Stephen- I'm not sure what you mean! Peirce was, as he himself said many times, 
an Aristotelian, in the sense of his understanding that the 'Form', or 
habits-of-formation, were generals/universals and were embedded within the 
particular instantiation. That is, he was not Platonic - where the Forms are 
actually existentially real on their own.

Edwina

  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Stephen C. Rose 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce List 
  Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2014 4:20 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for


  "Peirce was Aristotelian" in this context? Or entirely? I agree with your 
note but this confuses me.



  @stephencrose



  On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 3:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:

    Sung - don't divert from the issue by personalizing my criticism. I'm not 
saying that no-one can understand a sign unless they have read as much Peirce 
as I have. I'm saying that you, who has not read Peirce and yet who constantly 
chooses to use Peircean terms in your outline of semiosis, and to inform us of 
'what these terms mean', then, you HAVE to have read Peirce and you have to use 
them as he used them.

    I've said before - that if you choose to use the Peircean semiosis 
differently from that outlined by Peirce, then don't use the same terms. Use 
your own. And don't try to tell us that your use is Peircean when it isn't.

    And so what if - in yet another of your numbered admonitions to us - you 
tell us that other scholars have made 'fundamental contributions to the science 
of signs'. What does that have to do with your misuse and misunderstanding of 
Peircean terms?

    I certainly do assume that secondary sources on Peirce are not equivalent 
to the original writings of Peirce.  Your failure to read Peirce in the 
original and your attempts to twist and distort his analysis to suit your own 
outline of the world can't be laid at the feet of either the secondary sources 
or Peirce. It's your outline.

    Again, you are the one constantly informing us of the 'meaning' of Peircean 
semiosis - with outlandish claims, including your bizarre crosstabs table of 
the categories, your misunderstanding of the categories, your equation of 
Firstness with a priori, and, now your insistence that the Representamen (and 
that's a Peircean term) is a 'thing'. No, I'm not confusing nodes and edges; I 
don't use them and neither did Peirce. If you choose to use them - that's your 
choice but don't tell us that it is a Peircean framework.

    That's absurd - to insist that a 'material thing acts as a representamen'. 
Again, you totally fail to understand the nature of and function of the 
representamen within Peircean semiosis. You are merging the abstract 
habit-of-formation (the Representamen in Thirdness) with the thing-in-itself 
(in Secondness). The abstract habits of formation are real but not singularly 
existential; they are embedded within a conceptual or material particular 
existentiality. Pure Aristotle and Peirce was Aristotelian. So, a material 
thing does not act as a representamen; the habits of formation act as the 
representamen and transforms the input data from the object into the 
interpretant. Rather like a syllogism (something which you also don't 
understand - as you showed us a few weeks ago).

    This isn't about thermodynamics and semiosis. So again, don't try to divert 
the issue. It's about your failure to understand Peircean semiosis, your 
complete misuse of his analysis and his terms, your attempt to use his terms, 
twisting and turning them, to fit into your own analysis of the world - and, 
when criticized, your constant reflexive retreat into diversions and 
irrelevancies.

    Again, read Peirce. And use your own terms and don't misuse his terms.

    Edwina


    ----- Original Message ----- From: "Sungchul Ji" <[email protected]>
    To: "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]>
    Cc: "Sungchul Ji" <[email protected]>; "Clark Goble" <[email protected]>; 
"Benjamin Udell" <[email protected]>; <[email protected]>
    Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2014 3:01 PM
    Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis 
for



      Edwina wrote (073114-1):

      "Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's      (073114-1)
      original works, rather than, as you do, relying on secondary
      writings about Peirce and on cherry-quotes of his works."

      You have been repeating this admonition whenever you want to criticize my
      views on signs that differ from yours.  There are several things that seem
      wrong with this attitude which I once referred to as "childish", because:
      (1) You assume that no one can understand what sign is unless he or she
      studied Peirce as much a as you have.  This cannot be true because

      "There are scholars who made fundamental contributions to     (073114-2)
      the science of signs long before Peirce (1839-1914) was born
      or independently of Peirce's work, e.g., Saussure (1857-1913)."

