1]>>[Ben] "You have not explained what is so confining about seeing the
sign as a first, object as second, interpretant as third, in a general way. You
have not explained how that creates a problem for the sign classes. You have
not said whether you agree or disagree with Peirce about whether all three
universal categories are in every phenomenon. I'm less sure than ever of what
you mean by calling a sign a "triad." Maybe you mean a trichotomy, a three-way
classification."
>[Edwina] 1) The first sentence 'sign as a first, object as second,
interpretant as third' cannot refer to the three categories of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness, for these categories are modes of organization of
matter/concepts. Yet, from what I read of some people on this blog, they seem
to see these terms as merged. But a sign, which I understand as a
Representamen, i.e., the mediative Relation in the triad of the Sign, cannot
exist per se on its own. It is a Relation, an interaction, not a thing in
itself. So- the sentence 'sign as a first, object as second, interpretant as
third'...can't refer to all three sites (sign, object, interpretant) as each
existent on their own. It has to refer to a triadic interaction of three
Relations...where the Representamen within, let's say, a human being, is
stimulated by external data inputting from an object; this external data is
mediated by that Representamen Relation...and transformed into the
Interpretant.
That's the triadic process. The SIGN is made up of an active process of
three Relations.
[Ben] Peirce discusses sign, object, and interpretant quite as if they were
_relatives_, not _relationships_. In that spirit, he calls them _correlates_,
not _correlations_. In logic, he speaks of "the logic of relatives," not "the
logic of relations." He's pretty consistent about that sort of thing through
the years.
EDWINA: That's strange - in 6.318, Peirce writes 'I have, since 1870,
written much about the logic of relations"..but, not to quibble, his intense
study of the logic of relatives (see CP vol 3; see also his discussion in
1.563-4 on categories and 'the 'logic of relatives' and 'non-relative
characters and ..relations between pairs of objects". These are logical
interactions between objects.
BUT THIS is not what I am talking about. I'm talking about the constitution
of the SIGN. And I don't see that Peirce discusses these three aspects of the
ONE SIGN, the triad, as 'relatives'. Each part of the triad does not exist per
se on its own. He himself calls the three parts 'correlates'.
As he says, 'reasoning is of a triadic constitution' 6.321 and he refers to
thought itself as 'involves a triadic relation" 6.321. And he goes on in this
section, to discuss relations, relationships and 'three correlates'. Then, he
continues on 'For forty years....I have been constantly on the alert to find a
genuine triadic relation - that is, one that does not consist in a mere
collocation of dyadic relations....and he continues on in this whole section
6.322, to discuss triadic relations, triadic relationship..and continues on in
6.323 discussing triadic relationships.
In 1.564, he outlines his definition of the representamen, the interpretant
and the object which he also calls correlates.See also 2.228. The point of this
triad is that the interactions between them are actions that are irreducibly
connected with each other. As he says" the most important class of triadic
relations, those of signs or representamens, to their objects and
interpretants" 2.233. I read this as meaning that the Representamen has a
RELATION to its object and its interpretant. His triadic relations are outlined
in 2.234 and from these, we can derive the ten classes of signs.
Now, my point is that the SIGN, as a triad, is composed of three 'correlates'
with three relations - (2.242 - which shows the relation between the
correlates); that are networked together as a process of generating meaning.
Peirce does ALSO use the terms that you use (relative) as in "by 'semiosis, I
mean...an action or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three
subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative
influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs" 5.484.
But surely we know enough of Peirce to know that he doesn't mean that the
semiosic act consists of three separately existential units: the
representamen/sign; the object; the interpretant! The triad is not reducible.
------------
2] BEN: A relative is something defined through the relationship in which it
stands to something. "Opposite," "double," "parent," etc. That which you said
of relation is also to be said of a relative: a relative cannot exist per se on
its own (except in some sense in the relationship of self-identity). E.g,
"Parent." A parent is a parent of offspring. Therefore your objection to
speaking of the sign or representamen not as a relation, your objection that
the sign can't exist per se by itself, is not applicable to speaking of the
sign as a relative or, in particular, a correlate.
EDWINA: I don't think the whole sign, the triad, is a correlate; the three
parts of the sign: object-representamen-interpretant, are correlates.
