Thanks, Ben, for the research! 

I know that “Jon was suggesting that Peirce was consciously operating in a 
terminological tradition including the fields that we now call probability 
theory and statistics, in which Peirce did some important work.” But that seems 
to me unlikely in a context where he’s mainly referring to the logical 
difficulties with J.S. Mill’s concept of causality. Of course Peirce was aware 
of that technical sense, but there’s nothing in “Kaina Stoicheia” to indicate 
that he had that technical usage in mind. 

 

gary f.

 

From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: 10-Oct-14 12:36 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8

 

Gary F., Jon,

I think that Jon was suggesting that Peirce was consciously operating in a 
terminological tradition including the fields that we now call probability 
theory and statistics, in which Peirce did some important work. And you know 
how Peirce was about honoring terminological traditions. Years ago here at 
peirce-l I was discussing 'event' as that word is sometimes used in physics, 
going by a definition that I remembered from a passage somewhere by Einstein, 
pretty much equivalent to Peirce's definition of 'occurrence', and Jon became 
insistent that I shouldn't use the word 'event' in that way. Jon is often 
milder nowadays! Anyway, in case this argument is really about who is to do a 
little investigation, I'll do a little.

'Event' is in the word list at P.E.P.-UQÀM: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20120324152509/http://www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep?l=E
 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20120324152509/http:/www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep?l=E>
  

'Occur' (but not 'occurrence') is in the word list at P.E.P.-UQÀM: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20120324152344/http://www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep?l=O
 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20120324152344/http:/www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep?l=O>
  

I don't find anything in the Century Dictionary definitions of 'occur' and 
'occurrence' relating to a technical distinction made between them and 'event' 
in probability theory.

The Century Dictionary, starting with 4th meaning under "event":

A contingent, probable, or possible happening; a coming to pass; in the theory 
of probabilities, anything which may or may not be; any general state of things 
considered as having a probability: as, in the _event_ of his death his 
interest will lapse. — Compound event, that which in reference to its 
probability is regarded as consisting in the concatenation or coincidence of 
two or more different events. — Double event, two races, or other trials of 
strength or skill, upon the winning of both depends the winning of certain 
wager or stake. — Simple event, in the doctrine of probabilities, something 
whose probability is deduced from direct observation. = Syn. 1. [....] 
_Occurrence_ is literally that which meets us in our progress through life, and 
does not connect itself with the past as an _event_ does. [....]
[End quote] 

In that sense, the same event can take indefinitely many forms, since it is 
defined by an abstractive question that it resolves (note the etymological 
parallel between 'event' and 'outcome'). As Peirce was aware of that technical 
sense, it's easy to see how he felt the need to use another word for the sense 
of a slice of the actual in all its actual detail. Such a slice the closest 
that he gets to the idea of an actual thing in itself, - the _occurrence_ (in 
MS 647) is not incognizable, but instead is not fully cognizable, yet still is 
without some pre-designatable actual hidden part or actual secret compartment 
that in principle nobody could ever know or imagine.

Best, Ben

On 10/10/2014 11:06 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:

Jon,

If we adopt your methodology, I guess that in order to decode this message of 
yours, we need to look into the history of usage of the terms "probability", 
"statistics", "technical" and "distinction", as well as "term" and "look into"; 
and we have to make all of that history explicit before we dare to guess what 
you're talking about.

I think we have a better chance of understanding Peirce's particular usages of 
the terms "event" and "occurrence" by looking at the contexts in which he used 
them, including his purpose of contrasting them with the term "fact". We may 
guess wrong about what he means, at first - abductions are often wrong - but 
just as often, by continuing the dialogue, we can *learn* that they are wrong, 
and guess again.

gary f.

-----Original Message-----
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: 10-Oct-14 9:10 AM
To: 'Peirce List'
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8

Gary & All,

Just off-hand, you might look into the way the term "event" is used in 
probability and statistics, and the technical distinction that is made between 
"event" and "occurrence".  I'm pretty sure the terms have been used that way 
since Boole, at least, if not since the time of Fermat and Pascal.

Regards,

Jon

Gary Fuhrman wrote:

Gary R, Clark, Stephen, lists,

Clark, I can't comment on Davidson because I haven't read him. But as for 
Peirce's usage of "event", it never occurred to me that it means anything 
different than the usual vernacular meaning: an event is something that 
actually happens.

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