Peirce Listers: For what my opinion is worth, Jeff has given a clear, detailed, and careful example that gets at the crux of the issue
J. McCarthy It is not the sleep of reason that produces monsters, but the fury thereof. > From: [email protected] > To: [email protected] > Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2014 21:52:51 +0000 > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology > > Mara, Phyllis, List, > > In order to understand the point of the example concerning > transubstantiation, it would help to have a clear target in mind. One good > candidate is the position Aquinas takes (e.g., in Summa Theologica and The > Quodlibetal Questions). Once the theses and arguments are made clear, I > suspect that it will be easier to understand the points Peirce is making. > Given the fact that the pragmatic maxim is being used by Peirce to clarify > scientific conceptions, it will help to think of the claims Aquinas is making > as a series of metaphysical assertions. Aquinas presents the claims as a > development of Aristotle's metaphysics, so that seems fair. Each of the > assertions about the bread and the body and the wine and blood illustrate > more general principles of how the substantial identity of existing things > can change--and how God can be the cause of those changes. > > Here is a short summary of a few key points: > > 1. The bread and wine are substantially changed into body and blood. It is > not a mere symbolic change in terms of what they mean to us. Rather, the > bread and the wine are themselves quite literally transformed into a new kind > of thing. > 2. This happens through the sacrament delivered by the priest, but Christ > himself is the agent of the change. > 3. When the changes occur, the bread and wine are not moved somewhere else, > and they are not annihilated. Rather, the form of the bread and wine are > changed into the form of body and blood. > 4. The accidental properties of what they look, smell and taste like do not > change. That would be repulsive for creatures like us. Rather, all of the > observable properties stay the same--only the form has changed. > > Mara, you ask: "What about the habit of interpreting wine as becoming the > blood of Christ when in the type of setting, and preceded by the special type > of words spoken by a special type of person?" Notice that the habit of how > the sacrament is interpreted is not part of Aquinas's explanation of what > really taking place when the sacrament is being delivered. Insofar as we are > interested in questions about the real nature of the bread and wine > themselves when the sacrament is performed, we are working on the logical > presumption that the real nature of the things is independent of what you, or > I or any other individual happens to think. This assumption may turn out to > be a poor account of the nature of what is real, but we are starting with a > nominal definition that is based on common sense. > > In order to apply the pragmatic maxim, it will help to have some competing > hypotheses. There are quite a number to pick from. Aquinas was responding > to an ongoing controversy within the Catholic church, and we understand his > arguments in terms of objections made by the likes of Luther. Let's keep > things simple. Let me forward a metaphysical explanation. One possibility > is that, when the words are uttered, no real changes take place in the bread > and the wine themselves. The utterance of the words can definitely have an > effect on the people who interpret those words. Everyone to the debate > accepts that much. The question is, what is the meaning of saying 1-4 above? > In particular, what is the import of the fourth provision? Can you conceive > of any test that would separate the explanation Aquinas is offering from the > hypothesis I've ventured to put forth? Aquinas insists that, as a matter of > principle, there are no observable differences. If that is part of his > explanation, I can't conceive of any test that would separate the competing > explanations. Can you? If we can't, then there is no real difference in the > respective meaning of the competing hypotheses. That is, Aquinas is using > more words in (4), but he isn't really saying anything different than what is > contained in my hypothesis. It might appear that, when we think about the > familiar meanings of the words, that there is a difference, and there is. > What is more, a careful analysis of the meanings of the conceptions used will > show that the conceptions are distinct. Having said that, there are no real > differences between the hypotheses insofar as they are considered to be > scientific explanations. Real difference requires two things: a conceivable > test that could be run, and an observable difference we would expect to see. > > Hope that helps to explain why this is a good example of how we might use the > pragmatic maxim to clarify the meaning of competing metaphysical hypotheses. > > --Jeff > > P.S. There is a nice summary of Aquinas's position in Teresa Whalen's The > Authentic Doctrine of the Eucharist (pp. 