Jeff, Let me expose my ignorance.
Recently I chanced to read the first few pages of a recent book on Heidegger who is supposed to be phenomenologist, but the book never mentioned Peirce's phenomenology (or phaneroscopy) who preceded Heidegger by half a century. Was there any influence of Peirce's semiotics on Heidegger's philosophy ? With all the best. Sung ___________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net > List, > > This chapter on the philosophy of science breaks with the established > pattern of following Peirce's architectonic. Given the centrality of > scientific inquiry in his philosophical theory, there is good reason to > devote a separate chapter to this topic. When I compare Peirce's view to > those developed by other major philosophers, I can't help but wonder if > Peirce has drawn the boundaries of philosophical theorizing too narrowly. > In his phenomenological theory and in his normative sciences, so much > attention has been devoted to the philosophical foundations of the > scientific method, that one might wonder if he has paid too little > attention to the kinds of questions that figure prominently in the > philosophical theories developed by the likes of Plato, Aristotle, > Aquinas, Kant, Heidegger, and others. > > With these kinds of concerns in mind, let me try to frame two questions. > Peirce is trying to model philosophical inquiry on the scientific method. > In turn, the scientific method is itself the main focus of his > philosophical inquiries. Has the single minded focus on scientific method > come at too high a price? Has it caused him to pay too little attention > to other methods: dialectical, genealogical, hermeneutic? Has it caused > him to pay too little attention to other kinds of philosophical questions > about morality, art, and the like? > > --Jeff > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Benjamin Udell [[email protected]] > Sent: Sunday, April 13, 2014 8:46 AM > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy > of Science > > Jeffrey, Sam, Jeff K., list, > > Jeffrey, you wrote, > > is this list of three methods for fixing belief only a partial list of the > possible alternatives to the scientific method? > > Joe Ransdell and Jerry Dozoretz transcribed many draft manuscripts that > Peirce wrote back in the 1870s. Joe posted the transcriptions to the > Papers by Peirce page http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/bycsp.htm > at Arisbe. Scroll down to "1872-1873" where there are a number of drafts > on the inquiry methods. It's been a while since I've read them, maybe > somebody can find something on the methods there as to their list's > exhaustiveness. > > I'd say that the method of contest needs to be accounted for somehow. I > tend to see the method of authority as a species of it, though maybe one > could do it the other way around. In a previous post I said that the > method of contest doesn't seem obviously generally infallibilistic, but, > as a method of arriving at truth/falsity of the general opinions of the > contestants, arguably it is infallibilistic, insofar as it's > winner-take-all, never mind who would have won under different > circumstances, 'the gods have spoken' and all that. > > Peirce presents the inquirial methods as tending, for reasons that he > describes along the way, to be adopted and (three of them) abandoned in > the order in which he presents them. I think that he is trying to bring to > light a systematic character that they have collectively. > > I would guess that Peirce did use the categories as a heuristic in > organizing his ideas of three unscientific methods of inquiry in hopes of > arriving at an exhaustive list and that nevertheless he was not persuaded > that the result, on which he worked for years, was a genuine, > categorially-correlated trichotomy. Peirce or a Peircean would hope for a > genuine trichotomy there because the distinctions are logical, not > natural. > > I've had the notion that some Peirceans would be inclined to try (and may > have done so in some publication) to clarify the trio of unscientific > inquiry methods as an exhaustive, categorially-based trichotomy, logically > related to other such trichotomies of related issues. The exhaustiveness > would be further corroborated if other infallibilistic methods could be > classified as subclasses in the trichotomy, or maybe there could be other > global trichotomies of classes of the same things, as Peirce did with > classes of signs. Likewise, some fallibilistic methods of inquiry, such as > inquiry by trial-and-error, could be classified as dimensions or elements > or at least rudiments of scientific inquiry. > > I've generally thought of the three unscientific methods as the bad > methods despite Peirce's insistence that one should be, well, scientific > about it, anyway, impartial, and give them their due, weigh them > carefully, etc. So I'll just call them 'methodologically infallibilistic'. > > I doubt that I'm the first to entertain following picture, in which