Frederik, lists, So glad to learn that your health is improved, Frederik. It's terrific having you active again in the seminar.
Here's a little chart showing the terminological variations Peirce experimented with on the traditional triad: term/proposition/argument which I gleaned from NP 3.9. (1903) Rheme Dicisign Argument (1903) Sumisign Dicisign Suadisign (1903) Single sign (substitutive sign) Double sign (informational sign, or, "quasi-proposition") Triple sign (rationally persuasive sign, or, "argument") (1903) Rhema Proposition Argument (1906) Seme Pheme Delome I found the third column of particular interest, especially his referring to the Rheme as a 'substitutive sign' (or what we'd call today a 'propositional function'). Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear Jerry, lists - > > I think you are right chemistry played a central role in Peirce's > dicisign conception. He saw both the predicate part and the subject parts > as atoms with valencies which fit each other when forming the molecule of > the dicisign. He even compared the two with halogens and alkali metals in > the periodic table of the elements (corresponding, of course, to one-slot > predicates only) - I quote this in Natural Propositions. > As to the wording, you write "decisigns" - I have never seen that spelling > but it would not surprise me to find it in P's unpublished pages. > "Dicisigns" is one among several terminological proposals for the naming of > generalized propositions - others include Dicent Signs and Phemes. > "Dicisign" refers to the latin verb "dico" - I say - chosen, I think, to > underline that Dicisigns are signs that say something about something. > > Best > F > > Den 01/10/2014 kl. 19.04 skrev Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > : > > Gary F, lists, > > Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the > Syllabus that this struck him: > > GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the > sign itself as well as its object, and represents it as an *index* -- > which, strictly speaking, lacks the *generality* which makes the argument > a symbol and thus more genuine. > > > I think that your rewording *is* helpful (but then see the CP 2.293-4 > quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me); and, further, > that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so much self-rewording was > "to get through to the real, general, genuine Thought that was . . . a > piece of the Truth" and not a more (mere) personal expression of it, makes > good sense. I'm not sure that his re-wordings *always* made his thinking > more transparent, but often enough they did. > > You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or > genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism" > > GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the dicisign > might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument. > > > First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine > argument? While it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the dicisign is > degenerate relative to the argument, I wonder if this isn't straining > Peirce's terminology a bit. Perhaps I was thinking that Peirce speaks in > places of degenerate symbols *per se*. For example: > > . . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its > meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must > signify a character. A genuine symbol is a symbol that has a general > meaning. There are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol > whose Object is an existent individual, and which signifies only such > characters as that individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose > only Object is a character. CP 2.293 > > > I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of > genuine symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem to > apply to symbols other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two kinds of > degenerate symbols, the Singular (its object being an individual) and the > Abstract (its object being a character). But in speaking of" the immediate > interpretant of an index," Peirce goes on to say: > > Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index, yet > since its Object may be the Object of an Individual [Singular] Symbol, the > Index may have such a Symbol for its indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine > Symbol may be an imperfect Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a > degenerate Index, or an Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and > a genuine Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294 > > > I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph, > especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect' (as > opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be > important--especially in getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try to > grasp Peirce's meaning here. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary R, >> >> >> >> Yes, that quote at the end of your post (CP2.231, also EP2:282-3) is >> worth reflecting on in this context; but then that's true of the whole >> Speculative Grammar section of the *Syllabus*. Every time I read part of >> it, it seems that another word in the crossword puzzle gets filled in, >> because of clues I've picked up since the previous reading. This time >> around, what comes to the fore is that the interpretant of a dicisign or >> proposition represents the sign itself as well as its object, and >> represents it as an *index* -- which, strictly speaking, lacks the >> *generality* which makes the argument a symbol and thus more genuine. >> I'm not making it any more clear than Peirce did, just rewording it, but >> that seems to help make the words more transparent, so that we can see >> through them to what we're talking about. Maybe that's why Peirce did so >> much rewording of his own thought -- to get through to the real, general, >> genuine Thought that was not merely his, and not merely his momentary brain >> activity, but