Dear Jerry

I have just made a library loan of a book that seems rare in paper but can  be 
bought electronically, which looks very good: Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou (ed) 
2000. Aristotle and Contemporary Science, Vol one, Peter Lang. With 
introduction by Hillary Putnam and a chapter by Nicolescu and van Frassen. I 
think that it is correct that synechism makes it obvious that the differences 
between the course, of which Peirce only uses the three, is not absolute.

Cheers

                 Søren

Fra: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt: 29. maj 2014 15:40
Til: charles murray
Cc: Peirce List
Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on Mind, self, and 
person

List, Charles:

A brief comment on:
On May 27, 2014, at 3:08 PM, charles murray wrote:


Clarity about Peirce's view of this matter is especially important to me 
because I take seriously Smyth's insistence that minds are introduced as 
theoretical entities which have no power of efficient causation.  Physical 
efficacy is another matter, and Kees may feel his argument is consistent with 
Smyth's analysis.  I would appreciate others' reaction to this second issue.


I would argue that the intimacy of mind-body is an inseparable whole or 
totality and hence dynamical process such that the semantics of separation of 
Aristotelian causes is irrelevant. The effort to create a distinction between 
efficient causality and physical efficacy is very very weak as they emerge from 
the same root.

This creative intimacy, of thought to action, is essential, for example, in the 
performing arts.
Indeed it lies at the ground of human communicative capacities - including 
procreative capacities.

Cheers

Jerry
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