the > three unscientific methods seem to have the lineaments of a Peircean > trichotomy of infallibilistics: > > 1. Method of tenacity - policy of adherence to FIRST opinion - a > methodologically infallibilistic First? > > 2. Method of authority - deciding opinion by force or threat of force, the > knocking of heads - a methodologically infallibilistic Second? > > 3. Method of the _a priori_ - deciding opinion in a deductive spirit from > principles reached through fermentation, some capricious sort of > mediation, comparison and conversation, a choosing of or adherence to > principles by intellectual taste and fashion, 'agreeability to Reason', - > a methodologically infallibilistic Third? > > In a previous post I connected the idea of the method of tenacity > (putatively the 'methodologically infallibilistic First') with the idea of > practice and repetition (of one's first opinion), however practice and > repetition are not mainly a First. But all three infallibilistic methods > involve the idea of conduct of ongoing activity, so maybe that intrusion > of a non-First into the method of tenacity doesn't prevent it from being > relatively First within the trichotomy. > > Now, the various more-or-less non-cognitive methods of learning (such as > practice and repetition in general) that I mentioned in that post do not > seem to me to constitute a Peircean trichotomy, so I'd guess that a > Peircean who were to think that there's something to them as correlating > with the infallibilistic inquiry methods would be inclined to rework the > conceptions of those three non-cognitive methods, perhaps making one of > them cognitive, since Peirce tends to divide the mind's powers into those > of feeling (sensation, more or less), sense of reaction (including > volition), and general conception. Again, there would be an idea of > clarifying a genuine trichotomy of the infallibilistic methods by relating > that trichotomy (i.e., relating its divisions one-to-one) to (the > divisions of) other genuine trichotomies. > > Best, Ben > > On 4/11/2014 6:25 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > > Sam, Ben, Jeff K., List, > You point out that "An interesting interpretation of the moral dimension > of FoB is to be found in the 5th Chapter of Richard Smyths <Reading > Peirce Reading>, where Smyth draws an extended comparison between Peirces > argumentative strategy in FoB and the argumentative strategy Kant uses in > his ethics, particularly the second Critique." A nice way to test this > reconstruction of Peirce's argument is to ask if the list of methods is > meant to be a complete of the major classes of methods, or if there is a > larger list of possible methods for fixing belief--some of which he does > not consider in this essay. > The basic gist of Smyth's reconstruction of the argument is that Peirce is > employing a Kantian strategy, and that the target of his argument is any > philosophical position to tries to ground the methods of inquiry on > material practical principles. As such, he thinks that Peirce is > borrowing the strategy Kant uses in his ethics and is putting it to work > in his theory of logic. As such, Peirce is arguing that the scientific > method is the only one that is grounded on an understanding of the > requirements of logical inquiry as *formal* constraints on our conduct. > As you suggest, the defect of all material practical principles is that, > in one way or another, they are all based on a principle of self-love. > That is, they all rely on a pattern of justification that is based on the > idea that the fact that someone has a desire for X is a good enough reason > to adopt X as an end. Kant points out that this kind of principle does > not function as an imperative. As such, it is does not ! > function > as a rational constraint on deliberation. When Peirce claims that we > should adopt those ends that can be consistently pursued, it certainly > has echoes of Kant's claims that moral duties are grounded on rational > constraints of consistency. > Here is a follow up question that is designed to see who agrees and who > disagrees with this reconstruction of the argument in "Fixation": Do you > think Peirce's list of tenacity, authority and the a priori methods is > exhaustive of the major classes of material principles that one might > claim are fundamental in a normative theory of logic? Or, is this list of > three methods for fixing belief only a partial list of the possible > alternatives to the scientific method? > I think it is worth noting that, if it is a partial list, it would be hard > to see how Peirce could argue that the scientific method is the only > method that admits of any distinction of a right and a wrong way of fixing > beliefs. At most, he could argue that the scientific method is the only > one of the four that he considers that admits of such a difference, but > that others methods he has not considered might admit of the same > difference. > --Jeff > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Sam