a piece of the Truth ... >> >> >> >> But then I must be missing something too, because I don't see why >> Peirce's remark that "A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which >> is open to logical criticism" is in any way incompatible with the notion >> that the dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the >> argument. Can you maybe reword that part of your message? >> >> >> >> gary f. >> >> >> >> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:[email protected]] >> *Sent:* 30-Sep-14 7:11 PM >> *To:* [email protected] >> *Cc:* Peirce List >> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:7038] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.3 >> >> >> >> Gary, lists, >> >> >> >> GF: By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of "fact") from that >> Secondness to its *structure* -- which is that of a proposition or >> dicisign, and therefore partakes of Thirdness -- I think Peirce was adding >> another dimension to the mode of being of "fact". >> >> >> >> I would tend to agree that Peirce did indeed add exactly this new >> dimension to the mode of being a fact in his reflections ca. 1904, moving >> from his late 19th century emphasis on its *existential* *2ns* to >> examining its *structure* * as a dicisign *at the beginning of the 20th. >> >> >> >> Continuing with our ongoing analysis of genuineness and degeneracy in >> this regard, you wrote regarding a passage you quoted (EP2:274): >> >> >> >> GF: [That t]his shows at least that* genuineness and degeneracy are not >> absolute qualities* but *always relative to a function.* So even though >> Peirce gave the icon and index the "disparaging name" of "degenerate" in >> KS, he also pointed out that they (especially when combined!) can carry out >> semiotic functions that the symbol is incapable of *except by involving >> them*. >> >> >> >> Yes, no doubt mathematical ideas related to degeneracy can help us >> overcome a linguistic tendency to think perhaps a bit disparagingly of >> degeneracy in semiotic relations when such is not at all Peirce's intent. >> But this is still a vexing issue for me. For example, you wrote: >> >> >> >> GF: I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the proposition itself can be >> described as "degenerate" *relative to the argument*, which is the most >> complete and complex of all sign-types because it separately indicates its >> interpretant -- and which, for that very reason, can only be a *symbol*. >> Is that the main reason why the symbol is the most genuine member *of >> the first (icon/index/symbol) trichotomy* of signs? >> >> >> >> But in looking for telling passages related to "genuine" relations, I >> came across this. >> >> >> >> A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical >> criticism. CP 2.26 >> >> >> >> Perhaps one needn't make too much of this apparent equivalence of 'proof' >> and 'genuine argument', but it does make me abit unsure about your thought >> that the dicisign might be "described as 'degenerate' relative to the >> argument." I think there may be good reasons to think that that's a pretty >> good abduction, but I'm not yet entirely convinced. >> >> >> >> At CP 5.76 Peirce refers to the symbol as the "relatively genuine form of >> Representamen" in relation to the index and the icon. Again one needn't >> make too much of the phrase '*relatively* genuine', but I'm not exactly >> certain now *how much* to make of it. Maybe it simply means what we've >> always taken it to mean in this context, but why then "relatively"? >> >> >> >> As for the 'genuine index' in consideration of the dicisign, although you >> (or Frederik?) may have already quoted some of this passage, I found it of >> the greatest interest, although I not quite yet sure exactly what to make >> of it. >> >> >> >> . . . Now in analyses hitherto proposed, it seems to have been thought >> that if assertion [. . .] were omitted, the proposition would be >> indistinguishable from a compound general term--that "A man is tall" would >> then reduce to "A tall man." It therefore becomes important to inquire >> whether the definition of a Dicisign here found to be applicable to the >> former [. . .] may not be equally applicable to the latter. The answer, >> however, comes forthwith.* Fully to understand and assimilate the symbol >> "a tall man," it is by no means requisite to understand it to relate [. . >> .] to a real Object. Its Interpretant, therefore, does not represent it as >> a genuine Index; so that the definition of the Dicisign does not apply to >> it.* It is impossible here fully to go into the examination of whether >> the analysis given does justice to the distinction between propositions and >> arguments. But it is easy to see that *the proposition purports to >> intend to compel its Interpretant to refer to its real Object, that is >> represents itself as an Index*, while the argument purports to intend >> not compulsion but action by means of comprehensible generals, that is, >> represents its character to be specially symbolic (CP 2.321, emphasis >> added). >> >> >> >> I want to spend more time reflecting on this passage in consideration of >> "the distinction between propositions and arguments" as it seems to me to >> be of potential considerable importance in our reflections on the dicisign. >> I'll be interested to hear what you or other members of the lists make of >> this quotation. >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> >> >> Gary >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> >> *Communication Studies* >> >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> >> *C 745* >> >> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >> >> >> >> On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 2:53 PM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Gary R, lists, >> >> >> >> This is an extremely helpful post, Gary, and I'm still in the process of >> following up on it, but thought I'd better (rather than wait any longer) >> mention some of the considerations it inspires with