12-19) if you want to see more > detail. > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Phyllis Chiasson [[email protected]] > Sent: Wednesday, April 30, 2014 1:39 PM > To: 'Mara Woods'; 'Peirce-L' > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology > > Mara & List, > > I do not see a proof of pragmatism in this section either. Nor have I seen > such a proof anywhere else, though I know many people are working on it, most > via a proof of abduction/retroduction. If Abduction/Retroduction is the whole > of pragmatism, as Peirce claims, then we need a proof of abductive inference > to prove pragmatism. I was thinking in this vein when I wrote Abduction as an > aspect of Retroduction for Semiotica in 2005. > > I do, however, think that Kees has the first parts of the sequence right: > phenomenology for discerning, then semiotic (informed by aesthetics& ethics) > for grounding [my next post addresses this], then logical critic. > > I'm going to be proposing though, that none of these is capable, alone or > taken together, of proving pragmatism. The issue of system (as opposed to > patterns of language, inference etc), which Gödel assures us cannot be proven > from within, requires more--and Peirce provides for that in Methodeutic. In > addition, the pragmatic maxim is a criterion, not a process, so it can be > used as a pre/post tool or measure, but not as proof. I'll clean up my > second post (7.2.2) and get it out soon. > > As for transubstantiation: When I complained to Gary R. about this example, > he pointed out that it was from Peirce himself. (Peirce didn't care much for > the belief systems of Catholics, the cognitive capabilities of blacks, or the > mathematical abilities of women--a Larry Summers of his time?) I think this > example is a poor one for demonstration purposes and will get to that in post > 7.3. > > I’m with the late Stephen J. Gould on religion & science belonging to > different domains (in one sense, even different umwelts); one should not > expect valid results by applying the methods of one domain to the other. I > include Peirce’s Neglected Argument in this, because Reason, his summum bonum > and the ultimate aim of what he calls “religionism” (see ethical classes of > motives--motive #5) is just science redefined in religious words, but still > meaning scientific concepts--e.g. no inexplicable ultimates. > > Meanwhile, as for proving pragmatism I keep recommending E. David Ford's > book, SCIENTIFIC METHOD FOR ECOLOGICAL RESEARCH. It is an excellent > demonstration of how methodeutic might operate in practice. Since the field > of ecology examines consequences within open, as well as closed, systems, > Ford's book seems to me to address the reciprocal nature of the process of > retroduction. Though he doesn't use that word in the book, he did use it for > his classes at the University of Washington back when I met with him in the > late 1980's. > > Regards, > Phyllis Chiasson > > > ________________________________ > From: Mara Woods [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Tuesday, April 29, 2014 8:20 PM > To: Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology > > Phyllis, List, > > To be honest, I am not sure I see a proof of pragmatism in this section > (7.2). Rather, I see a justification for pragmatism being that it was > constructed using the pragmatic maxim. As far as I understand it, this > essentially means that signs are only meaningful if they can be translated > into thought-signs that have an effect on belief (and, thereby, also possibly > on actions). > > If I may jump ahead a touch to section 7.3, the example of transubstantiation > is used to demonstrate how a concept can be devoid of meaning because it has > no practical consequences. As far as I understand this section, the reason > why it is said to have no practical consequences is because no change in the > phaneron occurs to signal a shift. This perhaps goes back to an implied proof > of pragmatism that Phyllis alluded to with her vivid and useful description > of her pre-Peircean cultivation of phaneroscopic abilities, "It seems that > the call for the proof of pragmatism to begin with phaneroscopy speaks to the > examination of relevant properties (qualities of affect, sense, reason) of > whatever fact is under consideration." > > Now, the fact that I do not see the issue of transubstantiation as an example > of the pragmatic maxim applied suggests strongly to me that I am missing > something important here. My objection here is that it is more than the mere > qualities get involved in the development of higher grades of clarity of a > concept. What about the habit of interpreting wine as becoming the blood of > Christ when in the type of setting, and preceded by the special type of words > spoken by a special type of person? Tokens of these types are also part of > the phaneron when receiving communion, but somehow only the qualities of the > wine and bread are considered relevant. It would seem that this example is > suggesting that knowledge of substance cannot be gained through dynamic > objects mediated by symbols but only through immediate objects. > > Perhaps the issue is that only beliefs that are fixed by the method of > science are considered to be pragmatic, and since the belief in > transubstantiation is fixed by authority, it is excluded. That idea doesn't > seem to fit, however, especially given the connection of the pragmatism to > abduction. If the question is to whether the belief would have any practical > consequences, I'm not sure why the answer would be no since any proposition > that asserts the truth of transubstantiation also asserts a whole host of > other beliefs which must also be accepted, which in itself leads to practical > consequences on thought and action. > > I'd really appreciate explanations that may possibly lead to some > clarification. > > Mara Woods > M.A., Semiotics -- University of Tartu > > On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 3:46 PM, Gary Richmond > <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Phyllis, List, > > Thank you, first, for sharing your personal pragmatic story. It brought up > many thoughts for me beginning with how Peirce commented that pragmatism is > merely the formalizing of critical commonsensism as we move from a logica > utens to a logica docens. > > In addition, your remark that you don't consider yourself to be a 'real' > philosopher reminded me that the very democratic structure of this forum was > conceived by Joe Ransdell with a sense that, from the standpoint of > cenoscopic philosophy, we are all at least potential philosophers, and that > academic philosophy is not the be-all and end-all of philosophical > pragmatism, while academic philosophy has its own dangers and pitfalls, > something Joe spoke of informally, for example, in email messages to Ben and > me, and wrote of more formally. As Joe conceived it, the Peirce forum was to > be a place where anyone interested in the work of Peirce could discuss his > philosophy. > > Furthermore, my own experience in college teaching was, for example, to teach > a course titled "Critical Thinking" (which is not a course in formal logic) > from this cenoscopic standpoint, and informally, that is, as critical > commonsensism, logic not yet brought to the formal development whereas > pragmatism is placed within methodeutic in semeiotic. > > In a word, I think it is valuable that thinkers like yourself seem to find > pragmatic principles alive and valuable, and even long before they've > formally studied Peirce and pragmaticism. So, I'm very much looking forward > to discussing these and other related matters with you and others, including > how we pragmatically educate our young people, like you grandson, to become > excellent critical thinkers. > > As for the proofs of pragmatism beginning in phenomenology and continuing > into the normative sciences, that some of the later articles in EP2 are > structured and titled along these lines by Nathan Houser, has for some time > now aided me in considering Peirce's requirement that he prove his own brand > of pragmatism unlike the other pragmatists who felt no such compulsion. In > EP2 Nathan was, unfortunately, but understandably, not able to address > Peirce's proof employing Existential Graphs. However, Peirce's discussion of > "the valency of concepts" and his informal proof of the Reduction Thesis in > MS 908, which Nathan gives the title, "The Basis of Pragmatism in > Phaneroscopy," seems to me already to anticipate the case that is to be made > by Peirce that the strongest proof comes from EGs. > > There's much more to be said in this matter, but for now I'll conclude with > an except from MS 908 which I hope we'll have occasion to discuss as it > connects deeply to this matter of the proof of pragmatism beginning in > phenomenology. > > [U]nless the Phaneron were to consist entirely of elements altogether > uncombined mentally, in which case we should have no idea of a Phaneron > (since this, if we have the idea, is an idea combining all the rest), which > is as much as to say that there would be no Phaneron, its esse being percipi > if any is so; or unless the Phaneron were itself our sole idea, and were > utterly indecomposable, when there could be no such thing as an interrogation > and no such things as a judgment [. . .], it follows that if there is a > Phaneron [. . .] or even if we can ask whether there be or no, there must be > an idea of combination (i.e., having combination for its object thought of). > Now the general idea of a combination must be an indecomposable idea. For > otherwise it would be compounded and the idea of combination would enter into > it as an analytic part of it. It is, however quite absurd to suppose an idea > to be a part of itself, and not the whole. Therefore, if there is a Phaneron, > the idea of combination is an indecomposable element of it. This idea is a > triad; for it involves the ideas of a whole and of two parts [. . .] > Accordingly there will necessarily be a triad in the Phaneron. (EP2:363-4). > > This "idea is a triad" is almost immediately followed by valental diagrams of > medads, monads, dyads, triads, pentads, and hexads by way of examples > illustrating the Reduction Thesis. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > > > > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 5:17 PM, Phyllis Chiasson > <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Listers > I would like to approach this section about Kee’s discussion of the ‘proof of > pragmatism’ backwards--from experience to theory. I came into my > understanding of pragmatism in this way and still find it difficult to > analyze from the other direction. I’ve many years of practical experience > with these concepts (15 of the nearly 40 years pre any knowledge that they > WERE concepts, let alone Peircean). This experience still shapes the way I am > most able to think clearly about these issues. > In 1975, circumstances that left me without any other materials with which to > teach junior and senior language arts students forced me to make use of a set > of unused workbooks called, “Creative Analysis,” by Albert Upton. Once my > students and I made it through the first three sections of that workbook, we > all (me included) had learned to qualify (affective, sensory, rational), to > analyze based upon diagrams developed by deliberate qualitative choices and > to understand and apply the immensely complex construct that Upton simply > called “Signs.” > So, I feel that everyone should know that I am not a ‘real’ philosopher—my > only credentials are that I was able to write my first book (and everything > else) in isolation (I have still never met a formally trained Peircean in the > flesh). I started my first book pre-searchable discs, using only my limited > collection (3 anthologies) of Peirce’s writings, a few well-answered > questions from Dr. Ransdell, Cathy Legg (and some amiable Deweyans) and what > I knew (know) from Creative Analysis, as well as a non-verbal assessment of > Peirce-based non-verbal inference patterns, which I also did not know was > based on Peirce. > If Howard Callaway had not read an early snippet from the manuscript and > suggested I send it to Rodopi via him when it was complete & if John Shook > had not refereed that manuscript and accepted it for publication, that first > book would probably still be just a manuscript. If I had not made an online > (and now actual and close) friend of Jayne Tristan (a Deweyan) who vetted my > manuscript for philosophical trigger words—like “necessary,” I would probably > have made a complete fool of myself. (I still worry a lot about that, but > should probably just say dayenu here). > Thus, it is from this perspective of an aging and experience-based amateur > that I invite Peirce-l to join me in this excellent adventure. > Kee’s points out that any “…proof should begin with phaneroscopy and then run > through the normative sciences.” I understand this as meaning that the proof > of pragmatism begins with a close examination of the qualities (potential as > well as actual) of phanera (as facts and occurrences). > Peirce says that an occurrence is “a slice of the Universe [that] can never > be known or even imagined in all its infinite detail” and that every fact > within every occurrence is “inseparably combined with an infinite swarm of > circumstances, which make no part of the fact itself” (Rosenthal, 1994, pp. > 5-6). Peirce points out that a fact, which can be extracted from this swarm > of circumstances by means of thought, is only so much of reality as can be > represented by a proposition (Rosenthal, 1994, p. 5). One aspect of preparing > a proposition for testing is determining which factors within the swarm of > circumstances matter and which do not. > It seems that the call for the proof of pragmatism to begin with phaneroscopy > speaks to the examination of relevant properties (qualities of affect, sense, > reason) of whatever fact is under consideration. > Since Peirce allows for comparison & contrast, as well as sorting (and by > implication) diagrammatic thinking (as a perceptual, rather than a logical > judgment) in this non-normative branch of philosophy, it seems there is much > “work” that a phenomenologist can do here before engaging the normative > sciences, in particular, logic as semiotic (the semiotic paradigm) to craft > the theoretical construct. > It seems to me that the individual “strands” of the rope are discovered and > explored within phaneroscopy, based upon their qualities and their possible > relevance to something &/or one another. Only then would they be tested > against norms before being added to the rope-like braid that Kees describes. > I wonder how many others also see the ‘Proof’ beginning in phenomenology in > this sense of discerning? In another sense? Or do some of you see it > beginning somewhere else altogether? > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, > send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to > [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe > PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> . 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