3] BEN: The parent relationship might be expressed functor-style, from the
parent's side, as "parent-of" and, from the offspring's side, as
"offspring-of". In the case of a symmetrical relation, it's easier to come up
with a single name for both sides, e.g., "opposition" (and there the language
also better accommodates the hypostatic abstraction). The difference between
the relative and the relationship is at least analogous to the difference
between a function in the usual mathematical sense and a lambda function. In
any case the idea of a relative no more involves the idea of something existing
per se on its own than the idea of a relation does.
EDWINA: This is a very different topic than the one I am exploring.
4]BEN: Again, Peirce calls sign, object, and interpretant the semiotic
correlates, not the semiotic correlations. He typically distinguishes between
representation as the relation or operation of representing, on one hand, and
sign, or representamen, as that which represents, on the other hand. He never
refers to a sign or representamen as a representation except when he is using
the word 'representation' in one of its popular senses, to mean _something that
represents_, as when we say that a painting is a representation of something,
or that somebody made a representation in court.
EDWINA: Agreed - but I think that 'correlates' and 'correlations' is
nit-picking. I am aware when he uses the terms 'representamen' and
'representation' and again, I don't think that changes my outline.
5]>[Edwina] 2) It is only a problem for the ten classes IF, as some people on
this blog claim, the linear processing order of moving from the Input data from
the external Object, via the long term Representamen Relation, to the
interpretant....is instead of Representamen is first, gathering data from the
external object (second) ..mediating it via that Representamen.....to, finally,
third...the Interpretant.....IT IS ONLY a problem if this linear semiosic
tranformative path is instead viewed as, instead of ordinal (first, second,
third)....as categorical: (Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness). And that is
what, to me, some people on this blog are doing.
[Ben] The problem for you arises chiefly because you reject Peirce's sense of
the universality of his categories. That which is priman in one respect can be
secundan in another respect, and he places no limit on the number of categorial
conditions and semiotic relations in which a given phenomenon can stand. In one
of the quotes that I sent you see him laboring over how a sign stands to its
immediate object, relationships finer-grained than those of the 10 classes come
to light, and he came to work on the 10-trichotomy system that was meant to
issue in 66 classes.
EDWINA: Absolutely not. I don't reject the universality of the categories. I
agree with Peirce's outline of them. A category of Firstness can, in no way, be
a category of Secondness nor can it be a category of Thirdness. Secondness,
after all, is a mode of organization of matter which produces morphologies
interacting only within brute action and reaction. There are NO LAWS.
Thirdness, on the other hand, is a mode of organization of matter which
produces morphologies operating within habits, within laws - which are entirely
lacking in either Firstness or Secondness. The SAME phenonomen - which is, for
instance, operating ONLY within a mode of Secondness, cannot suddenly operation
within a mode of Thirdness. And the categories are not 'semiotic relations'.
6] BEN: The categories are related to the ordering for Peirce. Something is a
Second because it stands in a relation of reaction/resistance, essentially
dyadic. In other relations it takes on other categorial aspects. The degenerate
cases are complex examples of it. Here we have Peirce, in the 3rd Lecture on
Pragmatism, CP 5.66, 1903, 36 years after "On a New List", still not rejecting
the association between categories and monad/dyad/triad that he discussed on
"On a New List":
EDWINA: I disagree with how you outline the categories. You seem to define
them as aspects of interactions, of relations. I define them as modes of
organization of matter/energy. I agree with the descriptions you outline below,
but don't see them as dependent on interactions. The categories are primary
modes of organization of matter. Someone on this blog recently referred to
Spencer-Brown's morphologies of Form - which also uses the Peircean categories
to generate forms, i.e, as modes of organization. I agree with that..
For example, the nature of 'feeling', which is Firstness (1.304) is a mode of
organization of matter; a pure quality..."a feeling of redness or of purple
without beginning, end, or change'....1.305. These descriptions are not of
relations or interactions but of a mode of organization...such that you are
'feeling red or purple'..Secondness, again, is not an interaction but a mode of
organization of matter such that for example, you as a mode of organization are
in reaction with something else.
[Quote]
Category the First is the Idea of that which is such as it is regardless of
anything else. That is to say, it is a Quality of Feeling.
