Jon, lists, Would you say that Peirce, is in such a passage as this one (of which I could quote several), guilty of your putative fallacy of misplaced essence?
A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object. It is thus itself a general type or law, that is, is a Legisign. As such it acts through a Replica. Not only is it general itself, but the Object to which it refers is of a general nature. Now that which is general has its being in the instances which it will determine. There must, therefore, be existent instances of what the Symbol denotes, although we must here understand by "existent," existent in the possibly imaginary universe to which the Symbol refers. The Symbol will indirectly, through the association or other law, be affected by those instances; and thus the Symbol will involve a sort of Index, although an Index of a peculiar kind. It will not, however, be by any means true that the slight effect upon the Symbol of those instances accounts for the significant character of the Symbol. CP 2.249 If not--since this is all I meant to suggest by the snippets I quoted, then I don't see a problem, a fallacy, here. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 4:22 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: > Chapter 3.1 > GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14236 > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14249 > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14264 > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14265 > GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14267 > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14273 > JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14276 > CG:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14280 > GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14285 > CG:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14289 > GR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14293 > > Gary, List, > > We all want to get at the essential essence of things, the necessary forms > that govern the material contents of whatever domains we investigate. But > we have to be on guard against the Fallacy Of Misplaced Essence (FOME), the > error of fixing absolute, monadic, permanent predicates on things that are > merely filling a role a relation where the only real reality lies. > > Regards, > > Jon > > Gary Richmond wrote: > >> Gary F., Jeff, Clark, lists, >> >> I've been reading the passages you pointed to from *Kaina Stoicheia* ("New >> Elements") in EP2, Gary, and I tend to agree with you that, while I too >> will be very interested in the special direction that Jeff would like to >> take the discussion of this chapter of NP, that for the purposes of the >> seminar more can be accomplished of general interest and value to members >> of *both* lists if we don't get too distracted by reflections on the >> history of Whewill, Mill, and Kant conceptions of the proposition, at >> least >> just yet (one can imagine that a deep reflection on those accounts in >> relation to Peirce's own might itself warrant a seminar of several to many >> weeks; in fact, it sounds like a good dissertation topic). >> >> In any event, I'm finding section 4. of "New Elements" of especial >> interest >> and want to discuss the passage discussing the copula as an index and the >> way that in the proposition "Socrates is wise," for example, that ". . .it >> is not the two *signs* 'Socrates' and 'wise' that are connected, but the >> *replicas* of them used in the sentence" (EP2:110, emphasis added). >> >> This paragraph is very rich and I'd like to return to it later in the >> week. >> Just now I'm considering it in the light of something which Peirce says in >> the very next paragraph and which relates to Clark's question regarding >> the >> relation between logic and mathematics as well as to the nature of logic >> as >> semiotic itself. >> >> Three snippets: "Logic is a science little removed from pure mathematics." >> "Logic is the study of the essential nature of signs. A sign is something >> which exists in replicas." ". . . logic, [. . .] is a study, not of >> replicas, but of signs" (EP2.311). >> >> So taken together, I take this to mean that although signs exist as >> replicas, logic is *not *the study of those replicas at all, but rather >> the >> study of the *essential *nature of signs. That is to say that it is not >> the >> study of anything existential, but of something more *general* which *can >> be* instantiated. It is the nature of *that* reality behind the replicas, >> so to speak, which semiotics (and mathematics) study, one of the reasons >> why, in my understanding so far, that the study of dicisigns has direct >> application to biosemiotics. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R. >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690* >> >> > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
