Vinicius,

 

I was thinking of doing a transcription of the whole thing but wanted to
make sure first that it hadn't been done already. But I guess if it had,
IUPUI would know that . so I'll do that this weekend, because I do find it a
very interesting MS.

 

I haven't yet read through the follow-up posts from others on this, but on
our point of disagreement - I see what you mean here:

"the critical point is when we think the weather-cock is functional while it
is not. In THIS case, it will be an index but without involving an icon. It
will then convey no information and become a false proposition."

But to me, a proposition that conveys no information is not false. In this
case the interpretant would be false because the indexicality is broken: the
physical effect of the wind on the weathercock is not controlling its
iconicity. So you could just as well say that it's an icon that gives false
information because its indexicality is not functioning as we expect it to.
>From that point of view it's a misrepresentation; but if we should have
noticed that it sticks, then it's a misinterpretation on our part. Either
way, the principle holds that if an index involves no icon, it conveys no
information. It's the combination of iconicity and indexicality (just as
it's the logical product of depth and breadth) that constitutes information.

 

Or that's what I say, and I'm not sure whether you're saying the same thing
or not.

 

gary f.

 

From: Vinicius Romanini [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: 3-Apr-14 8:09 PM
To: [email protected] 1
Subject: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 5, Semeiotics, or the
doctrine of signs

 

 

Gary F., list

 

Thanks for transcribing this excerpt. I wish I had the time to transcript
the whole MS. If you do or find a transcription,  please send me!

 

You comment on my claim:

 

What he says here about the weathercock is:

1)   If it works properly, it is an index involving an icon, and a
proposition.

2)   If it sticks and fails to turn, it is a false proposition; unless

3)   it is known to be nonfunctional, in which case it "sinks to a mere
icon, at best."

So if we know that the weathercock doesn't work properly, it is neither
false nor an index!

 

 

But Peirce finishes your excerpt saying:

 

"It is not essential to an index that it should thus involve an icon. Only,
if it does not, it will convey no information." (Peirce, MS 7)

 

V: Certainly, if we know that the weather-cock is broken, then there would
be no point in assuming it is an index.  Then it is just an icon, like a
weather-cock exposed in a museum. But the critical point is when we think
the weather-cock is functional while it is not. In THIS case, it will be an
index but without involving an icon. It will then convey no information and
become a false proposition. 

That's what I meant to say: even if no interpreter ever sees it, its
representation of the wind is already false - unless the eventual
interpreter KNOWS it is broken. But in this last case, it is not even an
index anymore.

 

Vinicius

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