Bruton [[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > ] > Sent: Thursday, April 10, 2014 2:03 PM > To: Benjamin Udell; > [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: RE: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy > of Science > Ben, Jeff, Jeffrey, List, > I appreciate Bens reconstruction and interpretive remarks > thanks. With regards to Jeffs question about the role of > ethics in FoB, and at the risk of stating the obvious, paragraph > 5.387 seems to me simply shot through with ethical claims that > are clearly distinct from the various efficiency-related points > that also run through the essay, e.g., what is more wholesome > than any particular belief is integrity of belief, and that to > avoid looking into the support of any belief from a fear that it > may turn out rotten is quite as immoral as it is > disadvantageous. And at the end of the para., one who dares > not know the truth and seeks to avoid it, is in a sorry state of > mind indeed. > So perhaps Im missing the point at issue, but my simple-minded > reconstruction is that Peirce is arguing that anyone who > experiences doubts (i.e., virtually all of us) is committed to > an interest in arriving at the truth, or caring about the truth, > or something like that. For all such people, there is an > essentially moral obligation not to avoid looking at the truth, > i.e., an obligation not to adopt one of the failed three methods > described in the essay. Its an assertion of the moral status > of epistemic responsibility. Or at least thats how I take it. > An interesting interpretation of the moral dimension of FoB is > to be found in the 5th Chapter of Richard Smyths Reading Peirce > Reading, where Smyth draws an extended comparison between > Peirces argumentative strategy in FoB and the argumentative > strategy Kant uses in his ethics, particularly the second > Critique. Hints of that strategy can be seen in Peirces > passing reference to the costs of the method of science, and > his praise of the advantages of the other three methods. Like a > commitment to morality, the method of science may require > sacrifice of personal interests. > Hopefully someone else can take these thoughts further. Sam > From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[email protected] > ] > Sent: Wednesday, April 09, 2014 2:12 PM > To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: Re: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of > Science > Jeff, Jeffrey, Sam, list, > Jeff, I have trouble making more of Peirce's esthetic and ethical frames > of inquiry in "The Fixation of Belief." When the inquirially good is the > inquirially efficient (apart from countervailing moral concerns such as > involuntary tests of people), it seems a simple Peircean genus-species > relation of the good to the true. Insofar as theoretical inquiry is > subject to extra-inquirial ends, the ethical and esthetic issues get more > complex, and this happens inevitably. A lot may be implicit, but the > explicit statements toward the end of "Fixation" seem to sum up pretty > well the esthetic and ethical frames as conceived of in that article. But > I think that the problem is probably just me, in need of an IQ boost. > Anyway, in "Fixation" he is trying to get away from, or perhaps to > _precede_, metaphysical nominalist-realist arguments over truth, the real, > etc., so he pursues the issues in terms of belief, belief's security, a > hypothesis that there are reals, etc., and even denies that anybody cares > about truth _per se_. In later years he embraces the inquirial importance > of a hearty will to truth, and even disparages the idea of beliefs (in > some sense) in genuine science. But in those later years it is still > essentially truth as eventually distinguished from falsehood and defined > in "Fixation" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" - e.g., that opinion > which, unlike a false opinion, will not steer one wrong in what one aims > at, and the final opinion that _would_ be reached by sufficient inquiry - > it is truth so distinguished and presuppositionally defined that he > embraces as inquiry's end. He does not come to drop the idea that belief > and doubt are important terms in which to understand the ! > ideas of > > > truth and inquiry - for example in the 1902 Carnegie application. Thus > truth is a belief's ideal security or 'stability' as some put it - but > it's a stability not only in actual situations but across would-be > situations as well. I think that Peirce is quite right to see modal > realism as a necessary implication of his kind of pragmatism. > Peirce in later years allows of practical certainty, as opposed to > theoretical certainty. A practical general certainty would still in > principle be 'falsifiable', i.e., testable for falsity, at least by > critical discussion. Otherwise it would be a belief that makes no > practical difference, and thus, as you put it, not to be prized, not worth > having. One might say that an in-principle untestable belief