Edwina wrote (073114-1), (-3), (-5), (-8), (-9) and (-10): . . . if you choose to use the Peircean semiosis (073114-1) differently from that outlined by Peirce, then don't use the same terms. Use your own. And don't try to tell us that your use is Peircean when it isn't.
Edwina, I believe that All terms, including Peircean, have more than one meanings. (073114-2) Depending on the context of discourse, any term, whether used by Peirce previously, can be used in any discourse, as long as one clearly defines what one means with it. No, I'm not confusing nodes and edges; I don't use them and (073114-3) neither did Peirce. If you choose to use them - that's your choice but don't tell us that it is a Peircean framework. I am afraid you have misunderstood Peirce. Peirce did use nodes and edges since they are intrinsic to the diagram, -<, which is a network consisting of 3 edges connecting external 3 nodes to the central node. What is important here is that Peirce used the diagram to represent his concept of irreducible triad. Just because Peirce did not use the terms nodes and edges' (073114-4) does not mean that network did not play a fundamental role in Peircean thought. To deny (073114-4) is akin to denying that Peircean sign is isomorphic with /or related to the mathematical category (on which Jon and I agreed a month or two ago on the PEIRCE_L list) because Peirce did not use the term mathematical category. That's absurd - to insist that a 'material thing acts as a (073114-5) representamen'.Again, you totally fail to understand the nature of and function of the representamen within Peircean semiosis. Do you deny that DNA is matter ? Does it not represent an organism? Do you deny that Semiosis is a material process enabled by the action of the (073114-6) irreducible triad of object, representamen and interpretant. Hence, all the components of semiosis possess material bases. . . . the habits of formation act as the representamen and (073114-8) transforms the input data from the object into the interpretant. So, where is the habit encoded or what embodies the habit ? Thin air or a ghost ? This isn't about thermodynamics and semiosis. (073114-9) How do you know? Have you read enough thermodynamics (and related subjects, statistical mechanics, chemical kinetics and quantum mechanics) to form such an opinion? Rather like a syllogism (something which you (073114-10) also don't understand - as you showed us a few weeks ago). I thought it was you who showed (at least to me) a lack of understanding the limitations inherent in the simplistic version of syllogism you focused on. I think all our debates on this matter have been archived if you are interested in checking the validity of my impression. With all the best. Sung ___________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net > Sung - don't divert from the issue by personalizing my criticism. I'm not > saying that no-one can understand a sign unless they have read as much > Peirce as I have. I'm saying that you, who has not read Peirce and yet who > constantly chooses to use Peircean terms in your outline of semiosis, and > to > inform us of 'what these terms mean', then, you HAVE to have read Peirce > and > you have to use them as he used them. > > I've said before - that if you choose to use the Peircean semiosis > differently from that outlined by Peirce, then don't use the same terms. > Use > your own. And don't try to tell us that your use is Peircean when it > isn't. > > And so what if - in yet another of your numbered admonitions to us - you > tell us that other scholars have made 'fundamental contributions to the > science of signs'. What does that have to do with your misuse and > misunderstanding of Peircean terms? > > I certainly do assume that secondary sources on Peirce are not equivalent > to > the original writings of Peirce. Your failure to read Peirce in the > original and your attempts to twist and distort his analysis to suit your > own outline of the world can't be laid at the feet of either the secondary > sources or Peirce. It's your outline. > > Again, you are the one constantly informing us of the 'meaning' of > Peircean > semiosis - with outlandish claims, including your bizarre crosstabs table > of > the categories, your misunderstanding of the categories, your equation of > Firstness with a priori, and, now your insistence that the Representamen > (and that's a Peircean term) is a 'thing'. No, I'm not confusing nodes and > edges; I don't use them and neither did Peirce. If you choose to use them > - > that's your choice but don't tell us that it is a Peircean framework. > > That's absurd - to insist that a 'material thing acts as a representamen'. > Again, you totally fail to understand the nature of and function of the > representamen within Peircean semiosis. You are merging the abstract > habit-of-formation (the Representamen in Thirdness) with the > thing-in-itself > (in Secondness). The abstract habits of formation are real but not > singularly existential; they are embedded within a conceptual or material > particular existentiality. Pure Aristotle and Peirce was Aristotelian. So, > a > material thing does not act as a representamen; the habits of formation > act > as the representamen and transforms the input data from the object into > the > interpretant. Rather like a syllogism (something which you also don't > understand - as you showed us a few weeks ago). > > This isn't about thermodynamics and semiosis. So again, don't try to > divert > the issue. It's about your failure to understand Peircean semiosis, your > complete misuse of his analysis and his terms, your attempt to use his > terms, twisting and turning them, to fit into your own analysis of the > world - and, when criticized, your constant reflexive retreat into > diversions and irrelevancies. > > Again, read Peirce. And use your own terms and don't misuse his terms. > > Edwina > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> > To: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca> > Cc: "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>; "Clark Goble" <cl...@lextek.com>; > "Benjamin Udell" <bud...