Cathy, list Thank you Cathy for sharing with us your very good, and also charming, account of Peirce's basic ideas of perception. In my PhD thesis Minute Semeiotic (2005) I found it very difficult to put my understanding in a rhetoric narrative as you are presenting. My choice then was to interview Peirce himself. I went to Arisbe and luckily found him sitting in his armchair besides the well while Juliette was out for a fortune-telling session in Milford. That's how I perceived the whole situation, anyway - but my judgement might have failed... The interview lasted the whole afternoon and I could transcript it entirely as the 3rd chapter of my thesis. You can read Peirce's own account from pages 50-64: https://www.academia.edu/1115330/Minute_Semeiotic_PhD_Thesis_
I have some comments triggered by the reading of your that connects with my discussion about information, so I will save for my next post. Cheers, Vinicius 2014-04-02 10:26 GMT-04:00 Auke van Breemen <[email protected]>: > Gary, > > > > You replied to Vinicius: > > > > With that in mind, I don't quite follow your argument here, and could use > some further explanation on these points: > > "icons do not enter our concepts as such" > > "depth signifies the object by applying to it percipua discriminated as > predicative terms (mortal, rational, mammal etc)." > > (gf] I would say instead that the predicate signifies *characters* of the > object and thus furnishes the proposition with its depth.) > > --end > > > > A nice test on my understanding of Vinicius. > > In my estimate Vinicius is following the process of interpretation bottom > up. If you shift to interpretant terminology the icon is the mental > energetic interpretant and the sinsign the energetic, the emotional > interpretant being the qualisign that marks the start of the process. A > further development of the energetic interpretant is the logical > interpretant (which Peirce sub-divided in three: immediate, dynamical and > normal interpretant. Alas he didn't get the idea to look for all nine sign > aspects for counterparts in the interpretant division. So, there are no > interpretant counterparts for the index, the legisign and the symbol.) > > > > The icon/ mental energetic interpretant is a one time form. If this form > is familiar (famisign) to the interpreting system, it is a legisign form. > Indexically this form retrieves its associated symbol (the interpretive > habits associated with the chair form for instance). So, icons do not enter > our concepts as such, but as habit of interpretation or symbol. > > > > > > Auke van Breemen > > KiF-advies > > Oude Graafseweg 52 > > 6543 PS Nijmegen > > 024-3786910 > > 06 26350393 > > > > > > *Van:* Gary Fuhrman [mailto:[email protected]] > *Verzonden:* woensdag 2 april 2014 15:41 > *Aan:* 'Peirce List' > *Onderwerp:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 5, Semeiotics, or > the doctrine of signs > > > > Vinicius, > > > > My previous message was inspired by the kind of thing Peirce says in the > "New Elements" essay of 1904: > > > > [[ Every sign that is sufficiently complete refers to sundry real > objects. All these objects, even if we are talking of Hamlet's madness, are > parts of one and the same Universe of being, the "Truth." But so far as the > "Truth" is merely the *object* of a sign, it is merely the Aristotelian > *Matter* of it that is so. In addition however to *denoting* objects, > every sign sufficiently complete *signifies characters*, or qualities. We > have a direct knowledge of real objects in every experiential reaction, > whether of *Perception* or of *Exertion* (the one theoretical, the other > practical). These are directly *hic et nunc*. But we extend the category, > and speak of numberless real objects with which we are not in direct > reaction. We have also direct knowledge of qualities in feeling, peripheral > and visceral. But we extend this category to numberless characters of which > we have no immediate consciousness. All these characters are elements of > the "Truth." Every sign signifies the "Truth." But it is only the > Aristotelian *Form* of the universe that it signifies. ]] > > [[ The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of the > characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical *depth*. > ]] > > [[ It is remarkable that while neither a pure icon nor a pure index can > assert anything, an index which forces something to be an *icon*, as a > weather-cock does, or which forces us to regard it as an *icon*, as the > legend under a portrait does, does make an assertion, and forms a > *proposition*. ]] > > > > With that in mind, I don't quite follow your argument here, and could use > some further explanation on these points: > > "icons do not enter our concepts as such" > > "depth signifies the object by applying to it percipua discriminated as > predicative terms (mortal, rational, mammal etc)." > > (gf] I would say instead that the predicate signifies *characters* of the > object and thus furnishes the proposition with its depth.) > > "The process of discrimination, which is a hypostatic abstraction, is a > work of the interpretant." > > gf] You've lost me there. > > "What is left after all possible abstraction is done is the continuous > predicates - the very syntax of time and that cannot be further > discriminated because every try will leave it untouched as before." > > gf] Yes, that describes Peirce's practice of "throwing everything into the > subject" to reveal the continuous predicate. But I don't see how you are > connecting that with logical depth or with iconicity. Can you explain > further? > > > > gary f. > > > > *From:* Vinicius Romanini [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 1-Apr-14 4:57 PM > *To:* Gary Fuhrman > *Cc:* Peirce List > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 5, Semeiotics, or the > doctrine of signs > > > > Gary, > > > > Very quickly: Assuming that we are talking about symbols (concepts, terms, > propositions, assertions, arguments etc) I agree that indexes denote the > object of the proposition and are associated with breadth. But icons do not > enter our concepts as such. The iconic function is given - if we want to > dig enough - by percipua, which are the generalized qualities of percepts. > So depth signifies the object by applying to it percipua discriminated as > predicative terms (mortal, rational, mammal etc). The process of > discrimination, which is a hypostatic abstraction, is a work of the > interpretant. What is left after all possible abstraction is done is the > continuous predicates - the very syntax of time and that cannot be further > discriminated because every try will leave it untouched as before. > > > > Vinicius > > > ------------------------------ > > Geen virus gevonden in dit bericht. > Gecontroleerd door AVG - www.avg.com > Versie: 2014.0.4355 / Virusdatabase: 3722/7285 - datum van uitgifte: > 04/02/14 > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. > > > > > > -- Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D. Professor of Communication Studies School of Communications and Arts University of Sao Paulo, Brazil www.minutesemeiotic.org www.semeiosis.com.br Skype:vinicius_romanini
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