lacks all > intellectual _vividness_, at least at heart. It's interesting how you link > this with how we don't value that which comes to us inevitably and free of > cost, risk, etc. I wish that I had thought of that; you've traced a > connection from logic back through ethics to esthetics. > There's another point that I can make, however. In "Fixation", Peirce > argues that the scientific method is, _among the four methods that he > outlines_, the only one that leaves room for its own misapplication. > Peirce's big picture of inquiry methods is part of an even bigger picture > of methods of learning and development cognitive and otherwise, which > beckons when one starts to consider esthetic and ethical frames of > inquiry, a bigger picture that people like me, who are far less > encyclopedic than Peirce, find it helpful to thematize and explore now and > then. >>From here onward, my post becomes something of a ramble. Those who >> continue should not worry too much about what I'm 'driving at'. > One could outline further methods - e.g., the method of struggle, trial as > combat - which could be seen as a not-generally-obviously-infallibilistic > genus of which the method of (despotic) authority is an infallibilistic > species, a species such that one side in combat has become dominant and > seemingly infallible. Then there is the method of trial-and-error, which > is fallibilistic, and is the method of 'men of experience', whom Aristotle > rated below artisans and scientists, because the 'men of experience' are > least able to give an account of their supposed knowledge. Yet Peirce > defines a scientific intelligence as an intelligence capable of learning > from experience. One could argue that the method of trial-and-error is a > rudiment of scientific method, in a way trial-and-error, especially as > involving personal stakes (even if 'only' those of one's time, energy, > reputation, etc.), is the struggle-level of scientific inquiry. However, > struggle as trial-and-error is also, in addi! > tion to > > > that, a way of learning not so much cognitively as volitionally, i.e., > some sort of strengthening or unshackling of virtues or character > strengths, particularly in areas, arenas so to speak, where the struggle > element is predominant - conflicts for power and freedom, competition for > means and wealth, more-or-less cultural rivalries for glory, glamour, and > at least non-eclipse, and more-or-less societal disputes for standing, > honor, legitimacy. From these one could derive conceptions of > (infallibilistic) inquirial methods of authority - authority of power, > authority of wealth, authority of glamour (obviously related to the method > of the _a priori_), and authority of status (like the traditional > 'argument from authority', known in Latin as _argumentum ad verecundiam_ > (respect, reverence, etc.)), which settle opinions by the wrongs of > coercion, corruption, emotional manipulation, and delusion. Anyway, while > all inquiry involves learning, there is a broad sense of 'learning' suc! > h that n > > o > t all learning is cognitive (and even cognitive learning is not always > particularly inquirial or opinion-fixative even when it is a bit of > struggle, e.g., rote memorization). > Among the methods of authority, perhaps the biggest temptation in > discovery research is the method of status, especially when it is a method > of _self_-deception, such that one grants oneself a status of greater > knowledgeability, etc., than one fairly has; it's a temptation of the > intelligent; magicians find it easier to bewilder or beguile 'smart' > people than to do so with 'stupid' people, by whom magicians mean, the > people who are unimpressed and chuckle, "well, you did it somehow" (but > those people are obviously smart enough in another way). As Feynman said, > the person whom it is easiest for one to fool is oneself. Peirce focuses, > near the end of "Fixation," on the closing of one's eyes or ears to the > information or evidence that might bring one the truth particularly when > one should know better. This closing of one's perception, in sometimes > less guilty ways, plays a particularly vulnerable role in the method of > tenacity because it is there unprotected by folds of authori! > ty or of > > > aprioristic emulation of some fermented paradigm; instead there is to > keep practicing and repeating one's initial opinion, it seems a bit like > the gambler's fallacy, boosted sometimes by some initial luck. Well, > practice and repetition of something that has shown _some_ success is the > core practical-learning method, not inevitably infallibilistic, of > artisans and more generally practitioners productive and otherwise; to > which method they add the appreciational method of devotees (including > the religious) - identification (appreciation) and imitation (emulation) > and, these days, the methods of reflective disciplines as well (sciences, > fine arts, etc.). What I'm getting at is that some infallibilistic > methods of inquiry can be seen