Chapter 3.1
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14236
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14249
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14264
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14265
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JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14276
CG:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14280
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14285
CG:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14289
GR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14293
Gary, List,
We all want to get at the essential essence of things, the necessary forms that
govern the material contents of whatever domains we investigate. But we have to
be on guard against the Fallacy Of Misplaced Essence (FOME), the error of fixing
absolute, monadic, permanent predicates on things that are merely filling a role
a relation where the only real reality lies.
Regards,
Jon
Gary Richmond wrote:
Gary F., Jeff, Clark, lists,
I've been reading the passages you pointed to from *Kaina Stoicheia* ("New
Elements") in EP2, Gary, and I tend to agree with you that, while I too
will be very interested in the special direction that Jeff would like to
take the discussion of this chapter of NP, that for the purposes of the
seminar more can be accomplished of general interest and value to members
of *both* lists if we don't get too distracted by reflections on the
history of Whewill, Mill, and Kant conceptions of the proposition, at least
just yet (one can imagine that a deep reflection on those accounts in
relation to Peirce's own might itself warrant a seminar of several to many
weeks; in fact, it sounds like a good dissertation topic).
In any event, I'm finding section 4. of "New Elements" of especial interest
and want to discuss the passage discussing the copula as an index and the
way that in the proposition "Socrates is wise," for example, that ". . .it
is not the two *signs* 'Socrates' and 'wise' that are connected, but the
*replicas* of them used in the sentence" (EP2:110, emphasis added).
This paragraph is very rich and I'd like to return to it later in the week.
Just now I'm considering it in the light of something which Peirce says in
the very next paragraph and which relates to Clark's question regarding the
relation between logic and mathematics as well as to the nature of logic as
semiotic itself.
Three snippets: "Logic is a science little removed from pure mathematics."
"Logic is the study of the essential nature of signs. A sign is something
which exists in replicas." ". . . logic, [. . .] is a study, not of
replicas, but of signs" (EP2.311).
So taken together, I take this to mean that although signs exist as
replicas, logic is *not *the study of those replicas at all, but rather the
study of the *essential *nature of signs. That is to say that it is not the
study of anything existential, but of something more *general* which *can
be* instantiated. It is the nature of *that* reality behind the replicas,
so to speak, which semiotics (and mathematics) study, one of the reasons
why, in my understanding so far, that the study of dicisigns has direct
application to biosemiotics.
Best,
Gary R.
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
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