Jon, you might mention that there are at least two complete copies of Kaina Stoicheia on the web, one at Arisbe http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/stoicheia/stoicheia.htm and one at my site http://www.gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm - so again, I don't see the point of posting an excerpt from it when you don't say anything about it in the post, except that it's important.
gary f. -----Original Message----- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 25-Sep-14 3:25 PM To: Peirce List 1 Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Kaina Stoicheia 2014 Peircers, A bit more poking around reveals that I created the Wikipedia article on May 7, 2006. It looks like it got absorbed into the main article on C.S. Peirce. http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Kaina_Stoicheia&oldid=51937343 It appears that I found this passage to be of primary importance: | Logic is the study of the essential nature of signs. | | A sign is something that exists in replicas. Whether the sign "it is raining" | or "all pairs of particles of matter have component accelerations | toward one another inversely proportional to the square of the | distance" happens to have a replica in writing, in oral speech, or in | silent thought, is a distinction of the very minutest interest to | logic, which is a study, not of replicas, but of signs. | | But this is not the only, nor the most serious error involved in | making logic treat of "judgments" in place of propositions. It | involves confounding two things which must be distinguished if a real | comprehension of logic is to be attained. | | A 'proposition', as I have just intimated, is not to be understood as | the lingual expression of a judgment. It is, on the contrary, that | sign of which the judgment is one replica and the lingual expression another. | But a judgment is distinctly 'more' than the mere mental replica of a | proposition. It not merely 'expresses' the proposition, but it goes | further and 'accepts' it. | | I grant that the normal use of a proposition is to affirm it; and its | chief logical properties relate to what would result in reference to | its affirmation. It is, therefore, convenient in logic to express | propositions in most cases in the indicative mood. But the | proposition in the sentence, "Socrates est sapiens", strictly expressed, is "Socratem sapientum esse". | The defence of this position is that in this way we distinguish | between a proposition and the assertion of it; and without such | distinction it is impossible to get a distinct notion of the nature of the proposition. | | One and the same proposition may be affirmed, denied, judged, doubted, | inwardly inquired into, put as a question, wished, asked for, | effectively commanded, taught, or merely expressed, and does not | thereby become a different proposition. What is the nature of these | operations? The only one that need detain us is affirmation, | including judgment, or affirmation to oneself. | | As an aid in dissecting the constitution of affirmation I shall employ | a certain logical magnifying-glass that I have often found efficient | in such business. Imagine, then, that I write a proposition on a | piece of paper, perhaps a number of times, simply as a calligraphic | exercise. It is not likely to prove a dangerous amusement. But | suppose I afterwards carry the paper before a notary public and make | affidavit to its contents. That may prove to be a horse of another | color. The reason is that this affidavit may be used to determine an | assent to the proposition it contains in the minds of judge and jury; | -- an effect that the paper would not have had if I had not sworn to | it. For certain penalties here and hereafter are attached to swearing | to a false proposition; and consequently the fact that I have sworn | to it will be taken as a negative index that it is not false. This | assent in judge and jury's minds may effect in the minds of sheriff | and posse a determination to an act of force to the detriment of some | innocent man's liberty or property. Now certain ideas of justice and | good order are so powerful that the ultimate result may be very bad | for me. | | This is the way that affirmation looks under the microscope; for the | only difference between swearing to a proposition and an ordinary | affirmation of it, such as logic contemplates, is that in the latter | case the penalties are less and even less certain than those of the | law. The reason there are any penalties is, as before, that the | affirmation may determine a judgment to the same effect in the mind of the interpreter to his cost. | It cannot be that the sole cause of his believing it is that there are | such penalties, since two events cannot cause one another, unless they | are simultaneous. There must have been, and we well know that there | is, a sort of hypnotic disposition to believe what one is told with an | air [of] command. It is Grimes's credenciveness, which is the essence of hypnotism. | This disposition produced belief; belief produced the penalties; and | the knowledge of these strengthens the disposition to believe. | | C.S. Peirce, ["Kaina Stoicheia"], NEM 4, 248-249 | | C.S. Peirce, ["Kaina Stoicheia"], MS 517 (1904), pp. 235-263 in: | Carolyn Eisele (ed.), 'The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. | Peirce, Volume 4, Mathematical Philosophy', Mouton, The Hague, 1976. | | Cf. "New Elements", pp. 300-324 in 'The Essential Peirce, Volume 2 | (1893-1913)', Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, | Bloomington, IN, 1998. -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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