Gary F., List, Thank you for the effort, Gary. Actually, since you mentioned that understanding the motivation of my questions is somewhat difficult, perhaps it would prove helpful to present that motivation more clearly.
In the early theory of information, we have a fairly clear account of what information is: information is the information of a symbol, expressed in the quantity of interpretant, itself understand in terms of whether the symbol is used as subject or predicate in synthetic propositions. So information is the product of synthetic depth and breadth. I can consider any given symbol, consider the characters and things which inform it, and thereby understand what the symbol means -- how it is to be interpreted in terms of its characters and things. I can also clearly understand that the symbol changes according to changes in its information, while still being the same symbol. These changes would be understood as occurring through inferences, always through either induction or abduction; even though one or two of the kinds of inductions and abductions seem very similar to deductions because of verbal changes involved. I'm not entirely sure what's going on with the later theory of abduction, though it was the topic in Peirce's philosophy that interested me most during my master's studies. If I understand rightly, what would have been called abduction in the early theory is later subsumed under induction, in particular induction of qualities, so I am no longer certain how inference works in the later theory of information. This should serve as an indication that something is different about the later theory in more than a minor way. All the more so when we consider the later classifications of signs. We know the dicisign will convey information in the later theory, but a proposition can only be the dicisign that is also a symbol and legisign. Since there are also now dicisigns that are indices and sinsigns or indices and legisigns, we now have something besides syntethic propositions to deal with (though a proposition will be instantiated in a sinsign). We also know that icons and indices will determine the information of the dicisign, as we might have expected in the early theory as communicating characters and things to which the symbol applies. But in the later theory icons and indices have become a good bit more complicated, being distinguished in a number of ways. It may be doubted whether depth and breadth are any longer so easily characterized as referring to characters and things, so that the analysis of a proposition's information, not to mention of the other dicisigns, will now require something more of an elaborate analysis than the breaking it down into characters and things to which the terms (and now, in the later theory, the propositions and arguments) apply. So when I see that comprehension/depth is associated with interpretants and their misinterpretation, I would like a good bit more to be said about how this is to be understood. When I think of the interpretants now, I typically think of them in terms of the trichotomy of immediate-dynamic-final. But for one thing, the dicisign is not, classified as such, an interpretant, but the relation of sign to interpretant. So when the misinterpretation occurs, is it in this relation, or is it in the interpretants themselves? "Lack of information on the side of interpretant" makes it look as though it must be with the interpretants. But which interpretant? The immediate, the dynamic, or the final, or two of the three, or all three? And, when we consider comprehension/depth, is this going to be a more robust understanding of comprehension/depth than we find in the early theory relating to the quantity of characters informing the symbol? I am somewhat clueless here, so I'm seeking to be better informed about what is going on with misinterpretation. If I my motivation doesn't seem to be showing itself yet in this line of thinking, I will put it more explicitly: Information, in the early theory, has to do with the meanings of terms and how inductive and abductive inferences increase the state of information, reflecting, ideally, an increase in knowledge. Information, in the later theory, does not seem quite so clear cut; everything is a lot more complicated now, making it quite difficult to pull off one clear example of information change or growth. In the early theory, I had simply to take a term, consider its known characters and things to which it applied, and then develop ideas about how it might be expanded through abduction and put them to the test through induction. In the later theory, I am rather clueless where to begin. I'm not saying this is a bad thing; in some respects I have thought the early theory leaning nominalistic, whereas the later theory looks more adequate to the challenge of natural classification, i.e. the classification of forms operating as final causes in nature. But it's always been, from my point of view, unwieldy, and I would like to achieve a much improved understanding of it and, with hope, learn to become proficient in informational analysis through the later theory -- informational analysis, of course, in what would be Peirce's sense of that term if he had used it. I am actually quite glad that Vinicius brought up his point about information missing from Kees' book. Then again, since I know of no genuinely clear account of how to proceed through an analysis with the later theory's developments, perhaps it was better that Kees left it out. In any case, I was really more hopeful than anything that I could get a clearer account from Vinicius of his fourth point, the one regarding information, because if he thinks it should have been included, then perhaps he has a much superior grasp of the workings of the later theory and knows how it ought to have been presented in Kees' book; and I would like to, if I might, get some good hints about those workings. Hence my questions, which are somewhat searching, but also have to do with my heuristics and information at this point regarding Peirce's semiotic(s), which heuristics and information would appear in some way to conflict with Vinicius' statement of his own point of view. Well I hope this helps to understand the motivation behind my inquiry. Now I'm going to go check out what Jon Awbrey has offered of his own understanding, and will likely reply to him late tonight or tomorrow, depending on how long it takes me to get through his readings. -- Franklin On Mon, Mar 31, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Franklin, > > > > Just to let you know, I did have a go at answering your questions, but > made no progress; I'm not up to the task this morning. Somebody who better > understands their motivation will have to take over ... > > > > gary f. > > > > *From:* Frank Ransom [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 30-Mar-14 11:18 PM > *To:* [email protected] 1 > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 5, Semeiotics, or the > doctrine of signs > > > > Gary, Vinicius, List, > > > > After following the link and reading "Rehabilitating Information," I think > I have something of what I was looking for; but yes, I am especially > interested in the trichotomies of interpretants. > > > > There are two ideas that I took away from the article that somewhat change > my perspective: first, that Peirce later extends the concept of information > to apply not only to terms but also propositions and arguments; second, in > general I was impressed by the way information (or as Peirce's concept is > uniquely identified in the article, Information) is shown to be important > to the whole of the triadic relation and to semiosis, which