Gary F., Edwina, Cathy, Gary R., list,

As we try to explain the great evolution of new forms of being--and especially 
the growth of more developed forms of the communication and self-control of 
thought in creatures like Homo sapiens-- we should ask:  what is emerging from 
what?  Do we want to focus primarily on the emergence of new forms of order 
(i.e., semiotic reality, as Gary F. puts it) from the actuality of brute facts 
(i.e., physical existence)?  In many respects, it might be better to say that 
one form of order grows from lower forms of order, and that the character of 
this growth can be understood in terms of the growth of richer forms of 
systematicity among the parts of one or another kind of system.  I want to 
stress this point because I believe Peirce is onto something when he says that 
the are serious limitations in the Darwinian understanding of adaptation--and 
the relationship between adaptation and chance variation and heritability of 
traits.  The same point can be made, I believe, about the contemporary 
neo-Darwinian understanding of adaptation.  

For my part, I'm not convinced that the conception of emergence--as it has been 
refined in the literature of analytic philosophy or in the literature of the 
special sciences such as evolutionary biology over the course of the last 
several decades--is going to do the kind of work that some might like to think 
it will.  Having said that, I'd be interested in joining a seminar style 
discussion of Incomplete Nature (or a part of it) at some point in the future 
after we've finished Kees book if there is sufficient interest.

--Jeff





Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]]
Sent: Thursday, April 03, 2014 1:05 PM
To: Gary Fuhrman
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is 
ANYTHING called "a

Gary F., Edwina, Cathy, Jeffrey, list,

Gary F. wrote:

We do want to affirm the continuity of the relations between physical existence 
and semiotic reality, but we don’t want to assert that there is no difference 
between them. The only solution that I can see is some kind of dimensional 
hierarchy (or rather holarchy) where the one is nested in, or emergent from, 
the other. I think the best procedure is to ‘zoom in’ on the apparent boundary 
(or meeting place) between the physical universe and the semiotic, and show 
that it can be subdivided in strictly physical terms into stages of emergence. 
In other words, what appeared to be a point on the cosmic evolutionary timeline 
turns out to be a line segment which can be further subdivided. For instance, 
Deacon does this in Incomplete Nature by defining a holarchy of physicalprocess 
types, namely homeodynamics, morphodynamics and teleodynamics. The latter 
supports embodiment of triadic (semiotic) relations, while the prior segments 
of the timeline do not; and yet each supports the next development. This gives 
us physical-semiotic continuity without pansemiosis.

Well put! Of course I agree, except that I don't see Deacon's work towards an 
emergent dimensional holarchy as an 'instance' or example of this approach, but 
the only game in town. Please direct me to other work that I may have missed 
which supports this kind of thinking of a development which both "gives us 
physical-semiotic continuity without pansemiosis" along with some emergent 
process, like teleodynamics, which finally allows for the embodiment of 
semiotic relations.

While I temporarily removed myself from the biosemiotics list in order to 
concentrate on preparing for, and in other ways supporting, the seminar on 
Kees' book, while I was on that list I saw no great interest, or rather, almost 
no interest except your own in what Deacon was arguing, indeed some hostility 
towards it. Yet I continue to think that that discussion, as difficult as it no 
doubt would be--and nigh on impossible without the participants having read 
Incomplete Nature--is yet an important, perhaps essential one to have from both 
a general semiotic standpoint, but especially from the perspective of 
biosemiotics.

Best,

Gary


Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York


On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 10:38 AM, Gary Fuhrman 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Gary R., Edwina, Cathy, Jeffrey, list,

Gary, thanks for this explanation from Nöth, which is much more nuanced than 
the bit from his Handbook of Semiotics (which I included in my reply to Jeff 
before I saw your message).

The trouble with the pansemiotic issue is that it catches us between synechism 
and a hard place. We do want to affirm the continuity of the relations between 
physical existence and semiotic reality, but we don’t want to assert that there 
is no difference between them. The only solution that I can see is some kind of 
dimensional hierarchy (or rather holarchy) where the one is nested in, or 
emergent from, the other. I think the best procedure is to ‘zoom in’ on the 
apparent boundary (or meeting place) between the physical universe and the 
semiotic, and show that it can be subdivided in strictly physical terms into 
stages of emergence. In other words, what appeared to be a point on the cosmic 
evolutionary timeline turns out to be a line segment which can be further 
subdivided. For instance, Deacon does this in Incomplete Nature by defining a 
holarchy of physical process types, namely homeodynamics, morphodynamics and 
teleodynamics. The latter supports embodiment of triadic (semiotic) relations, 
while the prior segments of the timeline do not; and yet each supports the next 
development. This gives us physical-semiotic continuity without pansemiosis.

