Gary R., Edwina, Cathy, Jeffrey, list,
Gary, thanks for this explanation from Nöth, which is much more nuanced than the bit from his Handbook of Semiotics (which I included in my reply to Jeff before I saw your message). The trouble with the pansemiotic issue is that it catches us between synechism and a hard place. We do want to affirm the continuity of the relations between physical existence and semiotic reality, but we dont want to assert that there is no difference between them. The only solution that I can see is some kind of dimensional hierarchy (or rather holarchy) where the one is nested in, or emergent from, the other. I think the best procedure is to zoom in on the apparent boundary (or meeting place) between the physical universe and the semiotic, and show that it can be subdivided in strictly physical terms into stages of emergence. In other words, what appeared to be a point on the cosmic evolutionary timeline turns out to be a line segment which can be further subdivided. For instance, Deacon does this in Incomplete Nature by defining a holarchy of physical process types, namely homeodynamics, morphodynamics and teleodynamics. The latter supports embodiment of triadic (semiotic) relations, while the prior segments of the timeline do not; and yet each supports the next development. This gives us physical-semiotic continuity without pansemiosis. Of course, this is not a critique of Edwinas brand of pansemiosis; rather its my excuse for not devoting more time to Edwinas work. This is an important function of abduction, to limit ones information overload, and each of us has to do it for him- or herself. So thats why I dont want to argue about it. Let somebody else do the jury duty. J gary f. From: Gary Richmond [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 1-Apr-14 2:40 PM To: Gary Fuhrman Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called "a Gary F., Edwina, Cathy, Jeffrey, list, I would tend to agree with you, Gary that "a distinct ideal of Thirdness is necessary for synechism," something which a pansemiotic view would seem to undermine. Still, as Wilfred Noth remarks in his article, "Ecosemiotics" https://www.ut.ee/SOSE/sss/articles/noth_26.htm Peirce himself sometimes seems to hold for a kind of pansemiotic position. Yet, as Noth further explains, Peirce also maintains that "only triadic relations between organisms and their environment can be of a semiotic kind." A theoretical semiotics of far-reaching ecological implications[. . .] is the one of Charles S. Peirce. . . His interpretation of the interactions between organisms and their environment seems often to be a pansemiotic one, for example, when Peirce writes: "The entire universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448, fn.). However, Peirce distinguishes among the relations between the objects and the organisms in the environment of humans between those which are only of a dyadic and those which are of a triadic nature, specifying that only triadic relations between organisms and their environment can be of a semiotic kind. A merely dyadic and thus nonsemiotic organism-environment interaction occurs when the organism is confronted with something which presents itself as a "brute fact" or in an effect of mere chance. The environment in such a dyadic relation is experienced as "eminently hard and tangible; [...] it is forced upon us daily; it is the main lesson of life" (CP 1.358). Only when such dyadic interactions become triadic relations is the organism-environment relation transformed into a semiotic one. Noth explains that the organism must go beyond experiencing its environment "as brute fact" to interpreting it as having meaning or purpose, etc. In a semiotic interaction, the organism experiences its environment no longer in its immediacy as a brute fact, but interprets it with reference to a third, a "meaning", purpose, goal, or law which transcends the immediate environmental situation (see also Nöth 1994c: 3f.). Such triadic relationships of semiosis are characteristic of cognitive processes (cf. Nöth 1994b), goal-directed behavior, and more generally, any mental activity. This, of course, need not at all imply that semiosis occurs only in higher organisms, but that wherever an organism shows "any purpose. . . there is mind there" (CSP). Semiosis in this sense is by no means restricted to processes in higher organisms, to culture and social convention. Any primitive biological organism already interacts semiotically with its environment when it selects or avoids energetic or material objects in its environment for the purpose of its own survival. Such triadic interactions of the organism with its environment constitutes a semiotic threshold from the nonsemiotic to the semiotic world. Peirce goes so far as to see the presence of mind in organismic nature when he writes: "The microscopist looks to see whether the motions of a little creature show any purpose. If so, there is mind there" (CP 1.269; see also Santaella Braga 1994). Well, all of the above I hope is settled enough for most of those on peirce-l and the biosemiotics list. But it's exactly as regards the "physico-chemical realm" that I become unsettled and uncertain. There would seem to be a need for some sort of "mentality" in the laws and habits of these physico-chemico expressions of Thirdness, and while i think I see this in evolutionary processes manifesting a kind of teleology, I'm not sure I see them in all laws and habits. But for me the jury is still out. Best, Gary R.
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