perhaps should > be taken to show that information no longer has at all do with the quantity > of the interpretant. If I remember correctly, I read this paper before (or > perhaps something similar?) a long while ago, but it was good to read it > again and recall. > > > > Still, I found my questions unanswered, such as the one regarding the > immediate-dynamic-final trichotomy; should we expect comprehension to be of > three kinds now, and how do these relate to the characters of the object? > Also, is it really the case that extension or breadth no longer has to do > with the quantity of interpretant, but now to do with the object of the > sign instead? > > > > I should say that I have resolved one of my concerns stated before, "Since > misrepresentation has to do with the lack of information on the extension > of a term, and misinterpretation with the lack of information on the > comprehension of a term, how is it that the iconic is what is significant > with respect to the possibility of misinterpretation, rather than, say, the > symbolic? Partly I realized I made a mistake in my first post, saying "Also, > I would like to point out that in these readings, he says icons are > necessary for comprehension, while indices are necessary for extension." When > looking for an appropriate passage, I realized I had actually received this > idea by reading through André's essay from the following line in particular > from "Peirce's Logic of Information": "Peirce's elaborate discussion of > dicisigns or propositions in the Syllabus of 1903 (EP2: 275-85, 294-99) and > in "New Elements" (EP2: 308-24) demonstrates clearly how such propositions > always involve iconic and indexical elements--elements of depth and > breadth--without which they could not inform." Here I suppose, understanding > the terms as given respectively, that iconic and depth are to be understood > as representing the same elements. > > > > But if this is true, and if misinterpretation is both "the lack of > information on the side of intepretant (and interpreters)" and "lack of > information on the comprehension of a term" then this suggests that > iconic elements are associated with the interpretant and that > misinterpretation has to do with iconic elements, which casts doubt on the > example of the weathervane Vinicius used in showing the problem with the > iconic element to result in misrepresentation rather than > misinterpretation. In relating what André says about icons and depth with > what Vinicius had to say about misinterpretation and lack of information > with respect to interpretants and comprehension, and the connection I draw > between the iconic, comprehension, and the interpretant, we do find Peirce > saying in "Sundry Logical Conceptions" (EP2, pp.276-277) that "The part > which is represented to represent a part of the Dicisign, is represented as > at once part of the Interpretant and part of the Object. It must, > therefore, be represented as such a sort of Representamen (or to represent > such a sort) as can have its Object and its Interpretant the same. Now, a > Symbol cannot even have itself as its Object...An Index can very well > represent itself...But it is impossible for an Index to be its own > Interpretant...An Icon, however, is strictly a possibility, involving a > possibility, and thus the possibility of its being represented as a > possibility is the possibility of the involved possibility. In this kind of > Representamen alone, then, the Interpretant may be the Object. > Consequently, that constituent of the Dicisign which is represented in the > Interpretant as being a part of the Object, must be represented by an Icon > or by a Representamen of an Icon." Since Peirce here has explained how the > iconic is connected with the interpretant, I no longer have a concern with > how this is possible. > > > > But I would like to know how a broken weathervane, which would normally be > understood to point in the direction of the wind, can be broken such that, > not indexically, but iconically, it fails to represent the wind. For > indexically, we might expect that a broken weathervane would simply fail to > point at all, because no longer physically affected by the wind, and thus > fail to represent the wind; but if the problem is iconic, we might expect > a broken weathervane to still be pointing, but bent in such a way as to > misdirect the interpreter's attention -- which, I should think, means a > misinterpretation by the interpreter, not a misrepresentation; for surely > the bent weathervane is still moved by the wind and thus physically > affected to be in its current facing, thus still representing the wind. Or > perhaps, because the icon is at once part of the Object and part of the > Interpretant, it might somehow be said to be both misrepresentation and > misinterpretation? I don't think this can be right though; the weathervane > still looks well enough iconically to be understood as a weathervane, > albeit bent up or broken in some such way that the interpreter has not yet > figured out how to reinterpret it to understand the direction of the wind. > The only other possibility I can suppose, when considering the possibility > of iconic misrepresentation, is that the broken weathervane not only does > not look like a weathervane, it also has no longer a physical connection > with the wind. In this case, I'm not so sure that it's right to say that > there is any misrepresentation at all. There's simply no representation at > all anymore to act as a bad representation or misrepresentation. And, while > it would take too much searching to find the appropriate quote from Peirce, > I was fairly certain he thought that technically, any quality can represent > anything whatsoever, everything having a likeness, even in the vaguest > possible way, to everything else; it is merely uneconomical (perhaps a > gross understatement) for inquiry to follow certain qualities rather than > others when working to discover the truth of a sign. > > > > Well, perhaps I am horribly mistaken somewhere, but I'm not sure where it > would be. If an example could be brought up about how the lack of > comprehension of a term is possible in the weathervane case that does not > involve the possibility which is at once also its very capacity for iconic > representation, I might be satisfied with being wrong in my assessment of > the broken weathervane example. > > > > As an additional note, I also wonder if "misinterpretation is lack of > information on the comprehension of a term" can't be quite right, since > Peirce extended information to propositions and arguments. Quoting from > Gary's paper: > > > "Peirce later added supplementary notes to his paper in 1870 (W2:504-12) > and 1893 (CP 2.391-430 and notes). One of the latter includes this > explanation (CP 2.407 Fn P1): > > 'I restricted myself to terms, because at the time this chapter was first > written (1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of breadth and > depth was equally applicable to propositions and to arguments. The breadth > of a proposition is the aggregate of possible states of things in which it > is true; the breadth of an argument is the aggregate of possible cases to > which it applies. The depth of a proposition is the total of fact which it > asserts of the state of things to which it is applied; the depth of an > argument is the importance of the conclusions which it draws.'" > > > > I don't think I'm capable of drawing out the implications for > misrepresentation and misinterpretation, if there even are any, but I think > it's good food for thought. > > > > -- Franklin >
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