Edwina wrote: "A category of Firstness can, in no way, be (082614-1) a category of Secondness nor can it be a category of Thirdness."
Right, and this is because, as Ben pointed out (and I agreed), all phenomena have three basic aspects -- Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness -- that cannot be separated except in our head through the process of what Peirce called "prescinding". In other words, all the three universal categories of Peirce apply to all phenomena EQUALLY and SIMULTANEOUSLY. "Secondness, after all, is a mode of organization (082614-2) of matter which produces morphologies interacting only within brute action and reaction. There are NO LAWS." How can anything be organized without obeying LAWS ? Such an erroneous conclusion can be avoided if it is understood that all phenomena obey laws and that Secondness is just a "prescinded" aspect of phenomena and hence obeys laws as well. with all the best. Sung __________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net > > 1]>>[Ben] "You have not explained what is so confining about seeing > the sign as a first, object as second, interpretant as third, in a > general way. You have not explained how that creates a problem for the > sign classes. You have not said whether you agree or disagree with > Peirce about whether all three universal categories are in every > phenomenon. I'm less sure than ever of what you mean by calling a sign > a "triad." Maybe you mean a trichotomy, a three-way classification." > > >[Edwina] 1) The first sentence 'sign as a first, object as second, > interpretant as third' cannot refer to the three categories of > Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, for these categories are modes > of organization of matter/concepts. Yet, from what I read of some > people on this blog, they seem to see these terms as merged. But a > sign, which I understand as a Representamen, i.e., the mediative > Relation in the triad of the Sign, cannot exist per se on its own. It > is a Relation, an interaction, not a thing in itself. So- the > sentence 'sign as a first, object as second, interpretant as > third'...can't refer to all three sites (sign, object, interpretant) > as each existent on their own. It has to refer to a triadic > interaction of three Relations...where the Representamen within, > let's say, a human being, is stimulated by external data inputting > from an object; this external data is mediated by that Representamen > Relation...and transformed into the Interpretant. > > That's the triadic process. The SIGN is made up of an active process > of three Relations. > [Ben] Peirce discusses sign, object, and interpretant quite as if they > were _relatives_, not _relationships_. In that spirit, he calls them > _correlates_, not _correlations_. In logic, he speaks of "the logic of > relatives," not "the logic of relations." He's pretty consistent about > that sort of thing through the years. > > EDWINA: That's strange - in 6.318, Peirce writes 'I have, since 1870, > written much about the logic of relations"..but, not to quibble, his > intense study of the logic of relatives (see CP vol 3; see also his > discussion in 1.563-4 on categories and 'the 'logic of relatives' and > 'non-relative characters and ..relations between pairs of objects". > These are logical interactions between objects. > > BUT THIS is not what I am talking about. I'm talking about the > constitution of the SIGN. And I don't see that Peirce discusses these > three aspects of the ONE SIGN, the triad, as 'relatives'. Each part of > the triad does not exist per se on its own. He himself calls the three > parts 'correlates'. > > As he says, 'reasoning is of a triadic constitution' 6.321 and he > refers to thought itself as 'involves a triadic relation" 6.321. And he > goes on in this section, to discuss relations, relationships and 'three > correlates'. Then, he continues on 'For forty years....I have been > constantly on the alert to find a genuine triadic relation - that is, > one that does not consist in a mere collocation of dyadic > relations....and he continues on in this whole section 6.322, to > discuss triadic relations, triadic relationship..and continues on in > 6.323 discussing triadic relationships. > > In 1.564, he outlines his definition of the representamen, the > interpretant and the object which he also calls correlates.See also > 2.228. The point of this triad is that the interactions between them are > actions that are irreducibly connected with each other. As he says" the > most important class of triadic relations, those of signs or > representamens, to their objects and interpretants" 2.233. I read this > as meaning that the Representamen has a RELATION to its object and its > interpretant. His triadic relations are outlined in 2.234 and from > these, we can derive the ten classes of signs. > > Now, my point is that the SIGN, as a triad, is composed of three > 'correlates' with three relations - (2.242 - which shows the relation > between the correlates); that are networked together as a process of > generating meaning. Peirce does ALSO use the terms that you use > (relative) as in "by 'semiosis, I mean...an action or influence, which > is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its > object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in > any way resolvable into actions between pairs" 5.484. But surely we know > enough of Peirce to know that he doesn't mean that the semiosic act > consists of