Category the Second is the Idea of that which is such as it is as being
Second to some First, regardless of anything else, and in particular regardless
of any Law, although it may conform to a law. That is to say, it is Reaction as
an element of the Phenomenon.
Category the Third is the Idea of that which is such as it is as being a
Third, or Medium, between a Second and its First. That is to say, it is
Representation as an element of the Phenomenon.
[End quote]
BEN: If you disagree with Peirce, fine, say so. EDWINA: The above are good
descriptions but are not full outlines of the nature of the categories.
7] >[Edwina] 3 When I call a SIGN a triad, I don't mean a 'three-way
classification' (of what); I mean a set of three Relations ..that between the
Representamen and the Object; the Representamen-in-itself; and that between the
Representamen and the Interpretant. That's an irreducible triad of
Relations...and all three Relations together, made up the Semiosic Sign.
[Ben] That's clearer, thanks.
BEN: Now, what you describe is not Peirce's usage of the word 'sign,' and it
clashes with the popular ordinary English word 'sign'. On the other hand, the
idea of the sign as triadically relative, that is, as standing in a triadic
relation, does _not_ clash with the popular ordinary English word 'sign', since
a sign is usually taken as a sign for some object to some at least potential
interpreting mind.
EDWINA: But Peirce uses the term of SIGN, and sign=representamen and
sign=object and so on, all throughout his work. That is, he himself mixes us
these terms. Again, I am NOT defining the sign within a Saussurian framework -
'sign for some object'. My definition of the SIGN is that it is ONE UNIT
composed of three informational interactions; that between the Representamen
and the external Object; that of the Representamen in itself , ie, referring to
its habits/laws; and that between the Represntamen and the Interpretant.
8] BEN: I find it confusing to think of the semiotic triadic relationship as
the sign itself. I start wondering what is its object? What is its
interpretant? I find it difficult to form a sentence using the word "sign' to
mean the whole triadic relation. Since the semiotic triadic relationship is
also a relationship of triadic determination, why not call the object in it the
"objectamen" or "determinamen," and the relationship itself the Object? A
semiotic object is that which, for purposes of semiotic analysis, one takes as
a primary source of determination in a semiosis.
EDWINA: But Peirce uses the term Sign in multiple ways throughout his work. I
agree that it can be difficult to sort them out and to use them. Is the object
the primary source of determination? I certainly agree with objective reality;
objects exist outside of our observation and consideration. But I think it's
more complex. We, for example, don't just react to an object. We can initiate
the interaction.
9] BEN: Again, that is for the purpose of semiotic analysis, not in some
ontically absolute sense in which the semiotic object could never in turn be a
sign for something else. A sign mediates the determination. Something is a
semiotic object insofar as it determines something, as a sign, to determine
something, as an interpretant, to be determined by the object as the sign is
determined by the object. An objection to the word "determinamen" could be that
some determination is dyadic, merely reactional, etc., not triadic and
semiotical. Or why not call the interpretant in the triadic relation the
"interpretamen," and the whole triadic relation, which is also one of
interpretation, the Interpretant?
Morphologically it's messy. You want to call the whole triadic relation by
the name of one of the triadically relative elements in it, so you characterize
the triadic relationship by a name suitable for a triadically-relative element
rather than for a triadic relationship. Why don't you call it the 'trilation'
or something like that? It's just a semiosis regarded as a structure rather
than as a process. I don't think that that's bad. The structural view is handy
not only for general analysis but also for when one is talking about the same
correlates repeatedly conducting semioses - the wind, a weathercock, the
interpretant in a farmer's mind.
EDWINA: Of course I see your points but I consider that Peirce himself does
exactly this with his multiple uses of the same term of 'sign'. I consider
semiosis as a process, an endless continuous networking, which generates
'morphemes' so to speak, or singular morphologies...which then network with
other morphemes, which generate others, which dissipate and so on.
