Stan,
In Peirce’s view (and mine, and Frederik’s), fallibilism is part of the core logic of science. It is a historical fact that scientists very often choose to ignore or deny the fallibility of their favorite theories. But this only shows that scientists can do bad science; it does not alter the normative logic of science. Trying to base your logic, your epistemology or your metaphysics on facts about the sociology of science is just another variant of the “psychologism” that would base logic on psychology, and I think Frederik has already explained why it’s invalid. The problem with social constructivism (when taken beyond the obvious truth that scientific theories ARE socially constructed) is that it doesn’t allow for fallibilism, because it doesn’t admit that any hypothesis can be conclusively proven false. That move — unlike fallibilism — renders the concept of truth meaningless, and therefore reduces science into a political struggle. If you hold to it consistently, you can’t even assert that social constructivism itself is true, because it would just be a theory constructed to serve your own political purposes. It’s a self-destructive theory. Anyway, I think there’s more to life than politics. gary f. From: Stanley N Salthe [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 15-Sep-14 10:48 AM To: [email protected] Subject: [biosemiotics:6836] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2 Gary -- replying to: GF: We are indeed immersed in intersubjectivity when we engage in scientific thought. But we are also relying on the assumption that the phenomena which are the objects of our study (including those that are general or typical) have their being independently of our construction of theories about them, which entails that actual experience can tell us if those theories are false. Social constructivism, as I understand the term, does not include that assumption. And that’s the difference, as I see it. S: This goes beyond the boundaries of what I was commenting on. But... social construction has addressed this point. Testing VERY generally -- 'yes, objects only fall down' -- has already been accomplished in the past by successful cultures. The more recondite testing done in the laboratories of scientists is a more 'iffy' and subtle phenomenon. If it does not relate to societal interests it won't be carried out in the first place. If it has been blessed with societal support it is still problematic from an 'objective' perspective. When is a result deemed definitive? How to determine when an experiment is finished? How do the results appear to those holding competing theories (the experimenter was a holder of some theory)? These questions will depend also upon the social conditions bearing at the time when the results came in. Consider the single seemingly definitive test of curved spacetime (the sun's rays appearing before the sun's perisphere (?) had peeked from behind the moon). The result was immediately taken as definitive given the popular notoriety of Einstein at the time, 'proving' his views. Well, there are in fact other interpretations, and, indeed, the interpretation of any experimental results depends upon theories held by the investigators. It is well-known that these interpretations are theory laden, as was the experiment -- in a carefully planned experiment you can only find (or not) what you are searching for. This is why Popper tried so hard to suggest that theories are meant to be rejected, and that all WILL be disproven given time (during which, of course, a culture will have continued to evolve as well). It was this kind of thinking that so, understandably, 'ticked off' the scientific community against social constructivism. STAN
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