List, Jon: Kant and chemical semiotics are polar opposites. Kant did not accept the possibility of quantification of chemistry.
from: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-science/ "In the Preface to the Metaphysical Foundations Kant claims that chemistry, at least as he understood it in 1786, was not science “proper”, but such a claim leaves open the possibility that chemistry could be fully scientific in some other sense or that, with time, it could develop into science proper. Up through 1787, Kant accepted the fundamental tenets of Stahl's chemical theory, according to which water and air are fundamental elements that function as vehicles for change in both inflammable and “earthy” substances, and he commented on particular issues in chemistry in his various physics lectures. As a result, it is clear that Kant considers chemistry to be a science in some sense even during the Critical period." and "Kant's views on chemistry have not been widely discussed in the secondary literature. However, outstanding discussions of Kant's views on the topic can be found in Carrier (1990, 2001) and Friedman (1992, chapter 5, III). Lequan (2000) is a philosophical survey of Kant's thought on chemistry throughout his development. McNulty (forthcoming) explains why Kant takes chemistry to miss the threshold for proper science – specifically, the sense in which chemistry is not mathematizable, in Kant's view." One could suppose that these Kantian views grated on CSP's chemical ego. Today, the chemical sciences are grounded in the correspondence theory of truth in the sense that chemical symbolism and chemical representamen correspond with the uniqueness of each chemical elements. Thus, the quantities (indexes) of a molecule is composed from the symbols of the chemical elements present in the molecule. This is a many to one mapping achieved by combining the attributes of several indexes for the individual sinsigns of each unique chemical element. The composition of a molecule from individual elements creates new "part-whole" relations as well as different qualisigns for the individual molecule (the molecular sinsign now referring the specific molecule formed from the atoms.) Cheers Jerry On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:36 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > Peircers, > > Here is Kant on the correspondence theory of truth: > > <quote> > > Truth is said to consist in the agreement of knowledge with the object. > According to this mere verbal definition, then, my knowledge, in order to be > true, must agree with the object. Now, I can only compare the object with my > knowledge by this means, namely, ''by taking knowledge of it''. My > knowledge, then, is to be verified by itself, which is far from being > sufficient for truth. For as the object is external to me, and the knowledge > is in me, I can only judge whether my knowledge of the object agrees with my > knowledge of the object. Such a circle in explanation was called by the > ancients ''Diallelos''. And the logicians were accused of this fallacy by > the sceptics, who remarked that this account of truth was as if a man before > a judicial tribunal should make a statement, and appeal in support of it to a > witness whom no one knows, but who defends his own credibility by saying that > the man who had called him as a witness is an honourable man. (Kant, 45). > > </quote> > > Kant, Immanuel (1800), ''Introduction to Logic''. > Reprinted, Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (trans.), > Dennis Sweet (intro.), Barnes and Noble, > New York, NY, 2005. > > According to Kant, the definition of truth as correspondence > is a "mere verbal definition", here making use of Aristotle's > distinction between a ''nominal definition'', a definition in > name only, and a ''real definition'', a definition that shows > the ''true cause'' or essence of the thing whose term is being > defined. From Kant's account of the history, the definition of > truth as correspondence was already in dispute from classical > times, the "skeptics" criticizing the "logicians" for a form of > circular reasoning, though the extent to which the "logicians" > actually held such a theory is not evaluated in this account. > > Regards, > > Jon > > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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