Helmut, List, Helmut, your post has several intriguing ideas which I hope some List members will explore. For example, your interesting comments on how strong and weak negation differ in belief statements (and your example that atheism and agnosticism are logically distinct even though ordinary language often conflates them).
Also you remarks on how belief systems, hierarchies, and contemporary culture are responses to the 'loss of certainty' in our complex societies (John Dewey's analysis in *The Quest for Certainty* is relevant here; following Peirce, he arrives at the conclusion that the search for immutable foundations is itself misguided), and your speculative conclusion that the outsourcing of intelligence to AI may result in a devolution into a simpler form of humanity is provocative (I agree that there is the possibility of devolution but doubt that it would lead to a simpler humanity). I'm glad you added that Peirce's evolutionary 'openness' suggests that before any such end state occurs that humanity might transform again in wholly unforeseen ways. All these are interesting topics that could most certainly be further developed. But for now I'd like to take up only your comments on *belief*. You wrote: "Possibility, probability, and knowledge are a Peircean categorial trichotomy, and belief is something illogical, non-Peircean, something rogue.". Belief is certainly not a formal logical operation (like abduction, deduction, and induction as you noted) which are, of course, kinds of inference within logic proper. However, rather than seeing belief as a 'rogue' operation, it seems to me that it is in fact *integral to Peirce's logic of inquiry* since in science it functions towards the resolution of doubt. For example, it is not just an intellectual assent to a proposition but, as you suggest, a settled habit. As the mind-set of an inquirer, coming to a genuine belief ought to change his conduct. In “The Fixation of Belief” Peirce defines doubt as an uneasy, dissatisfied state that actually stimulates inquiry, belief as a calm, settled state that terminates inquiry -- at least temporarily. Since, as every student of Peirce knows, the pragmatic meaning of a conception lies in its conceivable practical effects, then belief can't really be separated from conduct since, if nothing in action would differ upon arriving at a 'new' belief, then there is no real difference in holding that belief. So, belief is not logically 'rogue' but the relatively stable outcome of inquiry. Contrasting it to abduction, for example, one can form a hypothesis without believing it. Authentic belief occurs in inquiry only when it becomes a habit. And because habits are central to Peirce’s metaphysics, one might say that belief participates in the growth of law, mediation, meaning, and other essential forms of 3ns. Of course scientific belief -- unlike, say, religious belief -- is always *fallible*; so, Peircean inquiry doesn't aim at certainty but only to an increasingly stable scientific communal opinion which can, of course, be refined or even overturned by further inquiry. So, in my view, belief has an important, even essential role to play in the context of inquiry even broadly speaking as it contributes to the guidance of thought toward truth. Best, Gary R On Fri, May 8, 2026 at 8:14 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > List, > > I wonder, can we symbolize the difference between strong and weak negation > in a way not using language? "I don´t believe in God" is agnostic, "I > believe that there is no God" is atheistic. I must admit, that "belief" is > a concept, I have both not understood yet (logically), and understand > (linguistically). Btw, "A believes", as part of an EG, is not a > symbolization not using language. "Belief" is a term for not a logical > concept, but for a hardened state of mind. Knowledge is due to deduction. > To estimate a probability is due to induction, and to take something for > possible is due to abduction. But to believe in something doesn´t have a > logical background, only its fixation can be analysed to four kinds. "I > know, that not" is a knowledge, "I don´t know, that" too. "It is > possible, that not" is a possibility, "It is not possible, that" is not a > possibility anymore. "It is probable, that not" and "It is not probable, > that" are both probabilities. "I believe, that not" is a belief, but "I > don´t believe, that" is not a belief anymore. So, belief logically works > like possibility, and knowledge like probability. But, while the difference > between strong and weak negation in the case of possibility is clear, in > the case of belief it is not so: Both agnostics and atheists are regarded > for heretics by believers. Ok, a term is not syntax, but a rogue term leads > to a rogue syntax: Strong and weak negation easily confused with each > other. Possibility, probability, and knowledge are a Peircean categorial > trichotomy, and belief is something illogical, non-Peircean, something > rogue. Jungle hunter/gatherer folks, who live in a paradise without > hierarchies, don´t even have to use hierarchical phrases. City folks, who > have lost their entanglement with former basic certainties, have to create > illogical terms and syntaxes, unconsciously trying to get some certainty > back. This leads to culture. So, culture is a deficiency symptom. But a > progress too, though to unknown direction. However, intelligence is being > outsourced to the AI, so de-evolution starts, and when we will be unable to > maintain the computers anymore, when the last LED will have stopped > flashing, we will all be in a dull paradise without hierarchies or beliefs. > But before that happens, something else, quite Peircean, will happen, and > everything will be completely different again, I believe. > > Best, Helmut > >
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