remnant of the scholastic doctrine of > occult causes; the very absurdity which Moliere so happily ridiculed when > he made one of his pedantic physicians account for the fact that “l’ opium > endormit,” by the maxim “parcequ’il a une vertu soporifique.” > > It is evident that when the physician stated that opium had “une vertu > soporifique,” he did not account for, but merely asserted over again, the > fact that it endormit. In like manner, when we say that snow is white > because it has the quality of whiteness, we are only re-asserting in more > technical language the fact that it excites in us the sensation of white. > If it be said that the sensation must have some cause, I answer, its cause > is the presence of the assemblage of phenomena which is termed the object. > When we have asserted that as often as the object is present, and our > organs in their normal state, the sensation takes place, we have stated all > that we know about the matter. There is no need, after assigning a certain > and intelligible cause, to suppose an occult cause besides, for the purpose > of enabling the real cause to produce its effect. If I am asked, why does > the presence of the object cause this sensation in me, I cannot tell: I can > only say that such is my nature, and the nature of the object; that the > fact forms a part of the constitution of things. And to this we must at > last come, even after interpolating the imaginary entity. Whatever number > of links the chain of causes and effects may consist of, how any one link > produces the one which is next to it remains equally inexplicable to us. It > is as easy to comprehend that the object should produce the sensation > directly and at once, as that it should produce the same sensation by the > aid of something else called the power of producing it. > > But as the difficulties which may be felt in adopting this view of the > subject cannot be removed without discussions transcending the bounds of > our science, I content myself with a passing indication, and shall, for the > purposes of logic, adopt a language compatible with either view of the > nature of qualities. I shall say, — what at least admits of no dispute,— > that the quality of whiteness ascribed to the object snow, is grounded on > its exciting in us the sensation of white ; and adopting the language > already used by the school logicians in the case of the kind of attributes > called Relations, I shall term the sensation of white the foundation of the > quality whiteness. For logical purposes the sensation is the only essential > part of what is meant by the word; the only part which we ever can be > concerned in proving. When that is proved, the quality is proved; if an > object excites a sensation it has, of course, the power of exciting it." > > In the analysis of Firstness in lecture 3 of RLT, where does Peirce appear > to be agreeing and/or disagreeing with Mill's account of this feature of > experience? > > Yours, > > Jeff > > > > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> on > behalf of [email protected] <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Wednesday, December 10, 2025 11:25 AM > *To:* [email protected] <[email protected]> > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Firstness and sentience > > > List, every now and then I return to a statement of Peirce’s that has > puzzled me in the past, and try again to make sense of it. My latest > attempt concerns something CSP said about Firstness in 1898, a few years > *before* he started referring to phenomenology (and later phaneroscopy) > as the “primal positive science.” Here is a link to it: > https://gnusystems.ca/TS/tpx.htm#1stns — in case anyone cares to comment > on whether it makes sense or not. > > By the way, a few readers have told me that the high-contrast > white-text-on-black is hard for them to read. I can put up an inverted > version if necessary; let me know privately. > > Love, gary f. > > Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg > > } The division of the perceived universe into parts and wholes is > convenient and may be necessary, but no necessity determines how it shall > be done. [G. Bateson] { > > substack.com/@gnox }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
