Phyllis, list, This is a topic which I think is of central importance in consideration of the development of Peirce's thinking in this matter of realism-nominalism, his moving eventually to an "extreme realistic" position. I've reflected on this several times before on the list, for example, commenting on Robert Lane's several papers on the theme. But here I'm considering Rosa Mayorga's arguments to this effect (in a snippet from a thread dated 1907)
http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/2226 Some, for example, Rosa Mayorga, have argued that the change in Peirce's interpretation of the diamond example is the consequence of his moving towards an "extreme realism" which allows for real possibles. Mayorga writes (Transactions, Spring, 2005): We can . . .see why scholastic realism is fundamental to Peirce's theory. There are real universals, or real generals, as Peirce prefers to call them, such as hardness, and the way that they are real is that they are unaffected by any thought about them. "I myself went too far in the direction of nominalism when I said that it was a mere question of the convenience of speech whether we say that a diamond is hard when it is not pressed upon, or whether we say that it is soft until it is pressed upon. I now say that experiment will prove that the diamond is hard, as a positive fact. That is, it is a real fact that it would resist pressure, which amounts to extreme scholastic realism."(CP 8.208, 1905) [Transactions, Spring, 2005, 267] She comments that "Scotus' description of what's real is limited to what did happen, and not to what would happen. Peirce confesses to having made this mistake in his earlier description of pragmatism" and quotes from CP 5.453 (She incorrectly gives this [at 268] as 5.454]; I've copied only a portion of a very long quotation). Indeed, it is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon. The article of January 1878 endeavored to gloze over this point as unsuited to the exoteric public addressed; or perhaps the writer wavered in his own mind. He said that if a diamond were to be formed in a bed of cotton-wool, and were to be consumed there without ever having been pressed upon by any hard edge or point, it would be merely a question of nomenclature whether that diamond should be said to have been hard or not. No doubt this is true, except for the abominable falsehood in the word MERELY, implying that symbols are unreal. Nomenclature involves classification; and classification is true or false, and the generals to which it refers are either reals in the one case, or figments in the other. For if the reader will turn to the original maxim of pragmaticism at the beginning of this article, he will see that the question is, not what did happen, but whether it would have been well to engage in any line of conduct whose successful issue depended upon whether that diamond would resist an attempt to scratch it (CSP) Mayorga comments that here Peirce "severs the scholastic tie to the particular which ensures the reality of the universal for Scotus. . . Peirce believes this tie overly emphasizes the importance of particularity, and therefore of the unknowable" as he writes elsewhere "that it is only the general which we can understand." And today I still would say that this later *severing the ties to the particular* does strongly suggest that his earlier analysis of the diamond example was to some degree nominalistic in not fully seeing "that it is only the general which we can understand." Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:11 PM, Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]> wrote: > Kees provides interesting information here about the swirling background > of (as well as nominalistic misinterpretations of) Peirce's pragmatic > maxim. Much discussion has already occurred about the transubstantiation > example (and still is.) Therefore, I would like to jump directly to > Peirce's example of the quality of "hardness." > > Kees identifies as nominalistic Peirce's example of the maxim, which > states "there is absolutely no difference between a hard thing and a soft > thing so long as they are not brought to the test." > > I can't help but wonder at this statement as perhaps belonging to the > concept of Peirce's pragmatism as opposed to Peirce's overall objective > cosmology. Pragmatism requires (entirely depends upon) human minds. It is > circumscribed by norms for its proper performance. On the other hand, > within his overarching philosophy & phenomenology, every possibility and > every thing is Real regardless of what anyone might think, believe or know. > > Thus, in terms of the maxim & the hardness example, it seems to me that > what he says above would be accurate, though easily misunderstood as > nominalistic by someone unaware of his big picture (which he seemed to > think included everybody but Royce, as I recall). > > Thus, I wonder if, as Kees says, Peirce was actually nominalistic at > times, or if he was just not making his "idea clear" enough to be > understood properly. If so, he would not have so much "explicitly revised" > his earlier application of the maxim to hardness, as he would have > explicated--or clarified it. > > On the other hand, I could be completely off base here. > Phyllis > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. > > > > > >
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