      (2) You assume that secondary sources on Peircean semiotics is not as
      reliable as Peirce's original writings.  This may be true in some cases
      but not always.

      (3) The science of signs is "larger" than Peircean semiotics, because

      "The science of signs is not yet complete and constantly      (073114-3)
      evolving with new advances in our knowledge in natural
      and human sciences and communication engineering."

      For these reasons I am inclined to believe that

      "Anyone, not versed in Peircean semiotics, can discover truth
          (073114-4)
      about signs, although Peircean scholarship can often, but not
      necessarily always, facilitate such discoveries."

      So, Edwina, whenever you feel like repeating (073114-1), think about the
      following admonition to you from me:

      "Edwina, I probably have read more Peirce to be able to     (073114-5)
      discuss signs than you have read thermodynamics to be
      able to discuss energy."


        Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's original works,
        rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and 
on
        cherry-quotes of his works. You wrote:

        "Written words are representamens and spoken             (073114-7)

          (and understood) words are signs."


        No.  Peircean semiosis is a process; the 'representamen' is not a thing 
in
        itself but an action of mediation within a triadic process.


      It seems to me that you are conflating semiosis and its components that
      make semiosis possible.  In other words, you may be conflating nodes and
      edges in networks. You cannot have edges without nodes !   Likewise, you
      cannot have semiosis without material things acting as representamens.  If
      you do not agree, please tryh to come up with an example wherein semiosis
      takes place without a material thing acting as a representamen (which, by
      definition, TRIADICALLY mediates object and intepretant, the TRIADICITY
      being the heart of Peircean semiotics and the category theory).


        The sign is the full triadic process and not a thing or interpretation.


      You seem to be repeating what I said in my response to Clark at 5:04 am
      July 31, 2014.  See Equation (073114-4) therein.


        In both cases if
        you interact with the word, in both its written and spoken form, the
        'word' is an object in the Peircean sense. The difference between the

      two has

        nothing to do with semiosis or the physics of energy dissipation.


      Please read my discussion on this issue with Ben on the PEIRCE-L list
      dated July 30, 2014 9:08 pm.  I think Ben has a much more realistic
      understanding of the thermodyanamic and semiotic  issues involved here.


        In a semiotic sense, there is no difference between the two because 
both are
        objects; there is only a material difference in their composition -
        similar  to frozen and liquid water.


      See above.


        One can go further and consider the word, in both its written and spoken
        form 'in itself' as a semiotic sign (as the full triad) because each one
        spatially and temporally exists. In its unread form on the paper, the 
word
        remains a sign (in the triadic form) because it exists as a material
        entity on another material entity; when read, it functions as a dynamic

      object.

        The spoken word functions as a dynamic object.



      See above.



        Edwina



      With all the best.

      Sung
      __________________________________________________
      Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
      Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
      Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
      Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
      Rutgers University
      Piscataway, N.J. 08855
      732-445-4701

      www.conformon.net


        Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's original works,
        rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and 
on
        cherry-quotes of his works. You wrote:

        "Written words are representamens and spoken                (073114-7)

          (and understood) words are signs."


        No.  Peircean semiosis is a process; the 'representamen' is not a thing 
in
        itself but an action of mediation within a triadic process. The sign is
        the
        full triadic process and not a thing or interpretation.  In both cases 
if
        you interact with the word, in both its written and spoken form, the
        'word'
        is an object in the Peircean sense. The difference between the two has
        nothing to do with semiosis or the physics of energy dissipation.  In a
        semiotic sense, there is no difference between the two because both are
        objects; there is only a material difference in their composition -
        similar
        to frozen and liquid water.

        One can go further and consider the word, in both its written and spoken
        form 'in itself' as a semiotic sign (as the full triad) because each one
        spatially and temporally exists. In its unread form on the paper, the 
word
        remains a sign (in the triadic form) because it exists as a material
        entity
        on another material entity; when read, it functions as a dynamic object.
        The
        spoken word functions as a dynamic object.

        Edwina

















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