10] >[Edwina] 4) As for whether all three categories are in every
phenomenon - no, I don't agree. I think that all three categories exist and can
be linked to every phenomenon, but, let's say a phenomenon that is in pure
Firstness. All three Relations are all in a mode of Firstness, a Rhematic
Iconic Qualisign. A burst of heat - That, in itself, has no Secondness in it
and no Thirdness. It most certainly will, in the next nanosecond, introduce
those two categories but in itself, right then, it is only one category. Thus,
its singular mode of organization enables it to network with other
objects...which are formed within the other categories.
[Ben] A qualisign is a quality standing as a sign, a quality insofar as it is
a sign. Every quality can be seen, semiotically, as a qualisign. For you 'pure
firstness' refers to being a (rhematic iconic) qualisign, because all three
'relations' are in a 'mode' of Firstness.
Yet, when one regards a quality as a qualisign, one brings_reason and
reflection_ to the phenomenon and no longer apprehends it in its _pure_
firstness. Instead one regards it as having an object and an interpretant.
(John mentions your pansemiotism but I don't see how pansemiotism requires you
not to see a phenomenological level prior to the semiotic level - prior, that
is, in the order of abstractness. Pure math is more abstract than both of them,
in Peirce's system.)
EDWINA: Yes, but what about BEFORE one starts the reasoning and reflection;
what about the pure isolate feeling...which will disappear as soon as one
starts to acknowledge it? Peirce talks about this pure feeling in his analysis
of the categories in, eg, 1.316.
No, I don't recognize anything prior to semiosis. Semiosis is, to me, basic.
["What Is a Sign?", circa 1894, EP 2.
http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ep/ep2/ep2book/ch02/ep2ch2.htm Quote]
It is necessary to recognize three different states of mind. First, imagine
a person in a dreamy state. Let us suppose he is thinking of nothing but a red
color. Not thinking about it, either, that is, not asking nor answering any
questions about it, not even saying to himself that it pleases him, but just
contemplating it, as his fancy brings it up. Perhaps, when he gets tired of the
red, he will change it to some other color, โ say a turquoise blue, โ or a
rose-color; โ but if he does so, it will be in the play of fancy without any
reason and without any compulsion. This is about as near as may be to a state
of mind in which something is present, without compulsion and without reason;
it is called Feeling. Except in a half-waking hour, nobody really is in a state
of feeling, pure and simple. But whenever we are awake, something is present to
the mind, and what is present, without reference to any compulsion or reason,
is feeling.
[....]
ยง2. There are three kinds of interest we may take in a thing. First, we may
have a primary interest in it for itself. Second, we may have a secondary
interest in it, on account of its reactions with other things. Third, we may
have a mediatory interest in it, in so far as it conveys to a mind an idea
about a thing. In so far as it does this, it is a sign, or representation.
[End quote]
In CP 5.70 (the 3rd Lecture on Pragmatism again):
[Quote]
In pure Secondness, the reacting correlates are Singulars, and as such are
Individuals, not capable of further division.
[End quote]
His idea of _pure_ Secondness does not involve signs at all. Instead it
involves sheer reaction between relate and correlate, or between correlates,
pretty much the same thing for the purpose of what he is saying. Here again he
distinguishes the relative (the 'correlate') from the relation. The most that
one can say in regard to enhanced or 'pure' secondness and the dicent indexical
sinsign is that the dicent indexical sinsign is the most secundan among the ten
sign classes, because all three of its trichotomical classifications (sinsign,
index, dicisign) are secundan. Its trichotomical classifications are 'pure' of
non-secundans.
>[Edwina] Another example, of a SIGN, that is in pure Secondness, a dicent
indexical sinsign. All three Relations are in a mode of Secondness. Purely
active-reactive. A mechanical hammer. Now, within its actions, Firstness does
indeed exist (as, for example, the sound of the hammer, the 'feeling' of the
metal striking the metal)...There is no Thirdness, but, it could emerge as the
analysis of what it is in the observation of another, or even, in the normative
results of the metal-on-metal. These other categorical modes are networked into
this one Sign in its current state of pure Secondness.
But, if you insist that all three categorical modes of organization are
always fully present in each SIGN, then, you are preventing the universe from
any diversity and also, preventing networking.
[Ben] No, since the various categories can be present in all the various
phenomena in differing proportions, in differing ways, etc. So that does not
prevent diversity, much less networking, if I guess rightly what you mean by
'networking'.
Best, Ben
Edwina
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