Just a bibliographic note here: I think that all references to or quotations from the Syllabus should just give the EP2 page number, unless it’s a reference to the “Nomenclature and Divisions of Dyadic Relations” (CP 3.571ff.). Except for that part, the Syllabus is complete and together in EP2, while in CP it’s scattered around, parts are missing, and parts are mistakenly dated as “c. 1902”. Since the chronological order is important here, I think that would clarify many of the terminological issues to use EP2 for citations.
gary f. From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 1-Oct-14 5:13 PM To: [email protected]; Peirce List Subject: [biosemiotics:7048] Re: Natural Propositions, Correction, sorry, the subindex quote was from CP 2.274, but that also was from MS 478 (the third section of "Syllabus") just like the passage with the Singular Symbol in CP 2.293. - Best Ben Gary R, Gary F., lists, There seemed some inconsistency here, especially because of the date "November 1903" appearing with the subindex quote, but date is for the start of the lecture series and isn't date of the MS itself. EP Headnotes indicate that CP 2.292-4 (including the hyposemes) is from: MS 478 [The third and longest section of the 1903 Syllabus, this text was not printed in the pamphlet for the audience. The subsection entitled "Speculative Grammar" was published in large part in CP 2.274-77, 283-84, 292-94, and 309-31.] [From the Headnote for EP 2 ch. 20, "Sundry Logical Conceptions", 267 http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#20 <http://www.iupui.edu/%7Epeirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#20> ] The tenfold classification, including the indexical legisign is from MS 540. [This is the fifth section of 1903 Syllabus, first published in CP 2.233-72.] [From the Headnote for EP 2 ch. 21, "Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined", 289 http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#21 <http://www.iupui.edu/%7Epeirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#21> The "dimly remembered passage" that I mentioned was, I now realize, the very one quoted about Singular Symbols in this thread. I remember years ago putting the passages together in my mind. Peirce said that subindexes are not indices, so what are they? I doubted that they could be icons, so I figured that they must be symbols. And then I found the passage on Singular Symbols, and put two and two together, so to speak. Best, Ben On 10/1/2014 2:00 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: Gary R., Gary F., lists, I'm not sure that Peirce stuck with his idea of a Singular Symbol. CP 2.293-4 is from the "Syllabus" (circa 1902, according to the CP editors). In a "Syllabus" passage - the one on subindices a.k.a. hyposemes, dated 1903, he said that indices are individuals - he had not embraced the idea of the indexical legisign yet. [Quote] _Subindices _ or _hyposemes _ are signs which are rendered such principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a proper name, [a] personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing to a real connection with its object but none of these is an Index, since it is not an individual. [1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:274] I dimly remember another passage touching on this issue in "Syllabus" but it's been years and years. Best, Ben On 10/1/2014 1:04 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: Gary F, lists, Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the Syllabus that this struck him: GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the sign itself as well as its object, and represents it as an index — which, strictly speaking, lacks the generality which makes the argument a symbol and thus more genuine. I think that your rewording is helpful (but then see the CP 2.293-4 quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me); and, further, that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so much self-rewording was "to get through to the real, general, genuine Thought that was . . . a piece of the Truth" and not a more (mere) personal expression of it, makes good sense. I'm not sure that his re-wordings always made his thinking more transparent, but often enough they did. You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism" GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument. First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine argument? While it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the dicisign is degenerate relative to the argument, I wonder if this isn't straining Peirce's terminology a bit. Perhaps I was thinking that Peirce speaks in places of degenerate symbols per se . For example: . . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must signify a character. A genuine symbol is a symbol that has a general meaning. There are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as that individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a character. CP 2.293 I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of genuine symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem to apply to symbols other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular (its object being an individual) and the Abstract (its object being a character). But in speaking of" the immediate interpretant of an index," Peirce goes on to say: Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index, yet since its Object may be the Object of an Individual [Singular] Symbol, the Index may have such a Symbol for its indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine Symbol may be an imperfect Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a degenerate Index, or an Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and a genuine Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294 I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph, especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect' (as opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be important--especially in getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try to grasp Peirce's meaning here. Best, Gary R
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