Gary F, Jon, List, In the discussion of Manheim's paper I think it's important to remember that his concern is primarily with* AI safety. Anything* that would contribute to that safely I would wholeheartedly support. In my view, Peircean semeiotic might prove to be of some value in the matter, but perhaps not exactly in the way that Manheim is thinking of it.
Manheim remarks that his paper does not try to settle philosophical questions about whether LLMs genuinely reason or only simulate thought, and that resolving those debates isn’t necessary for building safer general AI. I won't take up that claim now, but suffice it to say that I don't *fully* agree with it, especially as I continue to agree with your argument, Jon, that AI is* not* 'intelligent'. Can it every be? What Mannheim claims is necessary re: AI safety is to move AI systems toward Peircean semiosis in the sense of their becoming 'participants' in interpretive processes. He holds that this is achievable through engineering and 'capability' advances rather than "philosophical breakthroughs;" though he also says that those advances remain insufficient on their own for safety. Remaining "insufficient on its own for full safety" sounds to me somewhat self-contradictory. But I think that more importantly, he is saying that* if* there are things -- including Peircean 'things' -- that we can begin to do now in consideration of AI safety, then we ought to consider them, do them! Manheim claims that AI safety depends on deliberately designing systems for what he calls 'grounded meaning', 'persistence across interactions' and 'shared semiotic communities' rather than 'isolated agents'. I would tend to strongly agree. In addition, AI safety requires goals that are *explicitly defined* but also open to ongoing discussion rather than quasi*-emerging implicitly* from methods like *Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback *(RLHF) . Manheim seems to be saying that companies developing advanced AI should take steps in system design and goal setting -- including those mentioned above -- if safety is taken seriously. The choice, he says, is between ignoring the implications of Peircean semeiotic and continuing merely to refine current systems despite their deficiency vis-a-vis safety; OR to embrace Peircean semiosis (whatever that means) and intentionally build AI as genuine 'semiotic partners'. But,I haven't a clear notion of what he means by 'semeiotic partners', nor a method for implementing whatever he does have in mind. I think Manheim off-handedly and rather summarily unfortunately dismisses RLHF -- which is, falsely he argues, claimed as a way of 'aligning' models with human values. From what I've read it has not yet really been developed much in that direction. As far as I can tell, and this may relate to the reason why Manheim seems to reject RLHF in toto, it appears to be more a 'reward proxy' trained on human rankings of outputs which are then fed back through some kind of loop to strongly influence future responses. Human judgment enters only in the 'training'', not as something that a complex system can engage with and debate with or, possibly, revise understandings over time. In Manheim's view, RLHF is not 'bridging' human goals and machine behavior (as it claims) but merely facilitating machine outputs to fit *learned preferences*. Still, whatever else RLHF is doing that is geared specifically* toward AI safety*, it would likely be augmented by an understanding of Peircean cenoscopic science including semeiotic. I would suggest that the semeiotic ideas that it might most benefit from occur in the third branch of *Logic as **Semeiotic*, namely methodology (methodeutic) , perhaps in the present context representing, almost to a T, Peirce's alternative title, *speculative rhetoric*. It's in this branch of semeiotic that pragmatism (pragmaticism) is analyzed. There is of course much more to be said on methodology and theoretical rhetoric. For now, I would tweak Manheim's idea a bit and would suggest that we might try to move AI systems toward Peircean semeiotic rhetoric within communities of inquiry. Best, Gary R On Tue, Jan 6, 2026 at 9:55 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, list, > > I’d like to pick up where your post ended, Gary: > > GR: Can we say that consciousness is, in its 'primitive' form, surd, > while mind in its fullest sense is semiosic', that consciousness offers the > brute 'given' of existence, while thought supplies the purposive, > essentially semiotic structure that consciousness itself cannot provide? > > GF: Peirce’s remarks about surdity are mostly in the context of > Secondness, i.e. dyadic relations. I would say it is the *dyadic > *consciousness > that “offers the brute ‘given’ of existence,” and that’s why “*real > relations*” — genuine indexicality — are necessary to ground the ability > of triadic or semiotic relations to convey information, or for a > proposition to be *true*. Phaneroscopically, the “pure consciousness” of > Firstness lacks that grounding. But this never happens in (what we call) > *reality*! For the sense or feeling of reality to occur in perception, > something must be “present to the mind” *and other than* the mind, > external to it or independent of it, in order for words like “true” or > “real” to have any meaning. > > So you can’t have genuine Thirdness without genuine Secondness. Or to put > it physiologically, both the perceived object and the perceiver must be > *embodied*, and the *quality* of the experience is determined by the *real > relation* between the two. The percept is *not* just a representation of > the object, nor is it just an artifact of internal activity within the > perceiving mind or brain. > > It feel rather odd to even be writing this because it seems so obvious and > yet feels like beating around the bush when I try to express it verbally. > > However I just came across an open access article which strikes me as an > important application of it. It’s in *Philosophy & Technology* (2026) > 39:9, > > https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-025-00975-5, “Language Models’ Hall of > Mirrors Problem: Why AI Alignment Requires Peircean Semiosis,” by David > Manheim. Here is the abstract: > > [[ This paper examines some limitations of large language models (LLMs) > through the framework of Peircean semiotics. We argue that basic LLMs exist > within a “hall of mirrors,” reflecting only the