Gary R., Gary F., lists,
Yes, I think that the subindex is the singular symbol. Well, I can't
say, for example, that Peirce didn't have in mind more than one kind of
singular symbol, but I found no textual evidence for that. Anyway the
singular symbol is a sign for an individual thing, and is singular in
the same sense as a name like 'Socrates' is said in standard logic to be
a singular term - not because the symbol or term itself is a singular
object, but instead because it refers to a singular object. It really
seems like the subindex, which, Peirce said, is not an individual. The
simplest explanation is that the subindex is the singular symbol. I
remember years ago looking very hard for a passage where comes out and
says so, but I didn't find one.
Personal names, demonstratives, designations, etc., things that Peirce
had customarily classified as indices but then classified instead as
subindices in MS 478 (third section of "syllabus" - "Sundry Logical
Conceptions"), are once again classified as indices in his writings
after MS 478. So he quite seems to have dropped the non-index subindex.
I said that I wasn't sure that he stuck with the idea of the singular
symbol. If he flatly identified it as the subindex, then I'd say that he
dropped it. I don't know what he did with the abstract symbol, which I
take to include abstract terms like 'redness'. Peirce was very likely
aware of a traditional division of terms in logic into singular and
general and into concrete and abstract, and he gets into the
concrete/abstract thing in his ten sign-trichotomies.
Best, Ben
On 10/1/2014 5:41 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Ben, Gary F, lists,
So, putting your posts together, Ben, I think that you're saying that
the *Singular Symbol* is better understood as the "Subindex" (you
earlier remarked that Peirce didn't stick with the Singular Symbol
notion)? Or are they equivalent terms?
And what do you make of the "Abstract Symbol" in the same sentence in
which the "Singular Symbol" occurs?
Here are the Subindices quote followed by the Singular/Abstract Symbol
quote again for ready reference for whomever may be interested in this
analysis.
Subindices or Hyposemes are signs which are rendered such
principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a
proper name, personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the
letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing to a real
connection with its object but none of these is an Index, since it
is not an individual. CP 2.284
There are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol
whose Object is an existent individual, and which signifies only
such characters as that individual may realize; and the Abstract
Symbol, whose only Object is a character. CP 2.293
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*
On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 2:00 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Gary R., Gary F., lists,
I'm not sure that Peirce stuck with his idea of a Singular Symbol. CP
2.293-4 is from the "Syllabus" (circa 1902, according to the CP
editors). In a "Syllabus" passage - the one on subindices a.k.a.
hyposemes, dated 1903, he said that indices are individuals - he had
not embraced the idea of the indexical legisign yet.
[Quote]
_/Subindices/_ or _/hyposemes/_ are signs which are rendered such
principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a
proper name, [a] personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or
the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing to a
real connection with its object but none of these is an Index,
since it is not an individual.
[1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell
Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP
2:274]
I dimly remember another passage touching on this issue in "Syllabus"
but it's been years and years.
Best, Ben
On 10/1/2014 1:04 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Gary F, lists,
Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the
Syllabus that this struck him:
GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition
represents the sign itself as well as its object, and represents
it as an /index/ — which, strictly speaking, lacks the
/generality/ which makes the argument a symbol and thus more
genuine.
I think that your rewording /is/ helpful (but then see the CP
2.293-4 quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me);
and, further, that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so
much self-rewording was "to get through to the real, general,
genuine Thought that was . . . a piece of the Truth" and not a more
(mere) personal expression of it, makes good sense. I'm not sure
that his re-wordings /always/ made his thinking more transparent,
but often enough they did.
You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or
genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical
criticism"
GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the
dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the
argument.
First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine
argument? While it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the
dicisign is degenerate relative to the argument, I wonder if this
isn't straining Peirce's terminology a bit. Perhaps I was thinking
that Peirce speaks in places of degenerate symbols /per se/. For
example:
. . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its
meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an
individual, and must signify a character. A genuine symbol is a
symbol that has a general meaning. There are two kinds of
degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an
existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as
that individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only
Object is a character. CP 2.293
I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of
genuine symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem
to apply to symbols other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two
kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular (its object being an
individual) and the Abstract (its object being a character). But in
speaking of" the immediate interpretant of an index," Peirce goes on
to say:
Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an
Index, yet since its Object may be the Object of an Individual
[Singular] Symbol, the Index may have such a Symbol for its
indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine Symbol may be an imperfect
Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a degenerate Index, or
an Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and a genuine
Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294
I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph,
especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect'
(as opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be
important--especially in getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try
to grasp Peirce's meaning here.
Best,
Gary R
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*
On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
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