On Jul 25, 2014, at 8:01 PM, Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> wrote:
> As you know, Prigogine (1917-2003) divided all structures in the Universe > into two classes equilibrium structures (ES) and dissipative structures > (DS) [1, 2]. ESs do not but DSs do need to dissipate free energy for them > to exist. I think the ES-DS theory of Prigogine can be applied to > linguistics and semiotics generally. > > Thus, we can recognize two classes of words --- (i) written words > belonging to ES, and (ii) spoken words belonging to DS. Written words > cannot perform any work since they do not have any energy. They are like a > hammer, an ES, which cannot move matter until an agent inputs some energy > into it by, say, lifting and ramming it down on the head of a nail. But > spoken words, being sound waves (which are DSs), can perform work because > they possess energy and hence can move matter, for example, causing the > ear drum to vibrate. Apologies for not reading this before that last post. I’d just say that according to this definition I don’t think there are any pure ES. The very idea of equilibrium suggests this since it would entail that ES is really multiple DS that create a quasi-permanent patter but whose parts sometimes change. This would be in Peircean terms a habit. On Jul 28, 2014, at 10:47 AM, Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> wrote: > Conversely, anything that remains unchanged when energy supply is removed > would be equilibrium structures, such as an artificial candle or flower, > the photograph of a computer screen with images, words written down on a > piece of paper (which lasts a much longer time than a spoken word can > after it leaves the vocal cord of the speaker), melodies encoded in sheet > music, etc. I’m not trying to be pedantic in what follows because I think it a key issue. We have to qualify this with “when a particular energy supply is removed.” This is key since of course we aren’t dealing with a closed system except in very artificial thought experiments. The implications of this are quite important and demand we consider the thermodynamics far more holistically. This then leads to the points I raised earlier. Whenever we talk about equilibrium we are always really talking about equilibrium in a particular context and period. What you say is fine for that. But when we move from these more artificial chemical examples to the broader examples of writing and speech that context matters and matters a lot. The obvious example is the equilibrium of magnetic tape. In practice we always end up with semi-permanent equilibrium. > By denying the distinction between equilibrium and dissipative structures > in semiotics or philosophical discourse in general, one is denying the > fundamental role that energy plays in these disciplines and hence the > fundamental neurobiological mechanisms (or underpinnings) supporting such > mental activities. Hopefully I clarified why there is at best a continuum between these two categories. And indeed I’d question whether true equilibrium of the sort you specify is truly possible except as a regulative theoretical concept. (Much like the ideal gas law ends up being an idealization) Semiotically this is very important because contamination is always going on. As in physics and chemistry we can do theoretical or empirical perturbation analysis to see how well a system can withstand “noise” and maintain its equilibrium. However these are often statistical and there usually is a point of external energy where the system starts to break down. This energy can be external or internal (say the very stability of particular chemicals over time) When one moves from physics and chemistry to more broad semiotics this principle becomes quite important since equilibrium is maintained by a kind of replication of the sign system as it undergoes semiotic process. Yet (and this is key for Peirce’s semiotics) there is always a gap between object and interpretant in this process. For Peirce this is best conceived by way of the Epicurean notion of swerve. Peirce uses this by way of analogy I think. (Others might disagree) However regardless of how one takes Peirce’s ontology, I think the notion of this sign gap is a tremendously significant in semiotics. Effectively to deny this gap is to claim the legendary transcendental sign which is key to certain philosophies - especially many Platonic ones. I think a major theme of semiotics in the second half of the 20th century, regardless of jargon, is the denial of such a transcendental sign. Effectively this is the denial, in your terminology, of a pure equilibrium structure.
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