Vinicius, Kees, list,
Thank you, Vinicius, for these first two valuable and most stimulating
posts. I'm certain that Kees appreciates both that you recognize the
extreme space limitations placed upon him, and that his choices of what to
include were anything but arbitrary, rather, based on several
considerations, perhap especially that of introducing Peirce to those who
may not be very familiar with his work, including his sometimes complicated
terminology. In rereading his book I was reminded of how much Kees was able
to pack into a mere 164 pages, how clearly he presents some of Peirce's
most important, even difficult concepts, and yet how readable the whole is.
However, your pointing to what he wan't able to include is also valuable.
But, again, I find it remarkable that in the 19 pages which comprise the
chapter on semeiotics that, at least as I see it, he was able to say more
of value concerning that field than, for example, Tom Short was able to say
in the 347 pages of *Peirce's Theory of Signs*, a work which I know Joe
Ransdell considered--and I agree--to be an idiosyncratic distortion of
Peirce's semeiotic, what Joe once suggested might better be titled *Tom
Short's Theory of Signs* (which is not to suggest that it doesn't include
many original, valuable insights--but, I'd say, only for those
well-schooled in Peirce).
Be that as it may, and as your first mentioned of two issues objections to
Kees' presentation of hypostatic abstraction has already, albeit briefly,
been discussed, I'd like to comment on your second objection. You quote
Kees:
*CdW: "Thus we can say that, though any object, say a footprint on the
beach, can give rise to a great variety of signs (human presence, the
firmness of the sand, etc.), and though any sign can give rise to a variety
of interpretations (a spouse's infidelity, the movement of the tide), each
object limits, or determines, what may be a sign of it, and each sign
similarly limits what may be an interpretant of it. Peirce's account
suggests that what is picked out as a sign and how it is interpreted
relates to the purpose of the interpreter" (emphasis added).*
And remark:
*VR: I think this might not the best way to describe a genuine triadic
relation. The object appears here as some "thing" quite independent of the
other correlates and that "can give rise" to a variety of signs. Actually
the object of the sign is always in a logical relation to the sign. If the
relation does not subsist, then it is not the object of the sign. Besides
that, a sign might have several objects (or a complex object), but I don't
see how an object cannot "give rise" to several signs. *
As I read the snippet from Kees' chapter, he is not saying, as you wrote
immediately above, that "an object cannot 'give rise' to several signs;
indeed, he seems to be saying just the opposite in explicitly stating that
a object "can give rise to a great variety of signs." Rather, he says that
what i 'picked out as a sign' depends on the interpreter's (we're
discussing human semiosis here) *purpose*.
This seems to be what you are objecting to as you continue:
*VR: On the same vein, it is true that the sign can produce a variety of
interpretations, but each interpretation effectively produced is the result
of the potential that the sign itself has to be interpreted independently
of any psychological consideration such as "the purpose of the
interpreter". The purpose, which might be understood as related to the
final interpretant of the sign, must also be considered part of the logical
relation and should not be introduced "ex machina". *
It appears to me that you are here suggesting, in writing "*of the
potential that the sign itself has to be interpreted independently of any
psychological consideration such as "the purpose of the interpreter,"* that
the sign somehow *functions* independently of its being a sign of s*omething
*for someone. You continue by stating that "the footprint [is] the sign."
*VR: I would rather consider the footprint as the sign. Taken as an
individual, it is a sinsign. Considered as a true symptom, it is an index
that represents existentially its object, which is the very foot (and the
person related too such foot) that determined the form of that singular
footprint. As an indexical sinsign, it only represents that "something with
this shape was here", which is its interpretant dicisign. I am assuming
that the interpreter has already familiarity with the shape of a shoe, that
shoes leave their marks on the sand etc. We could put this into the
analysis too, but would lead us to nearly an infinite regress. As Peirce
states, we must start our inquiry with our own prejudices, or the "state of
information" about the universe we live in. *
But it is not simply familiarity with "the shape of a shoe" that is
critical here. It appear that Kees sees it somewhat differently in writing
that a *"footprint on the beach, can give rise to a great variety of signs
(human presence, the firmness of the sand, etc.)"*
Spring-boarding off the end of that snippet ("the firmness of the sand"),
but offering yet another example, consider the case of an archaeologist
who, while quarrying, comes upon a footprint of a perhaps small to
mid-sized reptile from the age of the dinosaurs. one which he immediately
identifies from his collateral knowledge of previous footprints, as well as
a very few other fossil remains which he, and those in his field, are
familiar with.
