Perhaps I am misreading your post, John, but it seems to me an argument over semantics. You seem to reject the term 'pansemiosis' - and I'm not sure why- other than that you understand the term to mean that 'the universe is NOT composed exclusively of signs"..and I don't understand how you come to that conclusion.
Yes - a physiosemiosic dimension; a biosemiosic dimension... And I'm not sure what you mean by 'semiosis is not the only process thus present' in the physical universe. I can understand your objection to pansemiotics vs biosemiotics, IF the former is understood as so universal that it includes biosemiotics anyway. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Deely, John N. To: Frederik Stjernfelt ; [email protected] ; Peirce List Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2014 6:32 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:6644] Re: Natural Propositions: "pansemiotics" (no) In CP 5.488 Peirce makes a crucial distinction: "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs". Only the latter idea - that the universe consists exclusively of signs - is properly termed "pansemiotics". The former idea - that the universe is perfused with signs - implies Peirce's thesis that signs are not restricted to the living world in the sense that semiosis is (not the whole of but) at work already in the preliving development of the universe. IF that is the case, we need to distinguish between biosemiosis and physiosemiosis under the general notion of "semiosis". Given the history of the modifier "pan-" in the history of philosophy, with its predominantly negative connotations or overtones, I think that it does a disservice to the development of semiotics to adopt (or try to adopt) positively the term "pansemiotics". Actually, Frederik and I had an extensive discussion around this point in "Let us not lose sight of the forest for the trees ...", Cybernetics & Human Knowing 13.3-4 (2006), 161-193, "Let us not lose sight of the forest for the trees ...", a rsponse to Stjernfelt's "Let us not get too far ahead of the story ..." in Cybernetics & Human Knowing 13.1 (2006), 86-103. The universe is not composed exclusively of signs: that is what the name "pansemiotics" preconsciously, as it were, conveys. The extent to which the universe (of things & objects) is "perfused" with signs is a different question. So, since "semiotics" is the knowledge acquired by studying the action of signs or "semiosis", the extent of semiotic studies is as wide (or "extensive") as is the process of semiosis. If semiosis is involved already in the evolution of the lifeless universe developing in the direction of life, then, just as biosemiotics studies semiosis as it is at work (or play!) in the world of living things, "biosemiosis", so there will be a "physiosemiotic dimension" to semiotics (just as there is a "biosemiotic dimension") as it is at work & play in the physical universe prior to and (later) surrounding life, "physiosemiosis". If there is any physiosemiosis, that is as much a part of semiotics as biosemiosis is. It is a question of the range or extent of the action of signs in the physical realm of things whether living or not. Per se, the question of physiosemiosis, thus, is "the final frontier" (to borrow an expression from StarTrek) of semiotic investigation. Per se, this "final frontier" question has NOTHING to do with so-called, or mis-called, "pansemiotics". Semiosis may be a process present throughout the physical universe, living or not; but semiosis is NOT the only process thus present (which is what the name "pansemiosis" or "pansemiotics" implies). The question of physiosemiosis is a question of to what extent is the action of signs simply co-terminous with the realm of living things. (to perhaps put it in Frederik's framework: are there natural dicisigns beyond the frontiers of life?) The question properly phrased cannot be, as Frederik below suggests, properly "rephrased as pansemiotics versus biosemiotics". From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Wednesday, September 03, 2014 15:48 To: [email protected]; Peirce List Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6624] Natural Propositions Dear Gary, Edwina, list This is an recurrent discussion in P scholarship. It may be rephrased as pansemiotics versus biosemiotics, or it may be expressed as the claim that all true triadic relations are signs vs. the claim that signs only comprise a subset of triadic relations. Both tendencies are in Peirce so the isssue can not be resolved by Peirce scholarship. Personally, I tend to side with the latter of the two schools, based on the observation that the science of physics does not need semiotics in the description of its subject matter (only in its theory of science) while biology, on all levels, involves spontaneous semiotic concepts, from biochemistry to ecology and ethology you'll find "genetic code", "Information", "signals", "cues" etc. which presumably form part of the subject matter of biology. For that reason, I think pre-biological nature could be seen as a sort of semiotic zero-case. Adding semiotic concepts to your description of physical events can be done, but it does not really add to our understanding of them - while in our understanding of biological events, semiotic concepts are always-already there. I do not discuss this deeply in "Natural Propositons" but of course it forms the prerequisite to my discussing biological sign processes but not purely physical events conceived as semiotics. But I think deciding pro or con pansemiotics is no prerequisite for following the book's argument. Best F Den 03/09/2014 kl. 16.08 skrev Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]>: Jon, Edwina, lists, Yes, I read McCullough a few decades ago and learned a lot from him, long before I started reading Peirce). But I think part of the problem here is that for Peirce, and I think for his contemporaries, "physiology" is closer to "phenomenology" than it is to "physics". It is the study of forms and sturctures generally, not only of physical forms and biological structures. For instance, in his classification of sciences where he's discussing phenomenology, esthetics and ethics, he writes: "The true principal purpose of these sciences is the Classification of possible forms. But this must be founded on a study of the Physiology of those forms, their general elements, parts, and mode of action. Thereupon should follow the Classificatory part, including the general discussion of what is good and what bad; and this should be followed up by a study of the principles that govern the production of such forms" (EP2:272). The same applies to the usage of "physiology" in the 1883 quote I posted today. Peirce is talking about the physiology of *logic* (i.e. of semiosis as he would put it later on), not primarily about biology or physics or psychology. That excerpt is about the connection of syllogistic logic with primitive forms of *cognition*, but Edwina reads it pansemiotically as applying to physical "organization of matter" all the way down to the molecular (maybe the atomic?) level, and thus doesn't distinguish between cognitive and physical processes. But for purposes of NP, we don't need to engage in the endless debate over pansemiotics; primitive cognition is as far down as we need to go in theorizing its continuity with reasoning. gary f.
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