Gary R., Gary F., List: The discussion of surdity echoes a List exchange <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-09/msg00024.html> that happened a few months ago, in which I noted that "every proposition involves at least one index or precept for finding an index to denote its dynamical object, not just words describing that object"; and the linked paper is reminiscent of the reservations that I expressed at that time about characterizing LLMs as "artificial intelligence."
JAS: One of Peirce's definitions of "logic as semiotic" is the science that ascertains "what *must be* the characters of all signs used by a 'scientific' intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience" (CP 2.227, c. 1897). LLMs do not qualify because they do not have that capability--they have no *beliefs *with corresponding habits of *conduct *that can be corroborated or confounded by the "outward clash" with reality itself. Just like formal systems of deductive logic, LLMs cannot *establish *truth, only *preserve *it once they have been "trained" by being fed a vast quantity of information; the principle of "garbage in, garbage out" still applies. LLMs cannot even *verify *the truth of any given sentence apart from comparing it with *other *sentences, so it is no wonder that they sometimes suffer from "hallucinations" that produce false or misleading responses to prompts. Manheim wonders whether LLMs *themselves *could someday be "genuine Peircean interpretants," but what he presumably means is that they could someday be quasi-minds whose *determinations *are "genuine Peircean interpretants." Even this is not quite right, because according to Peirce, *any *actual effect of a sign token is a *dynamical *interpretant of that sign token--a determination of an interpreting quasi-mind, which need not be an individual conscious mind like that of a human, such that LLMs presumably qualify already. My sense is that Manheim is really asking whether LLMs could someday go beyond only accessing and processing texts to have genuine Peircean *experience* of reality--the compulsive (2ns) aspect of cognition (3ns)--which would render them intrinsically self-correcting in the long run, if they consistently conform to the normative principles of inquiry (method of science). In any case, I still do not share his optimism, for the reasons expressed above. Moreover, although Manheim addresses the objection that LLMs are "finite-state systems" and situates human minds in that same category, he overlooks the fact that the former are always executing *discrete* operations while the latter (at least arguably) are performing *continuous *inferences. If genuine semiosis is truly continuous, as I maintain, then a digital computer, no matter how sophisticated, can only ever *simulate *it--just as the real numbers do not constitute a true continuum, but usefully *approximate *one for most practical purposes. After all, whenever we humans break up our own reasoning (arguments) into discrete steps--namely, "definitely formulated premisses" and conclusions (argumentations; see CP 6.456, EP 2:435, 1908)--we are always doing so artificially and retrospectively, *after *the real and continuous inferential process has already run its course (see CP 2.27, 1902; LF 3/1:234-5, 1906). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Jan 6, 2026 at 8:55 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, list, > > I’d like to pick up where your post ended, Gary: > > GR: Can we say that consciousness is, in its 'primitive' form, surd, > while mind in its fullest sense is semiosic', that consciousness offers the > brute 'given' of existence, while thought supplies the purposive, > essentially semiotic structure that consciousness itself cannot provide? > > GF: Peirce’s remarks about surdity are mostly in the context of > Secondness, i.e. dyadic relations. I would say it is the *dyadic > *consciousness > that “offers the brute ‘given’ of existence,” and that’s why “*real > relations*” — genuine indexicality — are necessary to ground the ability > of triadic or semiotic relations to convey information, or for a > proposition to be *true*. Phaneroscopically, the “pure consciousness” of > Firstness lacks that grounding. But this never happens in (what we call) > *reality*! For the sense or feeling of reality to occur in perception, > something must be “present to the mind” *and other than* the mind, > external to it or independent of it, in order for words like “true” or > “real” to have any meaning. > > So you can’t have genuine Thirdness without genuine Secondness. Or to put > it physiologically, both the perceived object and the perceiver must be > *embodied*, and the *quality* of the experience is determined by the *real > relation* between the two. The percept is *not* just a representation of > the object, nor is it just an artifact of internal activity within the > perceiving mind or brain. > > It feel rather odd to even be writing this because it seems so obvious and > yet feels like beating around the bush when I try to express it verbally. > However > I just came across an open access article which strikes me as an important > application of it. It’s in *Philosophy & Technology* (2026) 39:9, > https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-025-00975-5, “Language Models’ Hall of > Mirrors Problem: Why AI Alignment Requires Peircean Semiosis,” by David > Manheim. Here is the abstract: > > [[ This paper examines some limitations of large language models (LLMs) > through the framework of Peircean semiotics. We argue that basic LLMs exist > within a “hall of mirrors,” reflecting only the linguistic surface of > training data without indexical grounding in a shared external world, and > manipulating symbols without participation in socially-mediated > epistemology. We then argue that newer developments, including extended > context windows, persistent memory, and mediated interactions with reality, > are moving towards making newer Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems into > genuine Peircean