So the question here is not what extinct reptile this footprint is a sign
of (already known) but, say, because the texture of the material is well
known, and the footprint, clearly that of an adult of the species, the
print here being not shallow, but deep, the anthropologist, combining those
bits of information, is able to surmise the approximate weight of the
animal--new information, perhaps wholly unexpected (e.g., he might earlier
have thought it was quite small, but it appear to be considerably larger
based on his new knowledge).
So here the sign is not the footprint alone, but for the archeologist's
*purposes *it is the footprint, its depth, the constitution of the material
it's contained within, etc.
You continued by remarking that it is *not *the purpose, but merely the
familiarity from collateral knowledge which is significant here. But it
seems to me that purpose, in consideration of gaining *new *knowledge,
*is*important (otherwise one would be blind to the possibility of even
discovering new knowledge). In the present example, the purpose of
the archaeologist is *not* to identify the maker of the print (already
known) but to arrive at the approximate weight (and so possibly also size
and height) of this not well known extinct reptile, Yet, perhaps you are
saying something like this in writing:
*VR: If memory of these past experiences is vivid enough in the mind when
the sign footprint comes to the phaneron, associations will follow
naturally, even unconsciously, putting it in relation with information
already in the memory. This synthetical inference, which is an abduction,
will create a new and more developed sign* (emphasis added)
Possibly I've misrepresented either or both you and Kees in this matter of
'purpose'. Little doubt that I'll find out.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Vinicius Romanini <[email protected]>wrote:
> Dear list members,
>
> In this second message I will comment on Kees' excursion on Peirce's
> definition of signs and its elements: the representamen (or the sign
> prescinded from the other correlates), the object the sign professes to
> represent and the interpretant as the effect of the action of the sign.
> Kees gives us a rather succinct overview and avoids going too much into
> questions still open to scholar debate, sometimes with very strong
> disagreements (that's what I would do too, by the way, if I were to write a
> panoramic text).
>
> Actually, I have never found two Peirce scholars who would totally agree
> when it comes to Peirce's theory of signs - and I would not expect this
> will happen during this seminar either. I myself have some disagreements
> with Kees in minor details but also on some at least one important example
> of applying the above mentioned analysis of the correlates.
>
> As we know, Peirce wrote dozens of different definitions for "sign" in his
> more than 40 years of work around the subject and it seems that he ended
> his life never totally satisfied with any, for his last MS's, from 1908-11,
> are full of tentative definitions to accommodate his commitment to
> pragmatism, the reality of the three categories but also his further
> division of the three correlates into ten a aspects.
>
> These variations use verbs like "represent", "determine" , "affect",
> "influence", "cause", "specialize" etc. Although written in different
> wordings, all of them have the same fundamental goal which is to define
> what a genuine triadic relation is. Since there are three correlates, one
> can choose how to punctuate this triadic relation.
>
> Kees explains all this and also warns us that Peirce would sometime write
> a definition that he thought would be more intelligible. He would use for
> example the term "interpreter" instead of the more logical "interpretant" -
> a word that Peirce himself created to eliminate traces of psychologism in
> his logic.
>
> Having the above in mind, I two disagreements with Kees' account:
>
> - The first is that Kees suggests that all signs might be hypostatic
> abstractions (either entia realis or rationis) but I do not see why.
> Although hypostatic abstractions are certainly signs (such as the
> relations among the objects of a proposition), there might be signs which
> are not abstractions. Since any cognizable can be a sign, this would
> include real possibilities and existents not yet cognized. For example, I
> recall Peirce saying that a fossil fish is thought (and hence a sign) even
> if not yet found by anyone. Maybe Kees could clarify what he meant.
>
> - The second objection is the example he offers on page 80:
>
> "Thus we can say that, though any object, say a footprint on the beach,
> can give rise to a great variety of signs (human presence, the firmness of
> the sand, etc.), and though any sign can give rise to a variety of
> interpretations (a spouse's infidelity, the movement of the tide), each
> object limits, or determines, what may be a sign of it, and each sign
> similarly limits what may be an interpretant of it. Peirce's account
> suggests that what is picked out as a sign and how it is interpreted
> relates to the purpose of the interpreter (...)".
>
> I think this might not the best way to describe a genuine triadic
> relation. The object appears here as some "thing" quite independent of the
> other correlates and that "can give rise" to a variety of signs. Actually
> the object of the sign is always in a logical relation to the sign. If the
> relation does not subsist, then it is not the object of the sign. Besides
> that, a sign might have several objects (or a complex object), but I don't
> see how an object cannot "give rise" to several signs.