as misapplications, or at least as echoes, > of methods that have some validity outside of inquiry as the struggle to > settle opinion, and thus have validity in applications in inquiry (e.g., > one needs to keep _in practice_ in doing math, etc.), as lo! > ng as th > > o > se applications are not confused with inquiry itself. Anyway, one's > barring of one's own way to truth inhabits the core of all infallibilistic > inquiry. Perhaps one can reduce all logical sins to this, as long as one > remembers the difference between logical sin and other logical errors, > errors sometimes imposed on one. > Best, Ben > On 4/9/2014 1:09 AM, Kasser,Jeff wrote: > Sorry. I originally sent this only to Ben. > Sent from my iPhone > Begin forwarded message: > From: "Kasser,Jeff" > <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > <mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]> > > > Date: April 8, 2014 at 10:54:58 PM MDT > To: Benjamin Udell <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > <mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]> > > > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of > Science > Hi Ben, Sam, Jeffrey, et al. > I like Jeffrey's question about the status in Peirce's argument of the > claim that the scientific method is the only method that leaves room for > its own misapplication. And I like the answer Ben gave below. Peirce > rightly prefers overlapping strands of argumentation to a single line of > reasoning, but it's hard to resist raising questions about what in > "Fixation" depends on what. > I tend to trace his argumentative resources back to the doubt-belief > theory. I think Peirce wants to come as close as he can to deriving such > things as fallibility and openness to improvement from those resources > centered on Section III of the paper. For belief to be worth wanting, it > has to be something that can go wrong. Any game that makes it trivially > true that I win every time isn't worth playing, and if there's no prospect > at all of going wrong, there's no real sense in which one can claim to be > right. So belief couldn't be satisfactory unless it were, in principle at > least, open to correction. I can use a method that as a matter of fact > guarantees that I can't go wrong, but I can't think of myself as doing > that w/o undercutting the very notion of success. So such methods as > authority can be used but can't be voluntarily and clear-headedly adopted. > This comes close to building the hypothesis of reality into the notion of > belief, but Peirce does that a couple of tim! > es in "F > > > ixation," so far as I can tell. > I'd like to hear and talk more about how you see the role of ethics and > esthetics in the argument of "Fixation," Ben. I think you and I agree that > the contrast between the efficiency aspects of the argument and the > normative appeals involved isn't as clear as it's often been taken to be. > Best to all, > Jeff > ________________________________________ > From: Benjamin Udell [[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > <mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]> > ] > Sent: Tuesday, April 08, 2014 11:10 AM > To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > <mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of > Science > Jeffrey, Jeff, > Off to an excellent start! > Jeffrey, you wrote, > [Peirce] says: This is the only one of the four methods which presents > any distinction of a right and a wrong way. (EP, vol. 1, 121) > What is Peirce saying here? Let us try to clarify the bases of this > claim. In a number of places, including the lectures in Reasoning and the > Logic of Things, he stresses and develops the idea that the scientific > method is self-correcting. Id like to ask a question about the > relationship between these two claims. > Peirce means that, of the four methods, the scientific method is the only > one whereby inquiry, according to the method's own account, can go wrong > as well as right; scientific method alone among them presupposes, or > hypothesizes, that there are real things that are what they are > independently of the opinion of particular minds or communities - hence > the scientific method's fallibilism. According to each of the other three > methods' own accounts, inquiry by the method in the account cannot go > wrong. On the other hand, scientific method is like the other methods in > that, according its own account, inquiry by it can go right - hence, the > scientific method's rejection of radical skepticism, a rejection also > expressed in the opposition to merely quarrelsome or verbal doubt. The > scientific method's supposition of real things, external permanency, to be > cognized albeit fallibly, is what gives it hope of inquiry's not > floundering in opinion's vicissitudes. The scientific method takes! > fallibi > > > lity as well as the possibility of success into account by having inquiry > genuinely address genuine doubts. By this it can improve the security of > beliefs, sometimes by changing them. It lets