Stan asked: "Could we have an example where this difference (5470-1) would make a difference?"
A mathematical answer would be: "A set of three relations, R-R, R-O and R-I, (5470-2) is not a mathemcial category, whereas the triadic relations among R, O and I, i.e., the R-O-I relation, also called the Peircean sign relation, is." With all the best. Sung ___________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net > Edwina, John -- > > Edwina says: > > On a further note, John (and I know we will probably never agree), with > regard to my contention that the semiosic Sign is a single set of three > interactive Relations, while you consider that it is a 'single triadic > relation' > > Could we have an example where this difference would make a difference? > > STAN > > > On Thu, Mar 20, 2014 at 8:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On a further note, John (and I know we will probably never agree), with >> regard to my contention that the semiosic Sign is a single set of three >> interactive Relations, while you consider that it is a 'single triadic >> relation'. A relation is not just a simple connection but an active >> informational process. >> >> ... Peirce's ten classes clearly refer to three relations and he >> frequently uses the term 'correlate' to refer to both the interaction >> (ie >> the Relation) and the categorical mode of a relation. [See his Division >> of >> Triadic Relations 2.233). If we take the most basic Peircean sign, the >> rhematic indexical legisign - each of the three Relations in this Sign >> is >> in a different categorical mode. If the Sign was ONE, was a single >> relation >> or even just mere connections, those different categories could not >> remain >> distinct. The triadic sign most certainly is not built up of dyads for >> dyads, as pointed out, refer primarily to existentialities. He writes >> that >> 'Signs are divisble by three trichotomies; first, according as the sign >> in >> itself [ET:also called the Representamen] is a mere quality, is an >> actual >> existent, or is a general law; secondly, according *as the relation of >> the sign to its object* (my emphasis) consists in the sign's having some >> character in itself, or in some existential relation to that object, or >> in >> its relation to an interpretant.... >> >> The Peircean model, that three-pronged umbrella, (1.347), a 'triadic >> identity', is made up of a set of three relations; three 'prongs', so to >> speak, each one can operate in a different categorical mode and all, as >> an >> interactive process, form The Sign. >> >> So- we continue to disagree. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> *To:* [email protected] >> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 19, 2014 7:07 PM >> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:5461] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called >> "a >> >> John, see my comments below: >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Deely, John N. <[email protected]> >> *To:* [email protected] >> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 19, 2014 6:33 PM >> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called >> "a >> >> 1) The "representamen" is not a relation, but one of three terms within >> or "under" a single triadic relation, the one that serves as the >> sign-vehicle (one of Peirce's terms, by the way). The "significate" (or >> object) may or may not be an existential unit in itself: Napoleon as >> Emperor of the French at one time was such an "existential unit in >> itself"; >> Hamlet as Prince of Denmark never was. So there can often be a dyadic >> interaction with resultant dyadic relation between representamen and >> significate. >> >> >> >> EDWINA: Yes, the Representamen is a 'term' (which has no existential >> meaning!) but it exists within three Relations or interactions: that >> between itself-and-the-Object; that within itself; and that between >> itself-and-the-Interpretant. >> >> >> >> The SIGN exists as a single triadic relation - but within that triad, >> are >> those three Relations as I outlined above; this set of three are >> irreducible. >> >> Napoleon was a physically existential unit in itself. And Hamlet is an >> existential unit as well, a conceptually existent unit. >> >> >> >> Yes, one existential unit can dyadically interact with another >> existential >> unit, eg, Napoleon and his horse. That's not the same type of relation >> or >> interaction within a semiosic action. The semiosic relation is an >> informational interaction; where data from the input/external source is >> transformed within the organizational mediation of the Representamen to >> result in an intepretant 'meaning'. That's not made up of dyads; it's a >> full triadic interaction. >> >> >> >> >> >> 2) >> >> A relation I not an action but rather a suprasubjective >> connection or link that arises from actions. The representamen as such >> is >> such because of the postion it occupies in a given triadic relation; but >> the representamen is indeed often a thing, like that red-colored octagon >> with white markings commonly called "a stop sign". What doesn't >> represent >> another than itself, insofar as it does not, is simply not actually a >> representamen. >> >> >> >> EDWINA: No, here I disagree. That stop sign is a material object, a >> dynamic object. It functions as a sign (the triad) when it becomes part >> of >> a semiosic interaction...where I see the sign (input of data from the >> red >> sign object); my cognitive Representamen Process mediates that input of >> sense data according to my knowledge base: into the final part of the >> Sign, >> the Interpretant which means 'stop'. The Stop Sign is never in