Hello all,
I’ve been following with interest this thread on the proof (or otherwise) of pragmatism. I really liked Jeff D’s careful analysis of Peirce’s use of the transubstantiation issue to illustrate the pragmatic maxim. Mara made good points about how religious beliefs may nonetheless affect our practices in a ‘sideways’ manner, but I thought Jeff managed to show that transubstantiation with its in-principle unverifiability of the bloodiness of the wine provides an uniquely clean target for Peirce’s early pragmatism. Perhaps one might put the issue by saying that Aquinas’s claim of transubstantiation is ‘pseudo-scientific’, and thus in some sense not even truly religious. Jeremiah – thank you for the link to your paper on this. I just read through Kees’ explanation of the proof of pragmatism and I don’t quite follow it. On p. 119 the argument seems to be presented as: Peirce presents pragmatism as “the logic of abduction”, pragmatism is the *entire* logic of abduction, pragmatism cannot affect deduction or induction. Is this enough to **prove** pragmatism in any sense? Can anyone help me out here? A long time ago I read a paper by Richard Robin which I really liked in which he argued that the true proof of pragmatism will be the actual community of inquiry as it (if it!) goes about its business of increasing the world’s concrete reasonableness. Possibly the scholar who has had the most goes at explicating the proof of pragmatism is Chris Hookway. See for instance, in his latest book, chapter 9, “The Principle of Pragmatism: Peirce’s Formulations and Examples”, and chapter 11, “How Peirce Argued for his Pragmatist Maxim”. He is always careful and worth reading. Cheers, Cathy *From:* Mara Woods [mailto:[email protected]] *Sent:* Saturday, 3 May 2014 3:27 p.m. *To:* Jeffrey Brian Downard *Cc:* Peirce-L *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology Jeffrey, Thank you for the explanatory context; it helps to see the entire issue explained. The echo of the different methods of the fixation of belief here would suggests that the pragmatic maxim is applicable only to science because that's the only method that would require making such practical distinctions using the phaneron. If the issue of transubstantiation cannot, by definition, be decided through any test, which indeed makes any assertions meaningless from the point of view of the method of science. Does this mean that any doubt that arises about the validity of the issue of transubstantiation can only be resolved through one of the other three methods? Or is Peirce saying that the lack of meaning of the proposition suggests that there is, in fact, nothing meaningful to doubt in the first place? Another way to ask this question is: What role did Peirce think that science (as he defined science) should play in the development of religious thought? Mara Woods M.A., Semiotics -- University of Tartu On Wed, Apr 30, 2014 at 5:52 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: Mara, Phyllis, List, In order to understand the point of the example concerning transubstantiation, it would help to have a clear target in mind. One good candidate is the position Aquinas takes (e.g., in Summa Theologica and The Quodlibetal Questions). Once the theses and arguments are made clear, I suspect that it will be easier to understand the points Peirce is making. Given the fact that the pragmatic maxim is being used by Peirce to clarify scientific conceptions, it will help to think of the claims Aquinas is making as a series of metaphysical assertions. Aquinas presents the claims as a development of Aristotle's metaphysics, so that seems fair. Each of the assertions about the bread and the body and the wine and blood illustrate more general principles of how the substantial identity of existing things can change--and how God can be the cause of those changes. Here is a short summary of a few key points: 1. The bread and wine are substantially changed into body and blood. It is not a mere symbolic change in terms of what they mean to us. Rather, the bread and the wine are themselves quite literally transformed into a new kind of thing. 2. This happens through the sacrament delivered by the priest, but Christ himself is the agent of the change. 3. When the changes occur, the bread and wine are not moved somewhere else, and they are not annihilated. Rather, the form of the bread and wine are changed into the form of body and blood. 4. The accidental properties of what they look, smell and taste like do not change. That would be repulsive for creatures like us. Rather, all of the observable properties stay the same--only the form has changed. Mara, you ask: "What about the habit of interpreting wine as becoming the blood of Christ when in the type of setting, and preceded by the special type of words spoken by a special type of person?" Notice that the habit of how the sacrament is interpreted is not part of Aquinas's explanation of what really taking place when the sacrament is being delivered. Insofar as we are interested in questions about the real nature of the bread and wine themselves when the sacrament is performed, we are working on the logical presumption that the real nature of the things is independent of what you, or I or any other individual happens to think. This assumption may turn out to be a poor account of the nature of what is real, but we are starting with a nominal definition that is based on common sense. In order to apply the pragmatic maxim, it will help to have some competing hypotheses. There are quite a number to pick from. Aquinas was responding to an ongoing controversy within the Catholic church, and we understand his arguments in terms of objections made by the likes of Luther. Let's keep things simple. Let me forward a metaphysical explanation. One possibility is that, when the words are uttered, no real changes take place in the bread and the wine themselves. The utterance of the words can definitely have an effect on the people who interpret those words. Everyone to the debate accepts that much. The question is, what is the meaning of saying 1-4 above? In particular, what is the import of the fourth provision? Can you conceive of any test that would separate the explanation Aquinas is offering from the hypothesis I've ventured to put forth? Aquinas insists that, as a matter of principle, there are no observable differences. If that is part of his explanation, I can't conceive of any test that would separate the competing explanations. Can you? If we can't, then there is no real difference in the respective meaning of the competing hypotheses. That is, Aquinas is using more words in (4), but he isn't really saying anything different than what is contained in my hypothesis. It might appear that, when we think about the familiar meanings of the words, that there is a difference, and there is. What is more, a careful analysis of the meanings of the conceptions used will show that the conceptions are distinct. Having said that, there are no real differences between the hypotheses insofar as they are considered to be scientific explanations. Real difference requires two things: a conceivable test that could be run, and an observable difference we would expect to see. Hope that helps to explain why this is a good example of how we might use the pragmatic maxim to clarify the meaning of competing metaphysical hypotheses. --Jeff P.S. There is a nice summary of Aquinas's position in Teresa Whalen's The Authentic Doctrine of the Eucharist (pp. 12-19) if you want to see more detail. Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________
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