Dear Jerry

Your statement "we need disparately a new conceptualization of philosophical 
and scientific categories to bridge the chasm between science and public laws 
and public polices" seems very interesting, but also at the out rim of my 
conceptual universe. In my view it has to go through phaneroscophy and 
pragmaticism.

Your  "The ur-category is identity, a concept common to all disciplines, as a 
term for any form/mark. (representamen?) I can comprehend.

But "The co-ur-category is quantity." I do not get. With Peirce I would think 
it is quality.

Then  "The "natural unit" selected for bridging the chasm between science and 
policy is electricity." I do not understand either. I would suggest "life or 
meaning". Thud you seem to want to start in an empirical objective universe, 
where I want to start in a phaneroscopic, hermeneutical semiotic 
intersubjective realistic pragmaticism.

I do look forward to read your development of these thoughts in an article.

  Cheers

                      Søren


Fra: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt: 30. maj 2014 20:48
Til: Søren Brier
Cc: Peirce List; charles murray
Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on Mind, self, and 
person

Dear Soren, List:

On May 30, 2014, at 6:58 AM, Søren Brier wrote:


 I think it is important to distinguish between philosophical and scientific 
categories and your post seem to be on both at the same time. One is principles 
for thinking and another  more practical for  finding "natural units" for and 
by empirical research.


Yes, my post explicitly uses a single concept of categories.

I think that it is important NOT to distinguish between philosophical and 
scientific categories.

 This is essential to bridging the gap between science and ethics, more 
explicitly, between science and public policy and laws of man  (Legisigns?)

Mathematical category theory is used by Robert Rosen (anticipatory systems 
proponent) to justify his work.

A second mathematician, Andree Ehresmann uses category theory to justify her 
work on the nature of consciousness.

Extensive personal communication with both Robert and Andree strongly indicate 
that we need disparately a new conceptualization of philosophical and 
scientific categories to bridge the chasm between science and public laws and 
public polices.

The current situation is parallel with the situation described by CSP (W2:59) 
in the "The Logic of Mathematics" with respect to the terms "comprehension" and 
"extension"  (which are similar to the pairs (not triad!!!!) of breadth / depth 
and connotation / denotation.

I have recently sown together a new set of categories which bridges the 
disciplines (at least from my perspectives.) The ur-category is identity, a 
concept common to all disciplines, as a term for any form/mark. (representamen?)
The co-ur-category is quantity.
The "natural unit" selected for bridging the chasm between science and policy 
is electricity.
(This paper is a continuation of my work on the mathematics of emergence and 
third order cybernetics, which you have some familiarity with.)

(BTW,Both of these ur-categories were present in the early symbolization of the 
pre-cuniform symbols of Mesopotamia.)

(If you, Soren, are at the Baden-Baden / IIAS conference in August, the paper 
will be presented to the System Scientists there. Should be fun!)

I would note in passing that the Biosemioticians seem to be struggling with the 
conceptualization of categories.  Any comment from your perspectives of 
Cyber-semiotics?

Cheers

Jerry












Fra: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt: 29. maj 2014 21:45
Til: Søren Brier; Peirce List; charles murray
Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on Mind, self, and 
person

Dear Soren, Charles, List:

First, your post on your beliefs about the CSP and religion was, indeed, a very 
thoughtful post. We concur on many points of view here.

Next, with regard to Aristotle and the general notion of categorical approaches 
to philosophy and to philosophy of science (not the science of philosophy!)
This fascinating topic originally came to my attention in the 1970's when a 
loud public (and very political) debate on the public health risks from 
exposures to chemical carcinogens, mutagens and other biosemiotic change agents 
raged. The categorical issue how can one decide between the category 
"carcinogen" and "non-carcinogen".  This decision had huge economic inferences. 
 I published a short paper on this in the 1980's in "Risk Analysis".

In the intervening decades, I have studied the various philosophers' lists of 
categories and compared their motivation for establishing such lists - 
Aristotle, Scholastics, Kant, Hegel, CSP, Whitehead, Russell, and moderns on 
"structural realism, etc.

Clearly, the philosophers' picture of categories is anything but homogenous.  
Comparably, the various disciplines of the natural sciences use a wide range of 
methods to establish categories as either empirical or theoretical entities. In 
this context, mathematical category theory is a complete outlier, probably 
because Saunders Mac Lane asserted that philosophical categories were virtually 
meaningless (personal conversation, roughly 2002)

>From this historical perspective, augmented with the uniqueness of humans as 
>genetic, medical, and behavioral  unities, I find no reason to separate the 
>mind from other facets of human existence. In other words, the integral  whole 
>is a consequence of sublation to an assimilated individual with internal 
>coherence.  This is comparable to your views on 2 nd Order cybernetics, is it 
>not?
 (BTW, this statement justifies the separation of Kaufmann's views on set 
theory (as related to CSP's alpha graphs) and the natural integers that give 
mathematical perplexity to life.  The concept of IDENTITY becomes an 
ur-category)

(From a physical perspective, this view simply says that life is electrical 
with augmentation by newtonian weights, not Boscovich particles of CSP and not 
Cantorian "points" without values.)

Hopefully, this clarifies my brief and nearly incomprehensible remarks from 
this morning.

Cheers

Jerry







On May 29, 2014, at 12:04 PM, Søren Brier wrote:



Dear Jerry

I have just made a library loan of a book that seems rare in paper but can  be 
bought electronically, which looks very good: Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou (ed) 
2000. Aristotle and Contemporary Science, Vol one, Peter Lang. With 
introduction by Hillary Putnam and a chapter by Nicolescu and van Frassen. I 
think that it is correct that synechism makes it obvious that the differences 
between the course, of which Peirce only uses the three, is not absolute.

Cheers

                 Søren

Fra: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt: 29. maj 2014 15:40
Til: charles murray
Cc: Peirce List
Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on Mind, self, and 
person

List, Charles:

A brief comment on:
On May 27, 2014, at 3:08 PM, charles murray wrote:




Clarity about Peirce's view of this matter is especially important to me 
because I take seriously Smyth's insistence that minds are introduced as 
theoretical entities which have no power of efficient causation.  Physical 
efficacy is another matter, and Kees may feel his argument is consistent with 
Smyth's analysis.  I would appreciate others' reaction to this second issue.




I would argue that the intimacy of mind-body is an inseparable whole or 
totality and hence dynamical process such that the semantics of separation of 
Aristotelian causes is irrelevant. The effort to create a distinction between 
efficient causality and physical efficacy is very very weak as they emerge from 
the same root.

This creative intimacy, of thought to action, is essential, for example, in the 
performing arts.
Indeed it lies at the ground of human communicative capacities - including 
procreative capacities.

Cheers

Jerry

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