Sorry. I originally sent this only to Ben. Sent from my iPhone
Begin forwarded message: From: "Kasser,Jeff" <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Date: April 8, 2014 at 10:54:58 PM MDT To: Benjamin Udell <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science Hi Ben, Sam, Jeffrey, et al. I like Jeffrey's question about the status in Peirce's argument of the claim that the scientific method is the only method that leaves room for its own misapplication. And I like the answer Ben gave below. Peirce rightly prefers overlapping strands of argumentation to a single line of reasoning, but it's hard to resist raising questions about what in "Fixation" depends on what. I tend to trace his argumentative resources back to the doubt-belief theory. I think Peirce wants to come as close as he can to deriving such things as fallibility and openness to improvement from those resources centered on Section III of the paper. For belief to be worth wanting, it has to be something that can go wrong. Any game that makes it trivially true that I win every time isn't worth playing, and if there's no prospect at all of going wrong, there's no real sense in which one can claim to be right. So belief couldn't be satisfactory unless it were, in principle at least, open to correction. I can use a method that as a matter of fact guarantees that I can't go wrong, but I can't think of myself as doing that w/o undercutting the very notion of success. So such methods as authority can be used but can't be voluntarily and clear-headedly adopted. This comes close to building the hypothesis of reality into the notion of belief, but Peirce does that a couple of times in "Fixation," so far as I can tell. I'd like to hear and talk more about how you see the role of ethics and esthetics in the argument of "Fixation," Ben. I think you and I agree that the contrast between the efficiency aspects of the argument and the normative appeals involved isn't as clear as it's often been taken to be. Best to all, Jeff ________________________________________ From: Benjamin Udell [[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] Sent: Tuesday, April 08, 2014 11:10 AM To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science Jeffrey, Jeff, Off to an excellent start! Jeffrey, you wrote, [Peirce] says: “This is the only one of the four methods which presents any distinction of a right and a wrong way.” (EP, vol. 1, 121) What is Peirce saying here? Let us try to clarify the bases of this claim. In a number of places, including the lectures in Reasoning and the Logic of Things, he stresses and develops the idea that the scientific method is self-correcting. I’d like to ask a question about the relationship between these two claims. Peirce means that, of the four methods, the scientific method is the only one whereby inquiry, according to the method's own account, can go wrong as well as right; scientific method alone among them presupposes, or hypothesizes, that there are real things that are what they are independently of the opinion of particular minds or communities - hence the scientific method's fallibilism. According to each of the other three methods' own accounts, inquiry by the method in the account cannot go wrong. On the other hand, scientific method is like the other methods in that, according its own account, inquiry by it can go right - hence, the scientific method's rejection of radical skepticism, a rejection also expressed in the opposition to merely quarrelsome or verbal doubt. The scientific method's supposition of real things, external permanency, to be cognized albeit fallibly, is what gives it hope of inquiry's not floundering in opinion's vicissitudes. The scientific method takes fallibility as well as the possibility of success into account by having inquiry genuinely address genuine doubts. By this it can improve the security of beliefs, sometimes by changing them. It lets such doubts in, instead of leaving them to accrue against overall scientific method itself. It seems to me that the claim that the inquirer is fallible but has the potential for success is the basis for the scientific method's claim that inquiry should be self-critical and self-corrective. The argument does not seem to me to run in the opposite direction. Near the end of "The Fixation of Belief" Peirce does frame inquiry in terms of ethical and esthetic issues, even though he did not at that time regard the studies of esthetics and ethics as preceding the study of logic. http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html But, above all, let it be considered that what is more wholesome than any particular belief is integrity of belief, and that to avoid looking into the support of any belief from a fear that it may turn out rotten is quite as immoral as it is disadvantageous. The person who confesses that there is such a thing as truth, which is distinguished from falsehood simply by this, that if acted on it should, on full consideration, carry us to the point we aim at and not astray, and then, though convinced of this, dares not know the truth and seeks to avoid it, is in a sorry state of mind indeed. Yes, the other methods do have their merits: a clear logical conscience does cost something -- just as any virtue, just as all that we cherish, costs us dear. [....] "...immoral...", "Just as any virtue..." - those words point to ethics. "...just as all that we cherish..." - those words point to esthetics (in Peirce's sense of 'esthetics'). Now, in ethics there is usually the idea of a struggle, e.g., in virtue ethics, courage is due boldness (or at least due confident behavior) despite pressure to do otherwise; prudence is due caution despite contrary pressure; and so on. In the above-quoted passage, Peirce sees issues of struggle, costs, and trade-offs reaching into issues of one's most general values, i.e., the esthetic level. "The Fixation of Belief" starts with the idea of inquiry as struggle, and this struggle is also a case of ethical right and wrong and of esthetic good and bad, in Peirce's view at that time, even though he didn't yet see the studies of esthetics and ethics as preceding that of logic. As regards your last paragraph, the scientific method's fallibilism about opinion seems quite thoroughgoing enough to apply to premisses, conclusions, methods, etc., since all premisses, conclusions, and methods that are actually adopted are adopted on the basis of actual opinions. The infallibilism of the other three methods seems likewise. Best, Ben On 4/7/2014 3:12 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: List, In addition to joining Jeff K. in looking forward to the prospect of bouncing ideas off each other as we explore this chapter of the ’ <Guide for the Perplexed>, I’d like t0o start by saying that I found his introductory remarks about “The Fixation of Belief” clear and to the point. For the sake of getting the discussion started, I’d like raise a question about a claim Peirce makes in part V of the essay. He says: “This is the only one of the four methods which presents any distinction of a right and a wrong way.” (EP, vol. 1, 121) What is Peirce saying here? Let us try to clarify the bases of this claim. In a number of places, including the lectures in Reasoning and the Logic of Things, he stresses and develops the idea that the scientific method is self-correcting. I’d like to ask a question about the relationship between these two claims. Peirce seems to suggest that the self-correcting character of the scientific method is quite remarkable because it is able to correct for three kinds of errors: 1) in the premises (i.e., the observations) we’ve used as starting points, 2) in the conclusions we’ve drawn (i.e., the beliefs we’ve formed) in our scientific reasoning, 3) and in the method itself. I want ask a question about these three different kinds of error. Call them, if you will, observational errors, errors in our conclusions, and methodological errors. How might the claim that the scientific method is the only one that admits of any distinction of a right and wrong way be used in arguments to support each of these three claims about the self-correcting character of scientific inquiry? My hunch is that the other three methods he is considering—tenacity, authority and the a priori methods--fail on each of these three fronts. Yours, Jeffrey D. Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Kasser,Jeff [[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]> ] Sent: Monday, April 07, 2014 10:55 AM To: Jeffrey Brian Downard Cc: Peirce List Subject: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science
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