Jeffrey, Jeff,
Off to an excellent start!
Jeffrey, you wrote,
[Peirce] says: “This is the only one of the four methods which
presents any distinction of a right and a wrong way.” (EP, vol. 1, 121)
What is Peirce saying here? Let us try to clarify the bases of this
claim. In a number of places, including the lectures in Reasoning
and the Logic of Things, he stresses and develops the idea that the
scientific method is self-correcting. I’d like to ask a question
about the relationship between these two claims.
Peirce means that, of the four methods, the scientific method is the
only one whereby inquiry, according to the method's own account, can go
wrong as well as right; scientific method alone among them presupposes,
or hypothesizes, that there are real things that are what they are
independently of the opinion of particular minds or communities - hence
the scientific method's fallibilism. According to each of the other
three methods' own accounts, inquiry by the method in the account cannot
go wrong. On the other hand, scientific method is like the other methods
in that, according its own account, inquiry by it can go right - hence,
the scientific method's rejection of radical skepticism, a rejection
also expressed in the opposition to merely quarrelsome or verbal doubt.
The scientific method's supposition of real things, external permanency,
to be cognized albeit fallibly, is what gives it hope of inquiry's not
floundering in opinion's vicissitudes. The scientific method takes
fallibility as well as the possibility of success into account by having
inquiry genuinely address genuine doubts. By this it can improve the
security of beliefs, sometimes by changing them. It lets such doubts in,
instead of leaving them to accrue against overall scientific method itself.
It seems to me that the claim that the inquirer is fallible but has the
potential for success is the basis for the scientific method's claim
that inquiry should be self-critical and self-corrective. The argument
does not seem to me to run in the opposite direction.
Near the end of "The Fixation of Belief" Peirce does frame inquiry in
terms of ethical and esthetic issues, even though he did not at that
time regard the studies of esthetics and ethics as preceding the study
of logic.
http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html
But, above all, let it be considered that what is more wholesome
than any particular belief is integrity of belief, and that to avoid
looking into the support of any belief from a fear that it may turn
out rotten is quite as immoral as it is disadvantageous. The person
who confesses that there is such a thing as truth, which is
distinguished from falsehood simply by this, that if acted on it
should, on full consideration, carry us to the point we aim at and
not astray, and then, though convinced of this, dares not know the
truth and seeks to avoid it, is in a sorry state of mind indeed.
Yes, the other methods do have their merits: a clear logical
conscience does cost something -- just as any virtue, just as all
that we cherish, costs us dear. [....]
"...immoral...", "Just as any virtue..." - those words point to ethics.
"...just as all that we cherish..." - those words point to esthetics (in
Peirce's sense of 'esthetics').
Now, in ethics there is usually the idea of a struggle, e.g., in virtue
ethics, courage is due boldness (or at least due confident behavior)
despite pressure to do otherwise; prudence is due caution despite
contrary pressure; and so on. In the above-quoted passage, Peirce sees
issues of struggle, costs, and trade-offs reaching into issues of one's
most general values, i.e., the esthetic level. "The Fixation of Belief"
starts with the idea of inquiry as struggle, and this struggle is also a
case of ethical right and wrong and of esthetic good and bad, in
Peirce's view at that time, even though he didn't yet see the studies of
esthetics and ethics as preceding that of logic.
As regards your last paragraph, the scientific method's fallibilism
about opinion seems quite thoroughgoing enough to apply to premisses,
conclusions, methods, etc., since all premisses, conclusions, and
methods that are actually adopted are adopted on the basis of actual
opinions. The infallibilism of the other three methods seems likewise.
Best, Ben
On 4/7/2014 3:12 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
List,
In addition to joining Jeff K. in looking forward to the prospect of bouncing ideas
off each other as we explore this chapter of the ’ <Guide for the Perplexed>,
I’d like t0o start by saying that I found his introductory remarks about “The
Fixation of Belief” clear and to the point.
For the sake of getting the discussion started, I’d like raise a question about
a claim Peirce makes in part V of the essay. He says: “This is the only one
of the four methods which presents any distinction of a right and a wrong way.”
(EP, vol. 1, 121)
What is Peirce saying here? Let us try to clarify the bases of this claim. In
a number of places, including the lectures in Reasoning and the Logic of
Things, he stresses and develops the idea that the scientific method is
self-correcting. I’d like to ask a question about the relationship between
these two claims.
Peirce seems to suggest that the self-correcting character of the scientific
method is quite remarkable because it is able to correct for three kinds of
errors:
1) in the premises (i.e., the observations) we’ve used as starting points,
2) in the conclusions we’ve drawn (i.e., the beliefs we’ve formed) in our
scientific reasoning,
3) and in the method itself.
I want ask a question about these three different kinds of error. Call them,
if you will, observational errors, errors in our conclusions, and
methodological errors. How might the claim that the scientific method is the
only one that admits of any distinction of a right and wrong way be used in
arguments to support each of these three claims about the self-correcting
character of scientific inquiry? My hunch is that the other three methods he
is considering—tenacity, authority and the a priori methods--fail on each of
these three fronts.
Yours,
Jeffrey D.
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Kasser,Jeff [[email protected]
]
Sent: Monday, April 07, 2014 10:55 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science
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