> On Sep 24, 2014, at 1:16 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > In any event, I'm finding section 4. of "New Elements" of especial interest > and want to discuss the passage discussing the copula as an index and the way > that in the proposition "Socrates is wise," for example, that ". . .it is not > the two signs 'Socrates' and 'wise' that are connected, but the replicas of > them used in the sentence" (EP2:110, emphasis added).
Peirce’s treatment of the copula as an index is rather important I think in the history of being within philosophy. Again, while I’m often critical of continental philosophy at least this is an issue they recognize. Within the analytic tradition it tends to just be glossed over and ignored beyond a quick appeal to Kant’s “existence is not a predicate.” I’ve only gone through chapter 3 in Frederik’s book and I want to reread that before moving on to 4. So I don’t know if Frederik delves into that issue beyond the brief discussion in chapter 3. I don’t have his book handy to refer to that section, but again this seems important. In continental philosophy this ends up being discussed a lot due to the place Heidegger gives it contra Husserl. A common critique of Heidegger many make is that he confuses a logical or semantic issue as an ontological one. (i.e. apply Frege against Heidegger) In this tact the meaning of the copula is tied to the meaning of the two parts and exists purely as a kind of intent. By making the copula an index (in the robust sense he gives indices) Peirce goes well beyond the Frege inspired approaches. I honestly think Heidegger and Peirce are very similar in their approaches if not the same here. Heidegger famously talks about being not being a being, nor a property of beings, nor a concept etc. It mediates between concepts and beings but is itself not something mediated. While I think it fair to criticize the clarity of Heidegger’s language (although he is working within the Cartesian and Husserlian tradition) I think he really is speaking of the copula (being) as an index. Further it’s a robust index such that it is a sign and not merely a relation between two things. This isn’t to say Heidegger and Peirce are the same. Just that I think the move towards an externalist approach to mind in Heidegger is also made in Peirce. And it’s precisely within the proposition (or more expansively the dicisign) that Peirce makes this move. I suspect both of them are making this move due to influence from Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception. (I think this is explicit for Heidegger although I’m not sure) Within the analytic tradition a lot of this is “solved” via judgments. This doesn’t quite work since we then have to ask what makes judgements possible. (Heidegger gets at this in many places although I vaguely recall Peirce arguing along similar lines although I can’t find where) If there is a genuine index in the proposition then of course that explains why judgments are possible. I’d add that, while we aren’t discussing it, I think the iconic component of the dicisign for Peirce also pops up in various places in Heidegger. For instance his discussion of the lógos of the phenomena we have a icon/index pair such that objects show themselves. For Husserl we get an ideal meaning and for Kant we get a representation. While Peirce has a representational aspect, his icons are far more powerful than what Husserl or Kant supply. Especially when tied with the index. Further given the place of the index and his logic of vagueness Peirce is able to explain propositions that gesture towards the unknown. That becomes quite important within the Heideggarian tradition - especially where it’s pushed by Gadamer, Derrida and Ricouer. Now a possible place we have a divide between Heidegger and Peirce is found within your quote from EP 2:311. There the copula joins not the two signs “Socrates” and “wise” but their replicas. For Heidegger the copula shows the objects of both. So for Heidegger the copula brings the two elements as indices. Although Heidegger does distinguish between two senses. One he calls the existential-hermeneutical (or the hermeneutical “as”). This is the “for the sake of” relationship. The second is the predicative as-structure or opophantical. This is basically the use in assertions. I think, although I may well be wrong, that this is the distinction between the index as an index and the index as indicating via an icon. Peirce makes a move along those lines farther down in the EP 2:311 passage. For something would have to bring the general sense of that general verb down to the case in hand. An index alone can do this. But how is this index to signify the connection? In the only way in which any index can ever signify anything; by involving an icon. If I’m right then this aspect of the copula within the dicisign has the two rhemes originarily as indices but does so by way of an icon. That is the dicisign joins two rhemes on one level as icons and one level as indices. The later signified by the former.
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