linguistic surface of > training data without indexical grounding in a shared external world, and > manipulating symbols without participation in socially-mediated > epistemology. We then argue that newer developments, including extended > context windows, persistent memory, and mediated interactions with reality, > are moving towards making newer Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems into > genuine Peircean interpretants, and conclude that LLMs may be approaching > this goal, and we identify no fundamental architectural barriers that would > prevent this. This lens reframes a central challenge for AI alignment: > without grounding in the semiotic process, a model’s linguistic encoding of > goals may diverge from real-world values. By synthesizing Peirce’s > pragmatic view of signs, contemporary discussions of AI alignment, and > recent work on relational realism, we illustrate a fundamental > epistemological and practical challenge to AI safety and point to part of a > solution. ]] > > Love, gary f > > Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg > > > > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> *On > Behalf Of *Gary Richmond > *Sent:* 2-Jan-26 00:29 > *To:* Peirce List <[email protected]>; Gary Fuhrman <[email protected] > > > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Surdity, Feeling, and Consciousness, was, Truth and > dyadic consciousnessg > > > > Gary F, List, > > The material you linked to in *Turning Signs *on 'consciousness' and > 'feeling' is thought-provoking, especially your comments on 'surdity' in > relation to 'feeling' and 'consciousness'. I have changed the subject > line to show my emphasis on surdity. In *TS* you write: > > GF:The truth of a proposition depends on the dyadic or real relation (as > opposed to a relation of reason) between that sign and its dynamic object. > It must involve ‘action of brute force, physical or psychical,’ of the > dynamic object upon the sign, so that the relation between the two is > ‘real,’ i.e. surd – no sign can express or describe it. > > > GR: I agree that the *real relation* between a sign and its object is > *surd*, which concept I'd like to explore a bit in this post. You > continued: > > GF: The Secondness of experience itself is a dyadic relation or dynamic > action between two subjects; it is ‘brute,’ ‘surd,’ indicible, ineffable. > But a subject capable of both attention and intention can become a host, as > it were, of Thirdness, or semiosis, so that another subject can become an > ‘object of thought’ (Peirce, CP 1.343, 1903). Now we have a triadic > relation involving the object, the sign or ‘thought,’ and the experiencing > subject, the system of interpretation or ‘mind.’ This is the essential > structure of mental experience. *The 1ns of experience would be the pure > feeling that there is something other than feeling itself – a world > appearing to the subject, and thus becoming an object of attention* (emphasis > added by GR). > > > This reminded me that Peirce remarked -- and Joe Ransdell emphasized this > point in several of his papers, on Peirce-L, and in private conversations -- > that there can be no *pure* icon, which is to say that a qualisign must > be embodied in a sinsign in order to be operative at all. So, t*here are > no pure qualisigns in actual semiosis*, only qualitative aspects of > sinsigns: a qualisign is a 1ns that can signify only by being instantiated > as a sinsign and interpreted via a legisign. > > At bottom consciousness is tied to what is immediate and irreducible, and > this is linked to surdity. Consciousness is feeling: “. . . consciousness > is nothing but Feeling, in general” (CP 7.365). Feeling is simple, > immediate, yet qualitative. It can't infer, intend, or mean anything as it > is non-relational and non-purposive. In this primitive (primary?) sense, > then, consciousness lacks any internal rational structure: it simply is > what it is. This primary consciousness is *pure 1ns*, a qualitative > 'given' of unmediated feeling. This is to say that it is not a sign at all > (which, btw, contradicts the pansemiotic views of some theorists). > > > Peirce is careful not to conflate surdity with mentality, so he > distinguishes consciousness from mind: *consciousness** belongs to 1ns as > feeling*, while* mind** belongs to 3ns in semiosis*. “The mediate element > of experience is the mental element, which is semiosic but not necessarily > conscious” (CP 7.366). Mentality does not essentially require consciousness > since semiosis can -- and often does -- proceed without awareness (the > famous example of the growth of a crystal; but there are many others). What > defines mind isn't consciousness itself but, rather, final causation, > purpose, mind being a living complexus of signs, habits, and > consequent effects which these produce. > > > In an essential sense, surdity would seem to take on the form of brute > reaction (2ns) which may or may not be conscious. For example, the pain of > touching > a hot burner is a conscious instance of 2ns, while the reflex of removing > the hand from the source of the pain isn't. *Can one say > that surdity lies in the brute action/reaction itself, while consciousness > accompanies surdity only when feeling is present?* In contrast, 3ns > *interprets* brute facts and, over time, can make experience intelligible. > Yet, I firmly believe that 3ns cannot eliminate surdity without cutting > thought off from brute actuality, the *hic et nunc*. So Peirce argues > that thought requires resistance, and that signs require dynamic objects as > a kind of check on thought. > > > > Consciousness, then, is the ground upon which *both* semiosis and thought > operate. > > This would seem to resolve an apparent contradiction in Peirce’s use of > the term 'consciousness.' In its primary sense, consciousness is feeling, > so surd, immediate, so, categorially 1ns. In a looser sense, Peirce speaks > of “three modes of consciousness” (CP 8.256): the awareness of feeling, > action, law. I would say that this usage represents, at best, a secondary, > *mediated* consciousness. > > > > Can we say that consciousness is, in its 'primitive' form, surd, while > mind in its fullest sense is semiosic', that consciousness offers the brute > 'given' of existence, while thought supplies the purposive, essentially > semiotic structure that consciousness itself cannot provide? > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