three separately existential units: the representamen/sign; > the object; the interpretant! The triad is not reducible. > > ------------ > > 2] BEN: A relative is something defined through the relationship in > which it stands to something. "Opposite," "double," "parent," etc. > That which you said of relation is also to be said of a relative: a > relative cannot exist per se on its own (except in some sense in the > relationship of self-identity). E.g, "Parent." A parent is a parent of > offspring. Therefore your objection to speaking of the sign or > representamen not as a relation, your objection that the sign can't > exist per se by itself, is not applicable to speaking of the sign as a > relative or, in particular, a correlate. > > EDWINA: I don't think the whole sign, the triad, is a correlate; the > three parts of the sign: object-representamen-interpretant, are > correlates. > > > > 3] BEN: The parent relationship might be expressed functor-style, from > the parent's side, as "parent-of" and, from the offspring's side, as > "offspring-of". In the case of a symmetrical relation, it's easier to > come up with a single name for both sides, e.g., "opposition" (and there > the language also better accommodates the hypostatic abstraction). The > difference between the relative and the relationship is at least > analogous to the difference between a function in the usual mathematical > sense and a lambda function. In any case the idea of a relative no more > involves the idea of something existing per se on its own than the idea > of a relation does. > > EDWINA: This is a very different topic than the one I am exploring. > > > 4]BEN: Again, Peirce calls sign, object, and interpretant the semiotic > correlates, not the semiotic correlations. He typically distinguishes > between representation as the relation or operation of representing, on > one hand, and sign, or representamen, as that which represents, on the > other hand. He never refers to a sign or representamen as a > representation except when he is using the word 'representation' in one > of its popular senses, to mean _something that represents_, as when we > say that a painting is a representation of something, or that somebody > made a representation in court. > > EDWINA: Agreed - but I think that 'correlates' and 'correlations' is > nit-picking. I am aware when he uses the terms 'representamen' and > 'representation' and again, I don't think that changes my outline. > > > 5]>[Edwina] 2) It is only a problem for the ten classes IF, as some > people on this blog claim, the linear processing order of moving from > the Input data from the external Object, via the long term Representamen > Relation, to the interpretant....is instead of Representamen is first, > gathering data from the external object (second) ..mediating it via that > Representamen.....to, finally, third...the Interpretant.....IT IS ONLY a > problem if this linear semiosic tranformative path is instead viewed as, > instead of ordinal (first, second, third)....as categorical: (Firstness, > Secondness and Thirdness). And that is what, to me, some people on this > blog are doing. > > [Ben] The problem for you arises chiefly because you reject Peirce's > sense of the universality of his categories. That which is priman in one > respect can be secundan in another respect, and he places no limit on > the number of categorial conditions and semiotic relations in which a > given phenomenon can stand. In one of the quotes that I sent you see him > laboring over how a sign stands to its immediate object, relationships > finer-grained than those of the 10 classes come to light, and he came to > work on the 10-trichotomy system that was meant to issue in 66 classes. > > EDWINA: Absolutely not. I don't reject the universality of the > categories. I agree with Peirce's outline of them. A category of > Firstness can, in no way, be a category of Secondness nor can it be a > category of Thirdness. Secondness, after all, is a mode of organization > of matter which produces morphologies interacting only within brute > action and reaction. There are NO LAWS. Thirdness, on the other hand, is > a mode of organization of matter which produces morphologies operating > within habits, within laws - which are entirely lacking in either > Firstness or Secondness. The SAME phenonomen - which is, for instance, > operating ONLY within a mode of Secondness, cannot suddenly operation > within a mode of Thirdness. And the categories are not 'semiotic > relations'. > > 6] BEN: The categories are related to the ordering for Peirce. Something > is a Second because it stands in a relation of reaction/resistance, > essentially dyadic. In other relations it takes on other categorial > aspects. The degenerate cases are complex examples of it. Here we have > Peirce, in the 3rd Lecture on Pragmatism, CP 5.66, 1903, 36 years after > "On a New List", still not rejecting the association between categories > and monad/dyad/triad that he discussed on "On a New List": > > EDWINA: I disagree with how you outline the categories. You seem to > define them as aspects of interactions, of relations. I define them as > modes of organization of matter/energy. I agree with the descriptions > you outline below, but don't see them as dependent on interactions. The > categories are primary modes of organization of matter. Someone on this > blog recently referred to Spencer-Brown's morphologies of Form - which > also uses the Peircean categories