interpretants, and conclude that LLMs may be approaching > this goal, and we identify no fundamental architectural barriers that would > prevent this. This lens reframes a central challenge for AI alignment: > without grounding in the semiotic process, a model’s linguistic encoding of > goals may diverge from real-world values. By synthesizing Peirce’s > pragmatic view of signs, contemporary discussions of AI alignment, and > recent work on relational realism, we illustrate a fundamental > epistemological and practical challenge to AI safety and point to part of a > solution. ]] > > Love, gary f > > Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg > > > > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> *On > Behalf Of *Gary Richmond > *Sent:* 2-Jan-26 00:29 > *To:* Peirce List <[email protected]>; Gary Fuhrman <[email protected] > > > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Surdity, Feeling, and Consciousness, was, Truth and > dyadic consciousnessg > > Gary F, List, > > The material you linked to in *Turning Signs *on 'consciousness' and > 'feeling' is thought-provoking, especially your comments on 'surdity' in > relation to 'feeling' and 'consciousness'. I have changed the subject > line to show my emphasis on surdity. In *TS* you write: > > GF:The truth of a proposition depends on the dyadic or real relation (as > opposed to a relation of reason) between that sign and its dynamic object. > It must involve ‘action of brute force, physical or psychical,’ of the > dynamic object upon the sign, so that the relation between the two is > ‘real,’ i.e. surd – no sign can express or describe it. > > > GR: I agree that the *real relation* between a sign and its object is > *surd*, which concept I'd like to explore a bit in this post. You > continued: > > GF: The Secondness of experience itself is a dyadic relation or dynamic > action between two subjects; it is ‘brute,’ ‘surd,’ indicible, ineffable. > But a subject capable of both attention and intention can become a host, as > it were, of Thirdness, or semiosis, so that another subject can become an > ‘object of thought’ (Peirce, CP 1.343, 1903). Now we have a triadic > relation involving the object, the sign or ‘thought,’ and the experiencing > subject, the system of interpretation or ‘mind.’ This is the essential > structure of mental experience. *The 1ns of experience would be the pure > feeling that there is something other than feeling itself – a world > appearing to the subject, and thus becoming an object of attention* (emphasis > added by GR). > > This reminded me that Peirce remarked -- and Joe Ransdell emphasized this > point in several of his papers, on Peirce-L, and in private conversations -- > that there can be no *pure* icon, which is to say that a qualisign must > be embodied in a sinsign in order to be operative at all. So, t*here are > no pure qualisigns in actual semiosis*, only qualitative aspects of > sinsigns: a qualisign is a 1ns that can signify only by being instantiated > as a sinsign and interpreted via a legisign. > > At bottom consciousness is tied to what is immediate and irreducible, and > this is linked to surdity. Consciousness is feeling: “. . . consciousness > is nothing but Feeling, in general” (CP 7.365). Feeling is simple, > immediate, yet qualitative. It can't infer, intend, or mean anything as it > is non-relational and non-purposive. In this primitive (primary?) sense, > then, consciousness lacks any internal rational structure: it simply is > what it is. This primary consciousness is *pure 1ns*, a qualitative > 'given' of unmediated feeling. This is to say that it is not a sign at all > (which, btw, contradicts the pansemiotic views of some theorists). > > > Peirce is careful not to conflate surdity with mentality, so he > distinguishes consciousness from mind: *consciousness** belongs to 1ns as > feeling*, while* mind** belongs to 3ns in semiosis*. “The mediate element > of experience is the mental element, which is semiosic but not necessarily > conscious” (CP 7.366). Mentality does not essentially require consciousness > since semiosis can -- and often does -- proceed without awareness (the > famous example of the growth of a crystal; but there are many others). What > defines mind isn't consciousness itself but, rather, final causation, > purpose, mind being a living complexus of signs, habits, and > consequent effects which these produce. > > > In an essential sense, surdity would seem to take on the form of brute > reaction (2ns) which may or may not be conscious. For example, the pain of > touching > a hot burner is a conscious instance of 2ns, while the reflex of removing > the hand from the source of the pain isn't. *Can one say > that surdity lies in the brute action/reaction itself, while consciousness > accompanies surdity only when feeling is present?* In contrast, 3ns > *interprets* brute facts and, over time, can make experience intelligible. > Yet, I firmly believe that 3ns cannot eliminate surdity without cutting > thought off from brute actuality, the *hic et nunc*. So Peirce argues > that thought requires resistance, and that signs require dynamic objects as > a kind of check on thought. > > > > Consciousness, then, is the ground upon which *both* semiosis and thought > operate. > > This would seem to resolve an apparent contradiction in Peirce’s use of > the term 'consciousness.' In its primary sense, consciousness is feeling, > so surd, immediate, so, categorially 1ns. In a looser sense, Peirce speaks > of “three modes of consciousness” (CP 8.256): the awareness of feeling, > action, law. I would say that this usage represents, at best, a secondary, > *mediated* consciousness. > > > > Can we say that consciousness is, in its 'primitive' form, surd, while > mind in its fullest sense is semiosic', that consciousness offers the brute > 'given' of existence, while thought supplies the purposive, essentially > semiotic structure that consciousness itself cannot provide? > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R >
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