such doubts in, instead of > leaving them to accrue against overall scientific method itself. > It seems to me that the claim that the inquirer is fallible but has the > potential for success is the basis for the scientific method's claim that > inquiry should be self-critical and self-corrective. The argument does not > seem to me to run in the opposite direction. > Near the end of "The Fixation of Belief" Peirce does frame inquiry in > terms of ethical and esthetic issues, even though he did not at that time > regard the studies of esthetics and ethics as preceding the study of > logic. > http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html > But, above all, let it be considered that what is more wholesome than any > particular belief is integrity of belief, and that to avoid looking into > the support of any belief from a fear that it may turn out rotten is quite > as immoral as it is disadvantageous. The person who confesses that there > is such a thing as truth, which is distinguished from falsehood simply by > this, that if acted on it should, on full consideration, carry us to the > point we aim at and not astray, and then, though convinced of this, dares > not know the truth and seeks to avoid it, is in a sorry state of mind > indeed. > Yes, the other methods do have their merits: a clear logical conscience > does cost something -- just as any virtue, just as all that we cherish, > costs us dear. [....] > "...immoral...", "Just as any virtue..." - those words point to ethics. > "...just as all that we cherish..." - those words point to esthetics (in > Peirce's sense of 'esthetics'). > Now, in ethics there is usually the idea of a struggle, e.g., in virtue > ethics, courage is due boldness (or at least due confident behavior) > despite pressure to do otherwise; prudence is due caution despite contrary > pressure; and so on. In the above-quoted passage, Peirce sees issues of > struggle, costs, and trade-offs reaching into issues of one's most general > values, i.e., the esthetic level. "The Fixation of Belief" starts with the > idea of inquiry as struggle, and this struggle is also a case of ethical > right and wrong and of esthetic good and bad, in Peirce's view at that > time, even though he didn't yet see the studies of esthetics and ethics as > preceding that of logic. > As regards your last paragraph, the scientific method's fallibilism about > opinion seems quite thoroughgoing enough to apply to premisses, > conclusions, methods, etc., since all premisses, conclusions, and methods > that are actually adopted are adopted on the basis of actual opinions. The > infallibilism of the other three methods seems likewise. > Best, Ben > On 4/7/2014 3:12 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > List, > In addition to joining Jeff K. in looking forward to the prospect of > bouncing ideas off each other as we explore this chapter of the <Guide > for the Perplexed>, Id like t0o start by saying that I found his > introductory remarks about The Fixation of Belief clear and to the > point. > For the sake of getting the discussion started, Id like raise a question > about a claim Peirce makes in part V of the essay. He says: This is the > only one of the four methods which presents any distinction of a right and > a wrong way. (EP, vol. 1, 121) > What is Peirce saying here? Let us try to clarify the bases of this > claim. In a number of places, including the lectures in Reasoning and the > Logic of Things, he stresses and develops the idea that the scientific > method is self-correcting. Id like to ask a question about the > relationship between these two claims. > Peirce seems to suggest that the self-correcting character of the > scientific method is quite remarkable because it is able to correct for > three kinds of errors: > 1) in the premises (i.e., the observations) weve used as starting > points, > 2) in the conclusions weve drawn (i.e., the beliefs weve formed) in > our scientific reasoning, > 3) and in the method itself. > I want ask a question about these three different kinds of error. Call > them, if you will, observational errors, errors in our conclusions, and > methodological errors. How might the claim that the scientific method is > the only one that admits of any distinction of a right and wrong way be > used in arguments to support each of these three claims about the > self-correcting character of scientific inquiry? My hunch is that the > other three methods he is consideringtenacity, authority and the a priori > methods--fail on each of these three fronts. > Yours, > Jeffrey D. > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Kasser,Jeff > [[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > <mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]> > <mailto:[email protected] ><mailto:[email protected]> > ] > Sent: Monday, April 07, 2014 10:55 AM > To: Jeffrey Brian Downard > Cc: Peirce List > Subject: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science
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