itself a >> Representamen, because the Representamen in the triad is a generalizing >> action that mediates specific particular data and interprets that data >> into >> information. >> >> >> >> 3) >> >> It remains that what you call the "triadic sign" is the >> consequent of one relation irreducibly triadic; whence there is no such >> thing as "a non-triadic sign"; a system of signs indeed is a set of >> relations; but a given "sign" is a set of terms united under one >> relation. >> >> >> >> EDWINA: And here, I agree that there is no such thing as a non-triadic >> sign, but a don't see that a Sign is a 'set of terms' (I see that a Sign >> is >> a set of Relations, not terms)...and don't see that it is united under >> ONE >> Relation. >> >> >> >> Regards, >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> >> >> (Try that video -- < >> http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=E9651802BCDC14BF> -- all five >> parts, however.) >> >> >> >> Cheers >> >> >> >> >> >> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]] >> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 19, 2014 17:19 >> *To:* [email protected] >> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:5458] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called >> "a >> >> >> >> John, the interactions, or the relation that exists between the Object >> and >> Representamen is not a dyad, for a dyad operates only when both 'end >> points' are existential units in themselves. These connections or >> relations are not between two existential units and can't even exist >> except >> within the triadic set of three such interactions. >> >> >> >> The mediative Relation, the Representamen, doesn't exist in itself and >> therefore, its interactions with the object and interpretant cannot be >> dyadic. In addition, I don't think that the Representamen Relation >> 'represents another than itself, for, again, it cannot exist 'per se'. >> The >> Representamen Relation is, as a generalizing action rather than >> particular, >> always embedded within a particular. Generals are real but not >> spatiotemporally existential in themselves. >> >> >> >> Yes, the molecule as a 'sign', i.e., as an existential entity (made up >> of >> three Relations) does act WITHIN an object-Relation with another >> molecule... >> >> >> >> No, I don't agree with the notion of 'ONE relation uniting the three >> semiosically'. I like your three terms, though I define them differently >> and don't consider them positions but rather 'relations': the >> 'foreground', the 'significate' and the 'interpretant'....and I DO call >> the >> whole set the SIGN - but I reject the notion that this 'Sign' (the whole >> set of three) is itself a Relation. >> >> >> >> Things or 'signs' that are in relation ...that's a different type of >> relation than what I am talking about within the triadic Sign. >> >> >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> >> *From:* Deely, John N. <[email protected]> >> >> *To:* [email protected] >> >> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 19, 2014 5:42 PM >> >> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:5455] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called >> "a >> >> >> >> Whatever stands in the foreground position of representing another than >> itself to or for a third is (what is commonly called) a "sign". So if >> what >> happens to occupy that position is a molecule, then the molecule *in >> that >> circumstance* is called "a sign". >> >> But what occupies that foreground position (1) under one >> set of circumstances or for one person at one time may well under other >> circumstances or for other persons occupy the position of the other >> represented (2) or again occupy the to or for position (3) - the >> semiotic >> spiral of ever-growing experience. >> >> But what makes, say, some molecule in given >> circumstances >> a "sign" may make that same molecule in other circumstances an "object" >> or >> again an "interpretant", etc. >> >> So we need to have a name for the three positions to be >> occupied, and a name for ONE relation uniting the three semiosically. >> The >> best term for position 1 or the foreground position is probably >> "representamen"; for position 2 "significate" (rather than "object"); >> for >> position 3 "interpretant". Then the irreducibly triadic relation uniting >> the three to constitute an instance of semiosis is what "actually" or >> (as >> Peirce puts it) "formally" constitutes the sign. That also explains, >> relations as relations being only indirectly instantiable to sense, why >> alloanimals make use of signs but only human animals can come to know >> that >> there are signs, as Maritain put it, because only human animals can come >> to >> know relations, dyadic or triadic, in their difference from related >> things. >> (This summarizes the discussion on YouTube < >> http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=E9651802BCDC14BF>. >> >> Edwina's position, if the position common to Peirce and >> Poinsot is correct, is simply wrong. A set of three dyadic relations >> does >> not a triadic relation make (as Shakespeare might say through some >> character or other). >> >> >> >> *From:* Kalevi Kull [mailto:[email protected] <[email protected]>] >> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 19, 2014 16:28 >> *To:* [email protected] >> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:5453] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"? >> >> >> >> Okay. Sign is just a triadic relation. But a molecule is not just a >> triadic relation. Therefore, molecule is not a sign. >> >> Best >> >> Kalevi >> >> 19-03-2014 23:18 kirjutas Edwina Taborsky: >> >> Kalevi- you