In CP 5.488 Peirce makes a crucial distinction: "all this universe is perfused
with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs". Only the latter idea -
that the universe consists exclusively of signs - is properly termed
"pansemiotics". The former idea - that the universe is perfused with signs -
implies Peirce's thesis that signs are not restricted to the living world in
the sense that semiosis is (not the whole of but) at work already in the
preliving development of the universe. IF that is the case, we need to
distinguish between biosemiosis and physiosemiosis under the general notion of
"semiosis".
Given the history of the modifier "pan-" in the history of
philosophy, with its predominantly negative connotations or overtones, I think
that it does a disservice to the development of semiotics to adopt (or try to
adopt) positively the term "pansemiotics". Actually, Frederik and I had an
extensive discussion around this point in "Let us not lose sight of the forest
for the trees ...", Cybernetics & Human Knowing 13.3-4 (2006), 161-193, "Let us
not lose sight of the forest for the trees ...", a rsponse to Stjernfelt's "Let
us not get too far ahead of the story ..." in Cybernetics & Human Knowing 13.1
(2006), 86-103.
The universe is not composed exclusively of signs: that is what
the name "pansemiotics" preconsciously, as it were, conveys. The extent to
which the universe (of things & objects) is "perfused" with signs is a
different question. So, since "semiotics" is the knowledge acquired by studying
the action of signs or "semiosis", the extent of semiotic studies is as wide
(or "extensive") as is the process of semiosis. If semiosis is involved already
in the evolution of the lifeless universe developing in the direction of life,
then, just as biosemiotics studies semiosis as it is at work (or play!) in the
world of living things, "biosemiosis", so there will be a "physiosemiotic
dimension" to semiotics (just as there is a "biosemiotic dimension") as it is
at work & play in the physical universe prior to and (later) surrounding life,
"physiosemiosis".
If there is any physiosemiosis, that is as much a part of
semiotics as biosemiosis is. It is a question of the range or extent of the
action of signs in the physical realm of things whether living or not. Per se,
the question of physiosemiosis, thus, is "the final frontier" (to borrow an
expression from StarTrek) of semiotic investigation. Per se, this "final
frontier" question has NOTHING to do with so-called, or mis-called,
"pansemiotics". Semiosis may be a process present throughout the physical
universe, living or not; but semiosis is NOT the only process thus present
(which is what the name "pansemiosis" or "pansemiotics" implies).
The question of physiosemiosis is a question of to what extent
is the action of signs simply co-terminous with the realm of living things. (to
perhaps put it in Frederik's framework: are there natural dicisigns beyond the
frontiers of life?) The question properly phrased cannot be, as Frederik below
suggests, properly "rephrased as pansemiotics versus biosemiotics".
From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, September 03, 2014 15:48
To: [email protected]; Peirce List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6624] Natural Propositions
Dear Gary, Edwina, list
This is an recurrent discussion in P scholarship. It may be rephrased as
pansemiotics versus biosemiotics, or it may be expressed as the claim that all
true triadic relations are signs vs. the claim that signs only comprise a
subset of triadic relations. Both tendencies are in Peirce so the isssue can
not be resolved by Peirce scholarship.
Personally, I tend to side with the latter of the two schools, based on the
observation that the science of physics does not need semiotics in the
description of its subject matter (only in its theory of science) while
biology, on all levels, involves spontaneous semiotic concepts, from
biochemistry to ecology and ethology you'll find "genetic code", "Information",
"signals", "cues" etc. which presumably form part of the subject matter of
biology. For that reason, I think pre-biological nature could be seen as a sort
of semiotic zero-case. Adding semiotic concepts to your description of physical
events can be done, but it does not really add to our understanding of them -
while in our understanding of biological events, semiotic concepts are
always-already there.
I do not discuss this deeply in "Natural Propositons" but of course it forms
the prerequisite to my discussing biological sign processes but not purely
physical events conceived as semiotics.
But I think deciding pro or con pansemiotics is no prerequisite for following
the book's argument.
Best
F
Den 03/09/2014 kl. 16.08 skrev Gary Fuhrman
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>:
Jon, Edwina, lists,
Yes, I read McCullough a few decades ago and learned a lot from him, long
before I started reading Peirce). But I think part of the problem here is
that for Peirce, and I think for his contemporaries, "physiology" is closer
to "phenomenology" than it is to "physics". It is the study of forms and
sturctures generally, not only of physical forms and biological structures.
For instance, in his classification of sciences where he's discussing
phenomenology, esthetics and ethics, he writes:
"The true principal purpose of these sciences is the Classification of
possible forms. But this must be founded on a study of the Physiology of
those forms, their general elements, parts, and mode of action. Thereupon
should follow the Classificatory part, including the general discussion of
what is good and what bad; and this should be followed up by a study of the
principles that govern the production of such forms" (EP2:272).
The same applies to the usage of "physiology" in the 1883 quote I posted
today. Peirce is talking about the physiology of *logic* (i.e. of semiosis
as he would put it later on), not primarily about biology or physics or
psychology. That excerpt is about the connection of syllogistic logic with
primitive forms of *cognition*, but Edwina reads it pansemiotically as
applying to physical "organization of matter" all the way down to the
molecular (maybe the atomic?) level, and thus doesn't distinguish between
cognitive and physical processes. But for purposes of NP, we don't need to
engage in the endless debate over pansemiotics; primitive cognition is as
far down as we need to go in theorizing its continuity with reasoning.
gary f.
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