Thanks, Gary. Ben contacted me as well about this. I love being surprised by new (in this case new to me) information that collapses an assumption. I'm not quite sure how i failed to discover this before, but i suspect it was due to my failure to realize there was a discrepancy. Ignorance is not bliss, but it sure is rich with possibilities for new learning.
Several years back, when I stumbled across Peirce's comment that he once confused qualitative induction with abduction, I suddenly realized that I was making the same mistake and threw myself into an almost manic exploration of qualitative induction. I think i am clear on it now, as I identified and tested aspects of our measure that seem to identify acts of qualitative induction vs quantitative & crude. But figuring it out tied me up for quite a while. Now I am going to need to go back over what I have believed to be true concerning some other assumptions and see if I have them right. I suspect they will mostly have to do with the evolution of his thinking, because other than fixation, I'm much more familiar with his later works than i am the earlier ones. Thanks, again. Phyllis Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: >Phyllis, list, > >This is a topic which I think is of central importance in consideration of >the development of Peirce's thinking in this matter of realism-nominalism, >his moving eventually to an "extreme realistic" position. I've reflected on >this several times before on the list, for example, commenting on Robert >Lane's several papers on the theme. But here I'm considering Rosa Mayorga's >arguments to this effect (in a snippet from a thread dated 1907) > > >http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/2226 > >Some, for example, Rosa Mayorga, have argued that the change in Peirce's >interpretation of the diamond example is the consequence of his moving >towards an "extreme realism" which allows for real possibles. Mayorga >writes (Transactions, Spring, 2005): > >We can . . .see why scholastic realism is fundamental to Peirce's theory. >There are real universals, or real generals, as Peirce prefers to call >them, such as hardness, and the way that they are real is that they are >unaffected by any thought about them. "I myself went too far in the >direction of nominalism when I said that it was a mere question of the >convenience of speech whether we say that a diamond is hard when it is not >pressed upon, or whether we say that it is soft until it is pressed upon. I >now say that experiment will prove that the diamond is hard, as a positive >fact. That is, it is a real fact that it would resist pressure, which >amounts to extreme scholastic realism."(CP 8.208, 1905) [Transactions, >Spring, 2005, 267] > >She comments that "Scotus' description of what's real is limited to what >did happen, and not to what would happen. Peirce confesses to having made >this mistake in his earlier description of pragmatism" and quotes from CP >5.453 (She incorrectly gives this [at 268] as 5.454]; I've copied only a >portion of a very long quotation). > >Indeed, it is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most >concerned to insist upon. The article of January 1878 endeavored to gloze >over this point as unsuited to the exoteric public addressed; or perhaps >the writer wavered in his own mind. He said that if a diamond were to be >formed in a bed of cotton-wool, and were to be consumed there without ever >having been pressed upon by any hard edge or point, it would be merely a >question of nomenclature whether that diamond should be said to have been >hard or not. No doubt this is true, except for the abominable falsehood in >the word MERELY, implying that symbols are unreal. Nomenclature involves >classification; and classification is true or false, and the generals to >which it refers are either reals in the one case, or figments in the other. >For if the reader will turn to the original maxim of pragmaticism at the >beginning of this article, he will see that the question is, not what did >happen, but whether it would have been well to engage in any line of >conduct whose successful issue depended upon whether that diamond would >resist an attempt to scratch it (CSP) > >Mayorga comments that here Peirce "severs the scholastic tie to the >particular which ensures the reality of the universal for Scotus. . . >Peirce believes this tie overly emphasizes the importance of >particularity, and therefore of the unknowable" as he writes elsewhere >"that it is only the general which we can understand." > > >And today I still would say that this later *severing the ties to the >particular* does strongly suggest that his earlier analysis of the diamond >example was to some degree nominalistic in not fully seeing "that it is >only the general which we can understand." > >Best, > >Gary > > >*Gary Richmond* >*Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >*Communication Studies* >*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > >On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:11 PM, Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Kees provides interesting information here about the swirling background >> of (as well as nominalistic misinterpretations of) Peirce's pragmatic >> maxim. Much discussion has already occurred about the transubstantiation >> example (and still is.) Therefore, I would like to jump directly to >> Peirce's example of the quality of "hardness." >> >> Kees identifies as nominalistic Peirce's example of the maxim, which >> states "there is absolutely no difference between a hard thing and a soft >> thing so long as they are not brought to the test." >> >> I can't help but wonder at this statement as perhaps belonging to the >> concept of Peirce's pragmatism as opposed to Peirce's overall objective >> cosmology. Pragmatism requires (entirely depends upon) human minds. It is >> circumscribed by norms for its proper performance. On the other hand, >> within his overarching philosophy & phenomenology, every possibility and >> every thing is Real regardless of what anyone might think, believe or know. >> >> Thus, in terms of the maxim & the hardness example, it seems to me that >> what he says above would be accurate, though easily misunderstood as >> nominalistic by someone unaware of his big picture (which he seemed to >> think included everybody but Royce, as I recall). >> >> Thus, I wonder if, as Kees says, Peirce was actually nominalistic at >> times, or if he was just not making his "idea clear" enough to be >> understood properly. If so, he would not have so much "explicitly revised" >> his earlier application of the maxim to hardness, as he would have >> explicated--or clarified it. >> >> On the other hand, I could be completely off base here. >> Phyllis >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. 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