particular reference to >> dicisigns. >> >> >> >> First, your quote from CP 2.275-276 is originally from the "Speculative >> Grammar" section of the *Syllabus* (EP2:272-3) immediately preceding >> Peirce's introduction of the Dicisign as part of the "second trichotomy of >> representamens" (EP2:275). Your next quote, CP 1.539, is from the Lowell >> Lectures which the *Syllabus* was intended to accompany. But your third, >> CP 1.480 (about "genuine triads"), is from the "Logic of Mathematics" paper >> c.1896. It occurs to me that Peirce's concept of a *fact,* or his usage >> of the word, may have shifted somewhat during the intervening years. >> >> >> >> In "Kaina Stoicheia" (1904?), Peirce wrote that "What we call a "fact" is >> something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an >> element of the very universe itself." Earlier on, he wrote that >> representation is necessarily triadic because "it involves a sign, or >> representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object >> and an interpreting thought. Now this is *neither a matter of fact, >> since thought is general*, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is >> living" (CP 1.480, emphasis altered). This seems to imply that a "matter of >> fact" lacks the generality of "thought", as if the universe of which it is >> "supposed to be an element" is only the universe of *existence*, i.e. of >> Secondness. By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of "fact") from >> that Secondness to its *structure* -- which is that of a proposition or >> dicisign, and therefore partakes of Thirdness -- I think Peirce was adding >> another dimension to the mode of being of "fact". >> >> >> >> But I'm not sure how much sense this makes, yet ... I think it's related to >> a some other pieces of the puzzle of the "genuine" which turn up in this >> neighborhood. One is that although in KS the index is a degnerate sign, >> relative to the symbol, it also seems to be true that the *linguistic* >> symbol at least, if related to its object mainly by *reference*, >> involves a *degenerate index*: the Index is a "Representamen whose >> Representative character consists in its being an individual second. If the >> Secondness is an existential relation, the Index is *genuine.* If the >> Secondness is a reference, the Index is *degenerate*" (EP2:274)*.* This >> shows at least that genuineness and degeneracy are not absolute qualities >> but always relative to a function. So even though Peirce gave the icon and >> index the "disparaging name" of "degenerate" in KS, he also pointed out >> that they (especially when combined!) can carry out semiotic functions that >> the symbol is incapable of *except by involving them*. >> >> >> >> The more we take the concept of "degeneracy" back to its purely >> mathematical roots, the less disparaging it appears. For instance, we could >> describe a circle as a degenerate ellipse, which only means that it is >> *simpler* than an ellipse. I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the >> proposition itself can be described as "degenerate" *relative to the >> argument*, which is the most complete and complex of all sign-types >> because it separately indicates its interpretant -- and which, for that very >> reason, can only be a *symbol*. Is that the main reason why the symbol >> is the most genuine member * of the first (icon/index/symbol) trichotomy* >> of signs? >> >> >> >> It's difficult to hold all these pieces of the puzzle in mind long enough >> to see how it all fits together, and there's much in the latter part of >> your post that I haven't dealt with here. But I think the joint effort >> should be helpful toward a deeper and more exact understanding of Peirce's >> doctrine of the Dicisign. >> >> >> >> gary f. >> >> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:[email protected]] >> *Sent:* 26-Sep-14 3:51 PM >> *To:* [email protected] >> *Cc:* Peirce List >> *Subject:* Re: [biosemiotics:7008] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, >> Chapter 3.3 >> >> >> >> Gary F., lists, >> >> >> >> This is a very helpful outline of this section, Gary, which, along with >> the next, 3.4, seems to me to be at the heart of this chapter, perhaps even >> at the heart of NP itself. I've nothing to add or emend to what you've >> written, and so I'll move immediately to your now twice asked and doubly >> vexing question: >> >> >> >> GF: "if a *genuine dicisign* or "indexical proposition" does not have to >> be symbolic in order to fulfill its function of conveying information, why >> does Peirce identify the *symbol* with the *genuine sign*?" >> >> >> >> You conclude the substantive part of your post by giving Peirce's late >> definition of a symbol as "a sign which is fit to serve as such simply >> because it will be so interpreted" (EP2:307) then commenting: >> >> >> >> GF: "Now, the icon/index/symbol trichotomy is supposed to be the list of >> possible relations between sign (representamen) and *object*. Yet this >> definition of *symbol,* on the face of it, seems to be more about the >> sign's relation with its *interpretant* than with its object. No wonder >> the relation between dicisign and symbol seems so complex. >> >> >> >> Now as to the symbol seeming "to be more about the sign's relations with >> its interpretant than with its object," I find the following quotation >> suggestive (and, in consideration of the representamen, increasingly so as >> I proceed down the ensuing group of quotes): >> >> >> >> . . . . The most fundamental [division of signs] is into Icons, >> Indices, and Symbols. Namely, while no Representamen actually functions as >> such until it actually determines an Interpretant, yet it becomes a >> Representamen as soon as it is fully capable of doing this; and* its >> Representative Quality is not necessarily dependent upon its ever actually >> determining an Interpretant,* nor even upon its actually having an >> Object (emphasis added). >> >> An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a >> Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing >> renders it fit to be a representamen. Thus, anything is fit to be a >> Substitute for anything that it is like. (*The conception of >> "substitute" involves that of a purpose, and thus of genuine thirdness*.) >> [emphasis added CP 2.275-276] >> >> >> >> So the first hint here is that a representamen, while not actually >> functioning as such, is indeed one "as soon as it is fully *capable* of >> [determining an interpretant]. So, an icon is serving as a representamen >> when it merely *may* substitute for something which it's like, AND the >> idea of substitution involves that of purpose, "and thus of genuine >> thirdness." >> >> >> >> But stepping back a bit from signs to categorial thirdness itself, Peirce >> writes something telling here in suggesting that logic perhaps "ought to be >> the science of Thridness in general": >> >> >> >> Now it may be that logic ought to be the science of Thirdness in >> general. But as I have studied it, it is simply the science of what must be >> and ought to be true representation, so far as representation can be known >> without any gathering of special facts beyond our ordinary daily life. It >> is, in short, the philosophy of representation (CP 1.539). >> >> >> >> But philosophy is the work of human minds. Yet, since thirdness involves >> secondness and firstness, and since anything which involves the idea of >> "purpose" (even the icon as the likeness of something) expresses "genuine >> thirdness" (CP2.276), it would seem that to the extent that the dicisign >> expresses purpose (which I think it clearly does) it expresses thirdness >> even when it is not the symbolic variety of that sign. >> >> >> >> Peirce also comments on "genuine triads" in a way which might be >> pertinent to this inquiry. He begins the next passage with language >> seemingly contradicting that which he used directly above--but note the >> conclusion of the passage). >> >> >> >> Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine >> cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere >> law, or regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly genuine triad >> is separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of >> representations. Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine >> triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or >> inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this >> is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter >> of law, *since thought is living *(CP 1.480, emphasis added). >> >> >> >> So, every genuine triad "[involving] a sign, or representamen, o >> >> f >> >> some kind, outward or inward" (even the now near proverbial "sunflower") has >> the * potential* to become a living thought (see CP 2.276 above). So the >> idea of genuine thirdness, *the genuine triad*, may trump , in certain >> cases, the idea of *the genuine sign*, which is to say *the sign >> completed in its being interpreted*, that is, *the symbol*. >> >> So, as the following quote concludes, "take away the psychological or >> accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the >> operation of a sign," and 'philosophy' as such has nothing to do with it. >> >> >> >> >> >> Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are >> all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one >> another they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its >> capacity as mere possibility; that is, mere mind capable of thinking, or a >> mere vague idea. The second is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or >> event. That is, it is of the general nature of experience or information. >> The third is thought in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the >> information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is >> informing thought, or cognition.* But take away the psychological or >> accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the >> operation of a sign *(CP1.537). >> >> >> >> So, whether or not it is possible that "logic ought to be the science of >> Thirdness in general," for me the dicisign concept suggests that this idea >> might have some resonance in biosemiotics, or perhaps that semiotics >> generally ought be tempered by this idea (or something like it). >> >> >> >> Finally, Peirce makes a distinction which may make a difference in this >> direction of analysis by defining a sign as "anything which conveys any >> definite notion of any object in any way": >> >> >> >> . . . I use these two words, sign and representamen, differently. By a >> sign I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any >> way, as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start >> with this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is >> essential to a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that >> analysis applies to. [. . . ] *All signs convey notions to human minds; >> but I know no reason why every representamen should do so *(CP1.540, >> emphasis added). >> >> >> >> And this is immediately followed by the following famous definition >> (which, note in the context of what I just quoted, is a definition of a >> representamen and *not* of a sign): >> >> >> >> My definition of a representamen is as follows: >> >> A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called >> its OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation >> being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in >> the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant >> (CP1.541). >> >> >> >> I am not prepared to draw any definitive conclusions from the above which >> are just some preliminary thoughts I had today. In short, I offer these >> quotes and comments as suggestions towards a possible answer to the >> intriguing question you asked, Gary. For all I know I may be heading in the >> wrong direction. >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> >> >> Gary >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > >
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