Kees provides interesting information here about the swirling background of (as well as nominalistic misinterpretations of) Peirce's pragmatic maxim. Much discussion has already occurred about the transubstantiation example (and still is.) Therefore, I would like to jump directly to Peirce's example of the quality of "hardness."
Kees identifies as nominalistic Peirce's example of the maxim, which states "there is absolutely no difference between a hard thing and a soft thing so long as they are not brought to the test." I can't help but wonder at this statement as perhaps belonging to the concept of Peirce's pragmatism as opposed to Peirce's overall objective cosmology. Pragmatism requires (entirely depends upon) human minds. It is circumscribed by norms for its proper performance. On the other hand, within his overarching philosophy & phenomenology, every possibility and every thing is Real regardless of what anyone might think, believe or know. Thus, in terms of the maxim & the hardness example, it seems to me that what he says above would be accurate, though easily misunderstood as nominalistic by someone unaware of his big picture (which he seemed to think included everybody but Royce, as I recall). Thus, I wonder if, as Kees says, Peirce was actually nominalistic at times, or if he was just not making his "idea clear" enough to be understood properly. If so, he would not have so much "explicitly revised" his earlier application of the maxim to hardness, as he would have explicated--or clarified it. On the other hand, I could be completely off base here. Phyllis
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