Of course, this is not a critique of Edwina’s brand of pansemiosis; rather it’s 
my excuse for not devoting more time to Edwina’s work. This is an important 
function of abduction, to limit one’s information overload, and each of us has 
to do it for him- or herself. So that’s why I don’t want to argue about it. Let 
somebody else do the jury duty.  ☺

gary f.

From: Gary Richmond 
[mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>]
Sent: 1-Apr-14 2:40 PM
To: Gary Fuhrman
Cc: Peirce List

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is 
ANYTHING called "a

Gary F., Edwina, Cathy, Jeffrey, list,

I would tend to agree with you, Gary that "a distinct ideal of Thirdness is 
necessary for synechism," something which a pansemiotic view would seem to 
undermine.

Still, as Wilfred Noth remarks in his article, "Ecosemiotics" 
https://www.ut.ee/SOSE/sss/articles/noth_26.htm
Peirce himself sometimes seems to hold for a kind of pansemiotic position. Yet, 
as Noth further explains, Peirce also maintains that "only triadic relations 
between organisms and their environment can be of a semiotic kind."


A theoretical semiotics of far-reaching ecological implications[. . .] is the 
one of Charles S. Peirce. . . His interpretation of the interactions between 
organisms and their environment seems often to be a pansemiotic one, for 
example, when Peirce writes: "The entire universe is perfused with signs, if it 
is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448, fn.). However, Peirce 
distinguishes among the relations between the objects and the organisms in the 
environment of humans between those which are only of a dyadic and those which 
are of a triadic nature, specifying that only triadic relations between 
organisms and their environment can be of a semiotic kind. A merely dyadic and 
thus nonsemiotic organism-environment interaction occurs when the organism is 
confronted with something which presents itself as a "brute fact" or in an 
effect of mere chance. The environment in such a dyadic relation is experienced 
as "eminently hard and tangible; [...] it is forced upon us daily; it is the 
main lesson of life" (CP 1.358). Only when such dyadic interactions become 
triadic relations is the organism-environment relation transformed into a 
semiotic one.

Noth explains that the organism must go beyond experiencing its environment "as 
 brute fact" to interpreting it as having meaning or purpose,  etc.

In a semiotic interaction, the organism experiences its environment no longer 
in its immediacy as a brute fact, but interprets it with reference to a third, 
a "meaning", purpose, goal, or law which transcends the immediate environmental 
situation (see also Nöth 1994c: 3f.). Such triadic relationships of semiosis 
are characteristic of cognitive processes (cf. Nöth 1994b), goal-directed 
behavior, and more generally, any mental activity.

This, of course, need not at all imply that semiosis occurs only in higher 
organisms, but that wherever an organism shows "any purpose. . . there is mind 
there" (CSP).

Semiosis in this sense is by no means restricted to processes in higher 
organisms, to culture and social convention. Any primitive biological organism 
already interacts semiotically with its environment when it selects or avoids 
energetic or material objects in its environment for the purpose of its own 
survival. Such triadic interactions of the organism with its environment 
constitutes a semiotic threshold from the nonsemiotic to the semiotic world. 
Peirce goes so far as to see the presence of mind in organismic nature when he 
writes: "The microscopist looks to see whether the motions of a little creature 
show any purpose. If so, there is mind there" (CP 1.269; see also Santaella 
Braga 1994).
Well, all of the above I hope is settled enough for most of those on peirce-l 
and the biosemiotics list. But it's exactly as regards the "physico-chemical 
realm" that I become unsettled and uncertain. There would seem to be a need for 
some sort of "mentality" in the laws and habits   of these physico-chemico 
expressions of Thirdness, and while i think I see this in evolutionary 
processes manifesting a kind of teleology, I'm not sure I see them in all laws 
and habits. But for me the jury is still out.

Best,

Gary R.



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