@nyc.rr.com>; <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2014 3:01 PM > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis > for > > >> Edwina wrote (073114-1): >> >> "Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's (073114-1) >> original works, rather than, as you do, relying on secondary >> writings about Peirce and on cherry-quotes of his works." >> >> You have been repeating this admonition whenever you want to criticize >> my >> views on signs that differ from yours. There are several things that >> seem >> wrong with this attitude which I once referred to as "childish", >> because: >> (1) You assume that no one can understand what sign is unless he or she >> studied Peirce as much a as you have. This cannot be true because >> >> "There are scholars who made fundamental contributions to (073114-2) >> the science of signs long before Peirce (1839-1914) was born >> or independently of Peirce's work, e.g., Saussure (1857-1913)." >> >> (2) You assume that secondary sources on Peircean semiotics is not as >> reliable as Peirce's original writings. This may be true in some cases >> but not always. >> >> (3) The science of signs is "larger" than Peircean semiotics, because >> >> "The science of signs is not yet complete and constantly (073114-3) >> evolving with new advances in our knowledge in natural >> and human sciences and communication engineering." >> >> For these reasons I am inclined to believe that >> >> "Anyone, not versed in Peircean semiotics, can discover truth >> (073114-4) >> about signs, although Peircean scholarship can often, but not >> necessarily always, facilitate such discoveries." >> >> So, Edwina, whenever you feel like repeating (073114-1), think about the >> following admonition to you from me: >> >> "Edwina, I probably have read more Peirce to be able to (073114-5) >> discuss signs than you have read thermodynamics to be >> able to discuss energy." >> >>> Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's original works, >>> rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and >>> on >>> cherry-quotes of his works. You wrote: >>> >>> "Written words are representamens and spoken (073114-7) >>>> (and understood) words are signs." >>> >>> No. Peircean semiosis is a process; the 'representamen' is not a thing >>> in >>> itself but an action of mediation within a triadic process. >> >> It seems to me that you are conflating semiosis and its components that >> make semiosis possible. In other words, you may be conflating nodes and >> edges in networks. You cannot have edges without nodes ! Likewise, you >> cannot have semiosis without material things acting as representamens. >> If >> you do not agree, please tryh to come up with an example wherein >> semiosis >> takes place without a material thing acting as a representamen (which, >> by >> definition, TRIADICALLY mediates object and intepretant, the TRIADICITY >> being the heart of Peircean semiotics and the category theory). >> >>>The sign is the full triadic process and not a thing or interpretation. >> >> You seem to be repeating what I said in my response to Clark at 5:04 am >> July 31, 2014. See Equation (073114-4) therein. >> >>>In both cases if >>> you interact with the word, in both its written and spoken form, the >>> 'word' is an object in the Peircean sense. The difference between the >> two has >>> nothing to do with semiosis or the physics of energy dissipation. >> >> Please read my discussion on this issue with Ben on the PEIRCE-L list >> dated July 30, 2014 9:08 pm. I think Ben has a much more realistic >> understanding of the thermodyanamic and semiotic issues involved here. >> >>>In a semiotic sense, there is no difference between the two because both >>>are >>> objects; there is only a material difference in their composition - >>> similar to frozen and liquid water. >> >> See above. >> >>> One can go further and consider the word, in both its written and >>> spoken >>> form 'in itself' as a semiotic sign (as the full triad) because each >>> one >>> spatially and temporally exists. In its unread form on the paper, the >>> word >>> remains a sign (in the triadic form) because it exists as a material >>> entity on another material entity; when read, it functions as a dynamic >> object. >>> The spoken word functions as a dynamic object. >>> >> >> See above. >> >> >>> Edwina >>> >>> >> With all the best. >> >> Sung >> __________________________________________________ >> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >> Rutgers University >> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >> 732-445-4701 >> >> www.conformon.net >> >>> Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's original works, >>> rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and >>> on >>> cherry-quotes of his works. You wrote: >>> >>> "Written words are representamens and spoken (073114-7) >>>> (and understood) words are signs." >>> >>> No. Peircean semiosis is a process; the 'representamen' is not a thing >>> in >>> itself but an action of mediation within a triadic process. The sign is >>> the >>> full triadic process and not a thing or interpretation. In both cases >>> if >>> you interact with the word, in both its written and spoken form, the >>> 'word' >>> is an object in the Peircean sense. The difference between the two has >>> nothing to do with semiosis or the physics of energy dissipation. In a >>> semiotic sense, there is no difference between the two because both are >>> objects; there is only a material difference in their composition - >>> similar >>> to frozen and liquid water. >>> >>> One can go further and consider the word, in both its written and >>> spoken >>> form 'in itself' as a semiotic sign (as the full triad) because each >>> one >>> spatially and temporally exists. In its unread form on the paper, the >>> word >>> remains a sign (in the triadic form) because it exists as a material >>> entity >>> on another material entity; when read, it functions as a dynamic >>> object. >>> The >>> spoken word functions as a dynamic object. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > >
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