Jeffrey, List,
Let me put it this way:
Here are your two hypotheses:
1. The bread changes form without changing sensible effects.
2. The bread doesn’t change in form.
What could possibly be the difference in one’s understanding of these?
An answer “I don’t know” does not necessarily mean “nothing” because a
person’s understanding of anything can range from the obvious to the
occult. The difference in understandings might be too subtle to be
readily explained, but according to Peircian optimism with enough time
and persistent inquiry a real difference would be fleshed out.
Matt
On 5/1/14, 2:58 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
On 4/30/14, 5:52 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Real difference requires two things: a conceivable test that could
be run, and an observable difference we would expect to see.
Real difference means there is a potential test which would show this
difference. If inquiry lasts long enough the test will become
conceivable then executable, but in the mean time any real difference
is having its so far unconfirmable effect.
With no positive test results there is no reason to believe there is a
difference except for the reason of pure hope, i.e., James's Will to
Believe. But what drives this will? Is it the same thing that makes
abductions correct more often than chance allows?
Saying "With no positive test results there is no reason to believe,"
appears, on its surface, very rough and shoddy to me. Well before a
concrete peer-reviewable test is run the inquirer runs many deductions
and inductions in his head. These proto-tests, filling up a whole
spectrum ranging from the obvious, those at the fore-front of the
mind, to the occult, those way at the back of the mind, are all
assessed by the person and guide his actions.
So, does this potential test need to be so obvious that it can
potentially be peer reviewable? Or, are its results sufficient even if
its greatest possibility is that it can only reside in the occult end
of our reasoning?
(I had the Peirce-Jastrow experiment in the back of my mind while
writing this. Maybe there's potential to use their conclusions to
support or detract from my point.)
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