to generate forms, i.e, as modes of > organization. I agree with that.. > > For example, the nature of 'feeling', which is Firstness (1.304) is a > mode of organization of matter; a pure quality..."a feeling of redness > or of purple without beginning, end, or change'....1.305. These > descriptions are not of relations or interactions but of a mode of > organization...such that you are 'feeling red or purple'..Secondness, > again, is not an interaction but a mode of organization of matter such > that for example, you as a mode of organization are in reaction with > something else. > > [Quote] > Category the First is the Idea of that which is such as it is > regardless of anything else. That is to say, it is a Quality of > Feeling. > > Category the Second is the Idea of that which is such as it is as > being Second to some First, regardless of anything else, and in > particular regardless of any Law, although it may conform to a law. > That is to say, it is Reaction as an element of the Phenomenon. > > Category the Third is the Idea of that which is such as it is as being > a Third, or Medium, between a Second and its First. That is to say, it > is Representation as an element of the Phenomenon. > [End quote] > > > BEN: If you disagree with Peirce, fine, say so. EDWINA: The above are > good descriptions but are not full outlines of the nature of the > categories. > > 7] >[Edwina] 3 When I call a SIGN a triad, I don't mean a 'three-way > classification' (of what); I mean a set of three Relations ..that > between the Representamen and the Object; the Representamen-in-itself; > and that between the Representamen and the Interpretant. That's an > irreducible triad of Relations...and all three Relations together, made > up the Semiosic Sign. > > [Ben] That's clearer, thanks. > > BEN: Now, what you describe is not Peirce's usage of the word 'sign,' > and it clashes with the popular ordinary English word 'sign'. On the > other hand, the idea of the sign as triadically relative, that is, as > standing in a triadic relation, does _not_ clash with the popular > ordinary English word 'sign', since a sign is usually taken as a sign > for some object to some at least potential interpreting mind. > > EDWINA: But Peirce uses the term of SIGN, and sign=representamen and > sign=object and so on, all throughout his work. That is, he himself > mixes us these terms. Again, I am NOT defining the sign within a > Saussurian framework - 'sign for some object'. My definition of the SIGN > is that it is ONE UNIT composed of three informational interactions; > that between the Representamen and the external Object; that of the > Representamen in itself , ie, referring to its habits/laws; and that > between the Represntamen and the Interpretant. > > > 8] BEN: I find it confusing to think of the semiotic triadic > relationship as the sign itself. I start wondering what is its object? > What is its interpretant? I find it difficult to form a sentence using > the word "sign' to mean the whole triadic relation. Since the semiotic > triadic relationship is also a relationship of triadic determination, > why not call the object in it the "objectamen" or "determinamen," and > the relationship itself the Object? A semiotic object is that which, for > purposes of semiotic analysis, one takes as a primary source of > determination in a semiosis. > > EDWINA: But Peirce uses the term Sign in multiple ways throughout his > work. I agree that it can be difficult to sort them out and to use them. > Is the object the primary source of determination? I certainly agree > with objective reality; objects exist outside of our observation and > consideration. But I think it's more complex. We, for example, don't > just react to an object. We can initiate the interaction. > > 9] BEN: Again, that is for the purpose of semiotic analysis, not in some > ontically absolute sense in which the semiotic object could never in > turn be a sign for something else. A sign mediates the determination. > Something is a semiotic object insofar as it determines something, as a > sign, to determine something, as an interpretant, to be determined by > the object as the sign is determined by the object. An objection to the > word "determinamen" could be that some determination is dyadic, merely > reactional, etc., not triadic and semiotical. Or why not call the > interpretant in the triadic relation the "interpretamen," and the whole > triadic relation, which is also one of interpretation, the Interpretant? > > Morphologically it's messy. You want to call the whole triadic relation > by the name of one of the triadically relative elements in it, so you > characterize the triadic relationship by a name suitable for a > triadically-relative element rather than for a triadic relationship. Why > don't you call it the 'trilation' or something like that? It's just a > semiosis regarded as a structure rather than as a process. I don't think > that that's bad. The structural view is handy not only for general > analysis but also for when one is talking about the same correlates > repeatedly conducting semioses - the wind, a weathercock, the > interpretant in a farmer's mind. > > EDWINA: Of course I see your points but I consider that Peirce himself > does exactly this with his multiple uses of the same term of 'sign'. I > consider semiosis as a process, an endless continuous networking, which > generates 'morphemes' so to speak, or singular morphologies...which then > network with