>
> On the same vein, it is true that the sign can produce a variety of
> interpretations, but each interpretation effectively produced is the result
> of the potential that the sign itself has to be interpreted independently
> of any psychological consideration such as "the purpose of the
> interpreter". The purpose, which might be understood as related to the
> final interpretant of the sign, must also be considered part of the logical
> relation and should not be introduced "ex machina".
>
> *Data maxima venia*, I thought it would be interesting to offer to the
> members of the list a more detailed description of semiosis involving this
> example. This would certainly not be the case in a book directed to a more
> general audience, which would only lead to perplexity. But since I assume
> that most of us here are already passed the state of perplexity when
> dealing with Peirce's terminology, I will risk bothering you with my own
> interpretation from the same example.
>
> I would rather consider the footprint as the sign. Taken as an individual,
> it is a sinsign. Considered as a true symptom, it is an index that
> represents existentially its object, which is the very foot (and the person
> related too such foot) that determined the form of that singular footprint.
> As an indexical sinsign, it only represents that "something with this shape
> was here", which is its interpretant dicisign. I am assuming that the
> interpreter has already familiarity with the shape of a shoe, that shoes
> leave their marks on the sand etc. We could put this into the analysis too,
> but would lead us to nearly an infinite regress. As Peirce states, we must
> start our inquiry with our own prejudices, or the "state of information"
> about the universe we live in.
>
> Anything beyond this will depend on the familiarity of the interpreter
> with the object being represented by the sign, gathered by what Peirce
> calls collateral experience. Not the "purpose", but the familiarity. In the
> case of the tide, the mental habits about how ocean waves usually erase
> footprints, how tides come and go. In the case of the spouse infidelity,
> the knowledge that people are sometimes unfaithful, etc.
>
> The important here is that his knowledge must have been gathered by
> previous experiences with related situations, be it directly or indirectly
> perceived from from other sources (books, movies, newspapers, conversations
> etc). If memory of these past experiences is vivid enough in the mind when
> the sign footprint comes to the phaneron, associations will follow
> naturally, even unconsciously, putting it in relation with information
> already in the memory. This synthetical inference, which is an abduction,
> will create a new and more developed sign.
>
> But how is new sign and its information is created? The indexical sign
> "footprint" is attached to this "idea" already present in the mind (the
> immediate object of this new sign), which is a sort of composite image of
> all similar situations that are present in the mind. Attaching an index to
> an idea embodied on a particular moment produces the cognition - which is
> the sign that brings information to the mind.
>
> In the case that the inference is about the spouse's infidelity, the
> complex object of this new sign (the hypothesis) will be the owner of the
> foot that produced the footprint (her lover), the spouse, and the act of
> infidelity. The predicate would be the logical principle that holds all
> these objects together (that is, the form of the argument that prescribes
> that "if something would be true, than the observed relations among the
> objects would follow logically". That is: "if the spouse is unfaithful,
> then the foot of the footprint could be from her lover".
>
> In the case of the tide, a similar set of objects and a relational
> predicate would be necessary to produce meaning, which is always
> interpretations.
>
> Furthermore, it might be the case that a mind seeing the footprint will
> produce both inferences (about the tide AND about the spouse infidelity).
> These two former inferences would appear then as premises of a new and more
> developed sign, which now gets the shape of an argument.
>
> This is what Peirce's rhetoric (or methodeutic) is about: a continuous
> production of hypostatic abstractions and putting them in communication to
> create ever more embracing arguments about the reality. Starting with facts
> and cognitions initially not associated, a systematic and more coherent
> view becomes diagrammatized in the mind. Deduction then would extract the
> necessary consequences and induction would eventually put them to the text
> of experience.
>
> Certainly this outline could be refined to bring into scene the plethora
> of Peirce's types and classes of signs. I write all this to show, in
> advance, how difficult it is to put a "tag" such "this is an index, that
> is an abduction" without considering the whole "movement of the thought"
> involved. As in my next message we will have to deal with Peirce's classes
> of signs, I think it is good to keep this in mind.
>
> All the best,
> Vinicius
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D.
> Professor of Communication Studies
> School of Communications and Arts
> University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
> www.minutesemeiotic.org
> www.semeiosis.com.br
>
> Skype:vinicius_romanini
>
>
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