are having fun with me! I say that a sign consists of three >> relations - and no, it is not 'something else other than these >> relations'. >> A sign is a function..ie, where x(f)=y. Or X, the input Relation (the >> Object-Representamen Relation) is mediated within/by the function or >> Representamen Relation (f) to result in the output Y, the >> Representamen-Interpretant Relation. >> >> >> >> Taken together, these three interations or relations (for the sign is >> always active!!!) are..The Sign. So, the Sign is an irreducible set of >> three Relations. And no, the Sign is NOT something else other than >> these >> Relations. The Sign IS...nothing other than the whole three Relations as >> they interact. >> >> >> >> X, or the Object-Representamen Relation can provide input data within >> three modes, and so, provide data that is iconic, indexical or symbolic >> to >> its Dynamic Object >> >> >> >> f, or the Representamen-in-itself Relation can mediate, generalize >> within >> three modes, and so, can constrain, organize that input data within >> either >> a qualisign, dicisign or legisign form of organization; that is, it will >> organize that input data as generalized qualities, as habitual >> connections >> or as habitual patterns of organization. >> >> >> >> Y, or the Representamen-Interpretant Relation can provide a >> resulting closure of these Relations within three modes, and so, will >> present that input data (X), mediated by the Representamen Y, as either >> a >> rheme ..a cloned version of the Object so to speak; or a >> dicent..requiring >> a physical connection...or..a pure abstract thought (there is only one >> sign >> that does this). >> >> >> >> But all together, the Sign is an active, interactive process, made up of >> three Relations. >> >> >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> >> *From:* Kalevi Kull <[email protected]> >> >> *To:* [email protected] >> >> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 19, 2014 4:40 PM >> >> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:5451] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"? >> >> >> >> Edwina, >> >> hm, you are saying here that *sign is not a triadic relation*. You say >> that sign only consists (mainly of?) some relations, actually being >> itself >> something else than these relations. How so? >> >> John is hinting to the same problem, as I understand. >> >> Best >> >> Kalevi >> >> >> >> 19-03-2014 18:04 kirjutas Edwina Taborsky: >> >> Kalevi, to me, a sign is a morphological existence (in space and time) >> made up of three basic relations; those between the Object and >> Representamen; the Repre. in itself; and that between the Repre. and the >> Interpretant. Each Relation can be in one of the three categorical modes >> (though their correlation is another issue). >> >> >> >> So, the 'sign' is not in itself a relation, but a morphological reality >> (which I call a morpheme) made up of relations...and able to relate to >> other morphemes. Therefore, I consider the molecule a sign. I know >> that >> many biologists reject this inclusion of the physico-chemical realm >> within >> semiosis, but so far, no-one has provided me with a strong enough >> argument >> to make me reject that inclusion. >> >> >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> >> *From:* Kalevi Kull <[email protected]> >> >> *To:* [email protected] >> >> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 19, 2014 10:00 AM >> >> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:5430] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"? >> >> >> >> Dear Gary, >> >> thank you. But, well, a molecule never can be a sign. Because sign is a >> relation, while molecule is not a relation. >> >> Best >> >> Kalevi >> >> 19-03-2014 15:26 kirjutas Gary Fuhrman: >> >> Kalevi, if I might play a variation on your theme: a "gene" defined as >> a >> piece of a physically existing DNA molecule can be regarded as an >> indexical >> sinsign (which is a replica of a legisign); but its *object* is >> certainly >> not a cell. Its dynamic object can only be the dynamic process which >> produced it, which is of the *type* that generates DNA molecules of a >> structure which includes that gene. And like the gene, that process can >> only make sense (or exist) in its context, which includes both its >> (cellular) environment and the evolutionary history of that *type* of >> process. It's indexical because it has a real (causal) relation to that >> object, which determines it to determine its interpretant (say, a >> protein). >> >> >> >> It is certainly not a sign in the symbolic way that the word "chair" is >> a >> sign of the static physical object we call by that name. The cell is not >> the gene's object but the quasi-mind *informed* by the gene, which >> carries the semotic process forward. >> >> >> >> A "gene", like a letter of the alphabet, can only mean something as part >> of a larger sign. The concept of "gene" is a product of analysis; it has >> no >> independent physical existence. That's why I say it *can be regarded >> as*an indexical sinsign (just as a letter can be regarded as a symbol). >> >> >> >> gary f. >> >> >> >> *From:* Kalevi Kull [mailto:[email protected] <[email protected]>] >> *Sent:* 18-Mar-14 10:55 AM >> >> Dear colleagues, >> >> if to define *gene* as a piece of DNA molecule, then it is not a sign >> (of >> whatever kind) for a cell. It may only be a sign for a biologist, or for >> somebody who does not pay attention to the intracellular processes. >> >> Or you mean something else by gene. >> >> :-)) >> >> Best, >> >> Kalevi >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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