Gary F, List, The material you linked to in *Turning Signs *on 'consciousness' and 'feeling' is thought-provoking, especially your comments on 'surdity' in relation to 'feeling' and 'consciousness'. I have changed the subject line to show my emphasis on surdity. In *TS* you write:
GF:The truth of a proposition depends on the dyadic or real relation (as opposed to a relation of reason) between that sign and its dynamic object. It must involve ‘action of brute force, physical or psychical,’ of the dynamic object upon the sign, so that the relation between the two is ‘real,’ i.e. surd – no sign can express or describe it. GR: I agree that the *real relation* between a sign and its object is *surd*, which concept I'd like to explore a bit in this post. You continued: GF: The Secondness of experience itself is a dyadic relation or dynamic action between two subjects; it is ‘brute,’ ‘surd,’ indicible, ineffable. But a subject capable of both attention and intention can become a host, as it were, of Thirdness, or semiosis, so that another subject can become an ‘object of thought’ (Peirce, CP 1.343, 1903). Now we have a triadic relation involving the object, the sign or ‘thought,’ and the experiencing subject, the system of interpretation or ‘mind.’ This is the essential structure of mental experience. *The 1ns of experience would be the pure feeling that there is something other than feeling itself – a world appearing to the subject, and thus becoming an object of attention* (emphasis added by GR). This reminded me that Peirce remarked -- and Joe Ransdell emphasized this point in several of his papers, on Peirce-L, and in private conversations -- that there can be no *pure* icon, which is to say that a qualisign must be embodied in a sinsign in order to be operative at all. So, t*here are no pure qualisigns in actual semiosis*, only qualitative aspects of sinsigns: a qualisign is a 1ns that can signify only by being instantiated as a sinsign and interpreted via a legisign. At bottom consciousness is tied to what is immediate and irreducible, and this is linked to surdity. Consciousness is feeling: “. . . consciousness is nothing but Feeling, in general” (CP 7.365). Feeling is simple, immediate, yet qualitative. It can't infer, intend, or mean anything as it is non-relational and non-purposive. In this primitive (primary?) sense, then, consciousness lacks any internal rational structure: it simply is what it is. This primary consciousness is *pure 1ns*, a qualitative 'given' of unmediated feeling. This is to say that it is not a sign at all (which, btw, contradicts the pansemiotic views of some theorists). Peirce is careful not to conflate surdity with mentality, so he distinguishes consciousness from mind: *consciousness belongs to 1ns as feeling*, while *mind belongs to 3ns in semiosis*. “The mediate element of experience is the mental element, which is semiosic but not necessarily conscious” (CP 7.366). Mentality does not essentially require consciousness since semiosis can -- and often does -- proceed without awareness (the famous example of the growth of a crystal; but there are many others). What defines mind isn't consciousness itself but, rather, final causation, purpose, mind being a living complexus of signs, habits, and consequent effects which these produce. In an essential sense, surdity would seem to take on the form of brute reaction (2ns) which may or may not be conscious. For example, the pain of touching a hot burner is a conscious instance of 2ns, while the reflex of removing the hand from the source of the pain isn't. *Can one say that s**urdity lies in the brute action/reaction itself, while consciousness accompanies surdity only when feeling is present?* In contrast, 3ns *interprets* brute facts and, over time, can make experience intelligible. Yet, I firmly believe that 3ns cannot eliminate surdity without cutting thought off from brute actuality, the *hic et nunc*. So Peirce argues that thought requires resistance, and that signs require dynamic objects as a kind of check on thought. Consciousness, then, is the ground upon which *both* semiosis and thought operate. This would seem to resolve an apparent contradiction in Peirce’s use of the term 'consciousness.' In its primary sense, consciousness is feeling, so surd, immediate, so, categorially 1ns. In a looser sense, Peirce speaks of “three modes of consciousness” (CP 8.256): the awareness of feeling, action, law. I would say that this usage represents, at best, a secondary, *mediated* consciousness. Can we say that consciousness is, in its 'primitive' form, surd, while mind in its fullest sense is semiosic', that consciousness offers the brute 'given' of existence, while thought supplies the purposive, essentially semiotic structure that consciousness itself cannot provide? Best, Gary R On Sat, Dec 20, 2025 at 1:08 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > Resending this because it came back to me in my spam box. > > Gary f. > > *From:* [email protected] > *Sent:* 20-Dec-25 09:21 > *To:* <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Truth and dyadic consciousness > > In my last post in the other thread, I mentioned that the term > “consciousness” is problematic. In this little essay from the back side of > *Turning > Signs* I’ve tried to sort out some of those problems: > > https://gnusystems.ca/TS/tpx.htm#dyax > > Happy Winter Solstice to all those in the Northern Hemisphere! > > Love, gary f. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
