Edwina, Pansemiotics carries the connotation of panpsychism.
Physiosemiosis has no such connotation. And the term "pansemiosis"
carries
just the opposite of what you attribute, namely, the idea that the
universe IS composed exclusively of signs.
As to semiosis being not the only process of physical nature, consider
simply brute secondness!
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2014 18:21
To: [email protected]; Peirce List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6644] Re: Natural Propositions:
"pansemiotics" (no)
Perhaps I am misreading your post, John, but it seems to me an argument
over semantics. You seem to reject the term 'pansemiosis' - and I'm not
sure why- other than that you understand the term to mean that 'the
universe is NOT composed exclusively of signs"..and I don't understand
how
you come to that conclusion.
Yes - a physiosemiosic dimension; a biosemiosic dimension...
And I'm not sure what you mean by 'semiosis is not the only process thus
present' in the physical universe. I can understand your objection to
pansemiotics vs biosemiotics, IF the former is understood as so universal
that it includes biosemiotics anyway.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Deely, John N.<mailto:[email protected]>
To: Frederik Stjernfelt<mailto:[email protected]> ;
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> ; Peirce
List<mailto:[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2014 6:32 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:6644] Re: Natural Propositions: "pansemiotics"
(no)
In CP 5.488 Peirce makes a crucial distinction: "all this universe is
perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs". Only
the
latter idea - that the universe consists exclusively of signs - is
properly termed "pansemiotics". The former idea - that the universe is
perfused with signs - implies Peirce's thesis that signs are not
restricted to the living world in the sense that semiosis is (not the
whole of but) at work already in the preliving development of the
universe. IF that is the case, we need to distinguish between biosemiosis
and physiosemiosis under the general notion of "semiosis".
Given the history of the modifier "pan-" in the history
of
philosophy, with its predominantly negative connotations
or overtones, I think that it does a disservice to the
development of semiotics to adopt (or try to adopt)
positively the term "pansemiotics". Actually, Frederik and
I had an extensive discussion around this point in "Let us
not lose sight of the forest for the trees ...",
Cybernetics & Human Knowing 13.3-4 (2006), 161-193, "Let
us not lose sight of the forest for the trees ...", a
rsponse to Stjernfelt's "Let us not get too far ahead of
the story ..." in Cybernetics & Human Knowing 13.1
(2006), 86-103.
The universe is not composed exclusively of signs: that
is
what the name "pansemiotics" preconsciously, as it were,
conveys. The extent to which the universe (of things &
objects) is "perfused" with signs is a different question.
So, since "semiotics" is the knowledge acquired by
studying the action of signs or "semiosis", the extent of
semiotic studies is as wide (or "extensive") as is the
process of semiosis. If semiosis is involved already in
the evolution of the lifeless universe developing in the
direction of life, then, just as biosemiotics studies
semiosis as it is at work (or play!) in the world of
living things, "biosemiosis", so there will be a
"physiosemiotic dimension" to semiotics (just as there is
a "biosemiotic dimension") as it is at work & play in the
physical universe prior to and (later) surrounding life,
"physiosemiosis".
If there is any physiosemiosis, that is as much a part of
semiotics as biosemiosis is. It is a question of the range
or extent of the action of signs in the physical realm of
things whether living or not. Per se, the question of
physiosemiosis, thus, is "the final frontier" (to borrow
an expression from StarTrek) of semiotic investigation.
Per se, this "final frontier" question has NOTHING to do
with so-called, or mis-called, "pansemiotics". Semiosis
may be a process present throughout the physical universe,
living or not; but semiosis is NOT the only process thus
present (which is what the name "pansemiosis" or
"pansemiotics" implies).
The question of physiosemiosis is a question of to what
extent is the action of signs simply co-terminous with the
realm of living things. (to perhaps put it in Frederik's
framework: are there natural dicisigns beyond the
frontiers of life?) The question properly phrased cannot
be, as Frederik below suggests, properly "rephrased as
pansemiotics versus biosemiotics".
From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, September 03, 2014 15:48
To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>; Peirce
List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6624] Natural Propositions
Dear Gary, Edwina, list
This is an recurrent discussion in P scholarship. It may be rephrased as
pansemiotics versus biosemiotics, or it may be expressed as the claim
that
all true triadic relations are signs vs. the claim that signs only
comprise a subset of triadic relations. Both tendencies are in Peirce so
the isssue can not be resolved by Peirce scholarship.
Personally, I tend to side with the latter of the two schools, based on
the observation that the science of physics does not need semiotics in
the
description of its subject matter (only in its theory of science) while
biology, on all levels, involves spontaneous semiotic concepts, from
biochemistry to ecology and ethology you'll find "genetic code",
"Information", "signals", "cues" etc. which presumably form part of the
subject matter of biology. For that reason, I think pre-biological nature
could be seen as a sort of semiotic zero-case. Adding semiotic concepts
to
your description of physical events can be done, but it does not really
add to our understanding of them - while in our understanding of
biological events, semiotic concepts are always-already there.
I do not discuss this deeply in "Natural Propositons" but of course it
forms the prerequisite to my discussing biological sign processes but not
purely physical events conceived as semiotics.
But I think deciding pro or con pansemiotics is no prerequisite for
following the book's argument.
Best
F
Den 03/09/2014 kl. 16.08 skrev Gary Fuhrman
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>:
Jon, Edwina, lists,
Yes, I read McCullough a few decades ago and learned a lot from him, long
before I started reading Peirce). But I think part of the problem here is
that for Peirce, and I think for his contemporaries, "physiology" is
closer
to "phenomenology" than it is to "physics". It is the study of forms and
sturctures generally, not only of physical forms and biological
structures.
For instance, in his classification of sciences where he's discussing
phenomenology, esthetics and ethics, he writes:
"The true principal purpose of these sciences is the Classification of
possible forms. But this must be founded on a study of the Physiology of
those forms, their general elements, parts, and mode of action. Thereupon
should follow the Classificatory part, including the general discussion
of
what is good and what bad; and this should be followed up by a study of
the
principles that govern the production of such forms" (EP2:272).
The same applies to the usage of "physiology" in the 1883 quote I posted
today. Peirce is talking about the physiology of *logic* (i.e. of
semiosis
as he would put it later on), not primarily about biology or physics or
psychology. That excerpt is about the connection of syllogistic logic
with
primitive forms of *cognition*, but Edwina reads it pansemiotically as
applying to physical "organization of matter" all the way down to the
molecular (maybe the atomic?) level, and thus doesn't distinguish between
cognitive and physical processes. But for purposes of NP, we don't need
to
engage in the endless debate over pansemiotics; primitive cognition is as
far down as we need to go in theorizing its continuity with reasoning.
gary f.
