Gary,
You replied to Vinicius: With that in mind, I don't quite follow your argument here, and could use some further explanation on these points: "icons do not enter our concepts as such" "depth signifies the object by applying to it percipua discriminated as predicative terms (mortal, rational, mammal etc)." (gf] I would say instead that the predicate signifies characters of the object and thus furnishes the proposition with its depth.) --end A nice test on my understanding of Vinicius. In my estimate Vinicius is following the process of interpretation bottom up. If you shift to interpretant terminology the icon is the mental energetic interpretant and the sinsign the energetic, the emotional interpretant being the qualisign that marks the start of the process. A further development of the energetic interpretant is the logical interpretant (which Peirce sub-divided in three: immediate, dynamical and normal interpretant. Alas he didn't get the idea to look for all nine sign aspects for counterparts in the interpretant division. So, there are no interpretant counterparts for the index, the legisign and the symbol.) The icon/ mental energetic interpretant is a one time form. If this form is familiar (famisign) to the interpreting system, it is a legisign form. Indexically this form retrieves its associated symbol (the interpretive habits associated with the chair form for instance). So, icons do not enter our concepts as such, but as habit of interpretation or symbol. Auke van Breemen KiF-advies Oude Graafseweg 52 6543 PS Nijmegen 024-3786910 06 26350393 Van: Gary Fuhrman [mailto:[email protected]] Verzonden: woensdag 2 april 2014 15:41 Aan: 'Peirce List' Onderwerp: RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 5, Semeiotics, or the doctrine of signs Vinicius, My previous message was inspired by the kind of thing Peirce says in the "New Elements" essay of 1904: [[ Every sign that is sufficiently complete refers to sundry real objects. All these objects, even if we are talking of Hamlet's madness, are parts of one and the same Universe of being, the "Truth." But so far as the "Truth" is merely the object of a sign, it is merely the Aristotelian Matter of it that is so. In addition however to denoting objects, every sign sufficiently complete signifies characters, or qualities. We have a direct knowledge of real objects in every experiential reaction, whether of Perception or of Exertion (the one theoretical, the other practical). These are directly hic et nunc. But we extend the category, and speak of numberless real objects with which we are not in direct reaction. We have also direct knowledge of qualities in feeling, peripheral and visceral. But we extend this category to numberless characters of which we have no immediate consciousness. All these characters are elements of the "Truth." Every sign signifies the "Truth." But it is only the Aristotelian Form of the universe that it signifies. ]] [[ The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of the characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical depth. ]] [[ It is remarkable that while neither a pure icon nor a pure index can assert anything, an index which forces something to be an icon, as a weather-cock does, or which forces us to regard it as an icon, as the legend under a portrait does, does make an assertion, and forms a proposition. ]] With that in mind, I don't quite follow your argument here, and could use some further explanation on these points: "icons do not enter our concepts as such" "depth signifies the object by applying to it percipua discriminated as predicative terms (mortal, rational, mammal etc)." (gf] I would say instead that the predicate signifies characters of the object and thus furnishes the proposition with its depth.) "The process of discrimination, which is a hypostatic abstraction, is a work of the interpretant." gf] You've lost me there. "What is left after all possible abstraction is done is the continuous predicates - the very syntax of time and that cannot be further discriminated because every try will leave it untouched as before." gf] Yes, that describes Peirce's practice of "throwing everything into the subject" to reveal the continuous predicate. But I don't see how you are connecting that with logical depth or with iconicity. Can you explain further? gary f. From: Vinicius Romanini [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 1-Apr-14 4:57 PM To: Gary Fuhrman Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 5, Semeiotics, or the doctrine of signs Gary, Very quickly: Assuming that we are talking about symbols (concepts, terms, propositions, assertions, arguments etc) I agree that indexes denote the object of the proposition and are associated with breadth. But icons do not enter our concepts as such. The iconic function is given - if we want to dig enough - by percipua, which are the generalized qualities of percepts. So depth signifies the object by applying to it percipua discriminated as predicative terms (mortal, rational, mammal etc). The process of discrimination, which is a hypostatic abstraction, is a work of the interpretant. What is left after all possible abstraction is done is the continuous predicates - the very syntax of time and that cannot be further discriminated because every try will leave it untouched as before. Vinicius _____ Geen virus gevonden in dit bericht. Gecontroleerd door AVG - www.avg.com Versie: 2014.0.4355 / Virusdatabase: 3722/7285 - datum van uitgifte: 04/02/14
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