Dear Soren, List: On May 30, 2014, at 6:58 AM, Søren Brier wrote:
> I think it is important to distinguish between philosophical and scientific > categories and your post seem to be on both at the same time. One is > principles for thinking and another more practical for finding “natural > units” for and by empirical research. > Yes, my post explicitly uses a single concept of categories. I think that it is important NOT to distinguish between philosophical and scientific categories. This is essential to bridging the gap between science and ethics, more explicitly, between science and public policy and laws of man (Legisigns?) Mathematical category theory is used by Robert Rosen (anticipatory systems proponent) to justify his work. A second mathematician, Andree Ehresmann uses category theory to justify her work on the nature of consciousness. Extensive personal communication with both Robert and Andree strongly indicate that we need disparately a new conceptualization of philosophical and scientific categories to bridge the chasm between science and public laws and public polices. The current situation is parallel with the situation described by CSP (W2:59) in the "The Logic of Mathematics" with respect to the terms "comprehension" and "extension" (which are similar to the pairs (not triad!!!!) of breadth / depth and connotation / denotation. I have recently sown together a new set of categories which bridges the disciplines (at least from my perspectives.) The ur-category is identity, a concept common to all disciplines, as a term for any form/mark. (representamen?) The co-ur-category is quantity. The "natural unit" selected for bridging the chasm between science and policy is electricity. (This paper is a continuation of my work on the mathematics of emergence and third order cybernetics, which you have some familiarity with.) (BTW,Both of these ur-categories were present in the early symbolization of the pre-cuniform symbols of Mesopotamia.) (If you, Soren, are at the Baden-Baden / IIAS conference in August, the paper will be presented to the System Scientists there. Should be fun!) I would note in passing that the Biosemioticians seem to be struggling with the conceptualization of categories. Any comment from your perspectives of Cyber-semiotics? Cheers Jerry > > Fra: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:[email protected]] > Sendt: 29. maj 2014 21:45 > Til: Søren Brier; Peirce List; charles murray > Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on Mind, self, and > person > > Dear Soren, Charles, List: > > First, your post on your beliefs about the CSP and religion was, indeed, a > very thoughtful post. We concur on many points of view here. > > Next, with regard to Aristotle and the general notion of categorical > approaches to philosophy and to philosophy of science (not the science of > philosophy!) > This fascinating topic originally came to my attention in the 1970's when a > loud public (and very political) debate on the public health risks from > exposures to chemical carcinogens, mutagens and other biosemiotic change > agents raged. The categorical issue how can one decide between the category > "carcinogen" and "non-carcinogen". This decision had huge economic > inferences. I published a short paper on this in the 1980's in "Risk > Analysis". > > In the intervening decades, I have studied the various philosophers' lists of > categories and compared their motivation for establishing such lists - > Aristotle, Scholastics, Kant, Hegel, CSP, Whitehead, Russell, and moderns on > "structural realism, etc. > > Clearly, the philosophers' picture of categories is anything but homogenous. > Comparably, the various disciplines of the natural sciences use a wide range > of methods to establish categories as either empirical or theoretical > entities. In this context, mathematical category theory is a complete > outlier, probably because Saunders Mac Lane asserted that philosophical > categories were virtually meaningless (personal conversation, roughly 2002) > > From this historical perspective, augmented with the uniqueness of humans as > genetic, medical, and behavioral unities, I find no reason to separate the > mind from other facets of human existence. In other words, the integral > whole is a consequence of sublation to an assimilated individual with > internal coherence. This is comparable to your views on 2 nd Order > cybernetics, is it not? > (BTW, this statement justifies the separation of Kaufmann's views on set > theory (as related to CSP's alpha graphs) and the natural integers that give > mathematical perplexity to life. The concept of IDENTITY becomes an > ur-category) > > (From a physical perspective, this view simply says that life is electrical > with augmentation by newtonian weights, not Boscovich particles of CSP and > not Cantorian "points" without values.) > > Hopefully, this clarifies my brief and nearly incomprehensible remarks from > this morning. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > > > > > On May 29, 2014, at 12:04 PM, Søren Brier wrote: > > > Dear Jerry > > I have just made a library loan of a book that seems rare in paper but can > be bought electronically, which looks very good: Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou > (ed) 2000. Aristotle and Contemporary Science, Vol one, Peter Lang. With > introduction by Hillary Putnam and a chapter by Nicolescu and van Frassen. I > think that it is correct that synechism makes it obvious that the differences > between the course, of which Peirce only uses the three, is not absolute. > > Cheers > > Søren > > Fra: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:[email protected]] > Sendt: 29. maj 2014 15:40 > Til: charles murray > Cc: Peirce List > Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on Mind, self, and > person > > List, Charles: > > A brief comment on: > On May 27, 2014, at 3:08 PM, charles murray wrote: > > > > Clarity about Peirce's view of this matter is especially important to me > because I take seriously Smyth's insistence that minds are introduced as > theoretical entities which have no power of efficient causation. Physical > efficacy is another matter, and Kees may feel his argument is consistent with > Smyth's analysis. I would appreciate others' reaction to this second issue. > > > > I would argue that the intimacy of mind-body is an inseparable whole or > totality and hence dynamical process such that the semantics of separation of > Aristotelian causes is irrelevant. The effort to create a distinction between > efficient causality and physical efficacy is very very weak as they emerge > from the same root. > > This creative intimacy, of thought to action, is essential, for example, in > the performing arts. > Indeed it lies at the ground of human communicative capacities - including > procreative capacities. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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