other morphemes, which generate others, which dissipate and > so on. > > 10] >[Edwina] 4) As for whether all three categories are in every > phenomenon - no, I don't agree. I think that all three categories > exist and can be linked to every phenomenon, but, let's say a > phenomenon that is in pure Firstness. All three Relations are all in a > mode of Firstness, a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign. A burst of heat - > That, in itself, has no Secondness in it and no Thirdness. It most > certainly will, in the next nanosecond, introduce those two categories > but in itself, right then, it is only one category. Thus, its singular > mode of organization enables it to network with other objects...which > are formed within the other categories. > [Ben] A qualisign is a quality standing as a sign, a quality insofar as > it is a sign. Every quality can be seen, semiotically, as a qualisign. > For you 'pure firstness' refers to being a (rhematic iconic) qualisign, > because all three 'relations' are in a 'mode' of Firstness. > > Yet, when one regards a quality as a qualisign, one brings_reason and > reflection_ to the phenomenon and no longer apprehends it in its _pure_ > firstness. Instead one regards it as having an object and an > interpretant. (John mentions your pansemiotism but I don't see how > pansemiotism requires you not to see a phenomenological level prior to > the semiotic level - prior, that is, in the order of abstractness. Pure > math is more abstract than both of them, in Peirce's system.) > > EDWINA: Yes, but what about BEFORE one starts the reasoning and > reflection; what about the pure isolate feeling...which will disappear > as soon as one starts to acknowledge it? Peirce talks about this pure > feeling in his analysis of the categories in, eg, 1.316. > > No, I don't recognize anything prior to semiosis. Semiosis is, to me, > basic. > > > ["What Is a Sign?", circa 1894, EP 2. > http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ep/ep2/ep2book/ch02/ep2ch2.htm Quote] > It is necessary to recognize three different states of mind. First, > imagine a person in a dreamy state. Let us suppose he is thinking of > nothing but a red color. Not thinking about it, either, that is, not > asking nor answering any questions about it, not even saying to > himself that it pleases him, but just contemplating it, as his fancy > brings it up. Perhaps, when he gets tired of the red, he will change > it to some other color, â say a turquoise blue, â or a rose-color; > â but if he does so, it will be in the play of fancy without any > reason and without any compulsion. This is about as near as may be to > a state of mind in which something is present, without compulsion and > without reason; it is called Feeling. Except in a half-waking hour, > nobody really is in a state of feeling, pure and simple. But whenever > we are awake, something is present to the mind, and what is present, > without reference to any compulsion or reason, is feeling. > [....] > §2. There are three kinds of interest we may take in a thing. First, > we may have a primary interest in it for itself. Second, we may have a > secondary interest in it, on account of its reactions with other > things. Third, we may have a mediatory interest in it, in so far as it > conveys to a mind an idea about a thing. In so far as it does this, it > is a sign, or representation. > [End quote] > > In CP 5.70 (the 3rd Lecture on Pragmatism again): > > [Quote] > In pure Secondness, the reacting correlates are Singulars, and as such > are Individuals, not capable of further division. > [End quote] > > > His idea of _pure_ Secondness does not involve signs at all. Instead it > involves sheer reaction between relate and correlate, or between > correlates, pretty much the same thing for the purpose of what he is > saying. Here again he distinguishes the relative (the 'correlate') from > the relation. The most that one can say in regard to enhanced or 'pure' > secondness and the dicent indexical sinsign is that the dicent indexical > sinsign is the most secundan among the ten sign classes, because all > three of its trichotomical classifications (sinsign, index, dicisign) > are secundan. Its trichotomical classifications are 'pure' of > non-secundans. > > > >[Edwina] Another example, of a SIGN, that is in pure Secondness, a > dicent indexical sinsign. All three Relations are in a mode of > Secondness. Purely active-reactive. A mechanical hammer. Now, within > its actions, Firstness does indeed exist (as, for example, the sound > of the hammer, the 'feeling' of the metal striking the metal)...There > is no Thirdness, but, it could emerge as the analysis of what it is > in the observation of another, or even, in the normative results of > the metal-on-metal. These other categorical modes are networked into > this one Sign in its current state of pure Secondness. > > But, if you insist that all three categorical modes of organization > are always fully present in each SIGN, then, you are preventing the > universe from any diversity and also, preventing networking. > [Ben] No, since the various categories can be present in all the various > phenomena in differing proportions, in differing ways, etc. So that does > not prevent diversity, much less networking, if I guess rightly what you > mean by 'networking'. > > > Best, Ben > > > > Edwina > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . 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